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From the early days of the Internet, the use of trade marks have been the subject of intense debate 
and often litigation.  Indeed, much of what constituted "Internet Law" in the late 1990s was driven 
by controversies over the use of trademarks, in domain names, on Web sites (both visibly and 
invisibly), and other forms. As we entered the 21st century, the discussion shifted to the advertising 
arena, as search engine companies saw ways to profit by selling advertising, using methods tied to 
the trade marks of third-parties. For example, search engines such as Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, 
Ask.com, and others, have sold Internet "key words," words that when searched for using their 
search engine, might produce a desired search result, or "hit." When such key word search terms 
happen to be trade marks, the owners of such marks have reacted by filing litigation, in some 
jurisdictions, or government action has been brought, in others. This paper discusses those 
practices, and how third-party use of trade marks in Internet advertising is conducted in New 
Zealand and Australia, and how courts and government agencies in Australasia and elsewhere have 
dealt with such practices, or how existing jurisprudence might be applied.  The papers begins with 
an examination of the trade mark, its origins in English common law and how it has evolved, and 
how owners can prevent third-party unauthorised use. The paper discusses what constitutes "trade 
mark use," in various jurisdictions (including the US, the UK, Australia and New Zealand). 
Included is discussion of New Zealand and Australia’s trade mark law, the law of passing off, and 
  
*  InternetNZ Senior Research Fellow in Cyberlaw, Victoria University School of Law, Wellington, New 
Zealand, November, 2007. 
2 KEYWORD ADVERTISING, AND OTHER INVISIBLE USES OF THIRD-PARTY TRADE MARKS IN ONLINE ADVERTISING 
other consumer protection laws. The paper reviews relevant jurisprudence from the US and UK and 
discusses how such disputes might be resolved in New Zealand. 
I INTRODUCTION 
It is a general problem of the Internet that it works on words and not words in relation to goods or 
services. So, whenever anyone searches for that word, even if the searcher is looking for the word in one 
context, he will, or may find Web pages or data in a wholly different context. That is the reason why the 
plaintiffs bring these proceedings. Of course, users of the Internet also know that that is a feature of the 
Internet and their search may produce an altogether wrong Web page or the like. This may be an 
important matter for the courts to take into account in considering trademark and like problems.1 
*** 
It is not yet settled whether a trade-mark is to be primarily regarded as protecting the trade-mark owner's 
business from a species of unfair competition or protecting the public from imitations.2 
*** 
A trade mark is generally defined as "a mark, sign or symbol",3 the primary and proper function 
of which is, as the Courts say, "to identify origin or ownership of the goods to which it is affixed".4 
This paper will focus on the visible and invisible use of trade marks in the online advertising 
context, both from a global perspective and, more specifically, in New Zealand. In particular, it will 
focus on keyword advertising, ie, the use of another party's trade mark to "trigger" either a pop-up 
advertisement or a link to another party's web page. These uses of third-party trade marks have 
resulted in much litigation around the world, however no case has yet been brought in New Zealand. 
Since many of the cases in this area have questioned whether such triggering use constitutes 
trade mark use, a portion of this paper will focus on the concept of what "trade mark use" is. 
Beneath that is yet another question: is "trade mark use" the litmus test? Is use in fact the lens 
through which to assess whether such use of another party's trade mark is infringing? One school of 
thought maintains that the issue should be decided as follows: if it is indeed a trade mark use, then 
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you look to see if it causes confusion.5 Others would disagree, and would "reject trademark use as 
the 'wonder theory' of trademark law";6 in other words, it doesn't matter if it is "trade mark use" or 
not, if it is likely to (or actually does) confuse the consumer, it is infringing. 
Further, is the use of trade mark keywords offensive to just the trade mark owner, or is it also 
harmful to the consumer? In other words, if an Internet search for a third-party's trade mark triggers 
the appearance of a competitor's website, is the consumer harmed in any way? Is it likely to confuse 
or deceive the consumer? This theory is currently being tested in Australia. 7  Alternatively, if 
keyword advertising is prohibited, could that not be harmful to the consumer? If I type in the trade 
mark "Apple" simply to see what types of computers or digital music devices are out there, but if I 
am not wedded to purchasing an Apple product, or even viewing Apple's web pages, are not my 
search results diminished or my search strategy compromised, if only bona fide Apple websites are 
among the results? Is society then, including the would-be user of the keyword Apple (for example, 
Dell, or an information site, or a repair/technical support service), deprived of the use of a term, 
simply because it happens to be a trade mark? And what if I am searching for ... apples? Should 
words be removed from the lexicon of the Internet search engine, simply because they are trade 
marks? 
So, what is the underlying function of trade marks, in terms of whom they are intended to 
protect, ie, the trade mark owner, the consumer, or both? Indeed "[i]t is not yet settled whether a 
trade-mark is to be primarily regarded as protecting the trade-mark owner's business from a species 
of unfair competition or protecting the public from imitations."8 While those words were uttered in 
1922, and internet advertising is a new phenomenon, some underlying questions are ageless. 
With New Zealand as the focus, this paper will also look at the use of third-party trade marks in 
keyword advertising through different lenses, such as whether it constitutes trade mark 
infringement, or passing off, or if it violates the Fair Trading Act 1986. It will also examine 
jurisprudence from the Anglo-American legal tradition. Within this analysis, I will discuss the 
potential for liability of both the search engine and the party purchasing the keyword which triggers 
the resulting ad or link. This paper will also discuss major search engines' current keyword trade 
  
5  Stacey L Dogan and Mark A Lemley "Trademark and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet" (2004) 41 
Hous L Rev 777; Uli Widmaier "Use, Liability and the Structure of Trademark Law" (2004) 33 Hofstra L 
Rev 603; Margreth Barret "Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of 'Trademark Use'" (2005) 39 Davis L 
Rev 371; Eric Goldman "Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law" (2005) 54 Emory LJ 507. 
6  Graham B Dinwoodie and Mark D Janis "Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law" (2006) 
No 06-06 Univ Iowa ColL of Law, 13; http://ssrn.com/abstract=927996 (accessed 1 October 2007). 
7  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) v Trading Post Australia Pty Ltd, Google Inc, 
Google Ireland Limited, and Google Australia Pty Limited (11 July 2007) No NSD 1323/2007. 
8   Schechter, above n 2, citing A Bourjois & Co Inc v Katze (1923) 275 Fed 539, 543 (2d Cir) Hough J. 
 
4 KEYWORD ADVERTISING, AND OTHER INVISIBLE USES OF THIRD-PARTY TRADE MARKS IN ONLINE ADVERTISING 
mark policies, and will propose a New Zealand Keyword Advertising Best Practices, or some form 
of Safe Harbour in which trade marks may safely be used as keywords. 
II HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE TRADE MARK 
Legal scholars have traced the origins of trade marks, in the Anglo-American context, to 
Medieval England, arising out of these guild systems.9 Early product markings of this era served 
several purposes and had varying connotations, which evolved over the centuries. In my view, these 
purposes and connotations, are relevant to many of the controversies today in trade mark law and 
policy, including with respect of the specific area of keyword (and other forms of online) 
advertising.  
Many medieval connotations have survived to this day; for example, the word "brand" has its 
origins in the concept of a "brand" affixed to goods or other property, particularly cattle or livestock, 
to signify ownership.10 However, this concept of a cattle brand indicating that "this cow belongs to 
the Triple R Bar Ranch", is different from the concept of Nike® or Billabong® as brands today. In 
other words, when you see the distinctive Mercedes Benz® logo on an automobile, you do not 
think: "oh, that car belongs to Mercedes Benz." No, you understand that the car was made by 
Mercedes Benz. In other words, the brand, or trade mark, is an indicator of source or origin of the 
goods.  
Further, the underlying concept of "intellectual property" echoes many of these same themes. 
Just as in real property, intellectual property rights are not absolute. In real property, while water 
and air rights are to some degree enforceable, there are limits; for example, an airplane flying high 
overhead is not trespassing, nor can a landowner take all the water from a river passing through his 
land. Similarly, the concept of a "trademark common" exists,11 wherein fair, descriptive, or other 
forms of non-infringing use may be made, including comparative advertising. 
A The Medieval Guild System 
As noted above, historians have regarded England's guild system in the Middle Ages as the 
cradle of Anglo-American trade mark law. "Medieval trade was largely conducted through guilds or 
'misteries ...'"12 Guilds were "organizations of merchants and craftsmen",13 such as coopers, cutlers, 
  
9  Schecter, above n 2, 19; Mark P McKenna "The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law" (2007) 82 
Notre Dame L Rev 1839, 1850; Keith M Stolte "How Early Did Anglo-American Trademark Law Begin? 
An Answer to Schechter's Conundrum" (1998) 8 Fordham Intel Prop Media & Ent LJ 505, 543. 
10  Schechter, ibid, 20; McKenna, ibid, 1849. 
11  Jennifer Davis "The Need to Leave Free for Others to Use and the Trade Mark Common" in Jeremy Phillips 
and Ilanah Simon (eds) Trade Mark Use (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) ch 5. 
12  Schechter, above n 2, 16. 
13  Ibid. 
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weavers, bakers, smiths, clothiers, printers, wax-workers, arrow-head makers, pewterers,14 and the 
like, as will be discussed below. These guilds came to place so-called "merchant's marks" on their 
goods.15 
But what did the marks signify? In his seminal 1925 book, which focuses on the Anglo-
American tradition, Frank Schechter noted the distinctions between a mark signifying "ownership" 
versus an indication of source or origin.16 He stated that "marks designating ownership are not 
trade-marks at all but merely proprietary marks, which may or may not incidentally serve to 
designate the source or origin of the goods to which they are affixed."17 Schechter's work is, inter 
alia, a "study of the metamorphosis of the modern trade-mark and of the development of trade-mark 
law." Schechter concluded his discussion of merchants' marks as "indicative of property",18 and 
noted that "medieval proprietary marks, while not, strictly speaking, trade-marks in the modern 
sense of the word, were an important factor in the development of modern trade-mark law."19 
B The Guilds' Use of Marks and the Metamorphosis of Trade Marks  
Citing the exceptions of the clothier and cutler, Shechter and other scholars have traced the 
evolution of trade marks from the guilds of medieval England to their role in modern times.20 "In 
these trades is clearly noticeable the evolution of the trade-mark from a mark of origin to a mark of 
quality and hence from a liability to an asset, of distinct value to the owner of the mark."21 "Local 
guilds developed reputations for the quality of their products. When they did, the names of the 
towns or regions in which those guilds operated became repositories of goodwill. To maintain that 
goodwill, guilds needed to be able to restrict membership and identify and punish members who 
produced defective products. Guilds therefore required their members to affix distinguishing marks 
to their products so they could police their ranks effectively."22 However, in these early times, such 
marks were more akin to the collective or membership marks of today. In other words, the mark did 
not represent the individual craftsman, but rather the guild to which he belonged.23 
  
14  Ibid. 
15  Ibid, 22. 
16  Ibid, 20. 
17  Ibid, 20.  
18  Ibid, 34. 
19  Ibid. 
20  McKenna "The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law", above n 9, 1850. 
21  Schechter, above n 2, 78. 
22  McKenna "The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law", above n 9, 1850. 
23  Schechter, above n 2, 62-63. 
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As the guild system began to decay, and with the "rapid growth of the cloth trade", bringing 
about its products flowing "from the towns into the suburbs and country districts, where it ran its 
course free from any impediment or restraint",24 the very localised nature of commerce in England 
began to more closely resemble the broader trade found in more recent times. With it, the marks 
used on cloth and clothing begin to take on more of the properties of the trade mark today. 
C The Cloth Trade 
With respect of the continuing evolution of trade marks in England, Schechter discussed a key 
"proclamation of Charles I 'against frauds and deceits used in Draperie'". It was designed to clarify 
much preceding legislation, reciting that the "frauds and deceits used in Drapery ... in time, if 
prevention be not made, may bring dis-esteeme upon the Clothes of this Realm."25 In discussing 
Godsall's Case, another cloth trade infringement action, Schechter observed:26 
[A]n arrival of the notion among lawyers – though not yet among judges, of a trade-mark as a symbol of 
good-will, as an asset of value, instead of merely a regulatory mark of origin, and consequently a 
liability. … the proclamation makes a clear distinction between theses marks, which the modern 
manufacturer would call factory marks, and the marks of the clothier, which the same modern 
manufacturer would call trade-marks. In other words, the proclamation not merely conceives of a trade-
mark as an asset, but also regards it as symbolizing the good-will, not of the actual maker or craftsman 
of the goods, but of the capitalist who furnishes the material or tools for the production of the article. 
Schechter noted that although there had been discernible evolution in trade marks in that 
industry, it was not yet complete as of the 17th century. Although progress had been made "to the 
point where trade-marks are regarding not only the defects but also the good qualities of the source 
of production from which they emanate", and the recognition of trade marks "by administrative 
courts ... as assets of value that are worthy of protection",27 he concluded that "we have so far seen 
no evidence of 'property in trade-marks ... as a legal possession, which may be bought and sold and 
transmitted.' For the link between the typical regulatory and liability mark of the Middle Ages and 
the modern asset mark, and for the immediate foundations of the systematic legal protection of 
trade-marks as property, we look to the cutlery trades.28 
  
24  Schecter, above n 2, 81, citing E Lipson An Introduction to The Economic History of England (A And C 
Block Limited, India, 1915) 415-416. 
25  Ibid, 94. 
26  Ibid, 94-95, citing the Proclamation of Charles I, 13 April 1633 (Brit Mus 506, h 12 [19]) 2. 
27  Ibid, 95-96. 
28  Ibid, 101, citing the Proclamation of Charles I, April 13, 1633, 3. 
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D The Cutlery Trades, the Evolution Continues 
As Schechter observed, it was within the realm of the cutlers' marks where we see the greatest 
degree of evolution toward what we now know today as a trade mark, including the genesis of the 
concept of individuality, ie, the right of individuals, not just guilds or collectives, to own marks. 
Such individual mark owners could protect their marks, seek damages for infringement, sell or lease 
their marks, or bequeath them to their wife or son.29 Schechter stated:30 
The records of the cutlers show as early as the fifteenth century a sense of property in and the value of a 
mark, and by the seventeenth century we see the actual working of at least a qualified system of 
ownership in trade-marks, which may, to at any rate a limited extent – be 'bought and sold and 
transmitted,' and which are the subject of rigorous protection. 
E Overview of Evolution 
Schechter's extensive treatment of the guild system seems, from a modern-day perspective, to 
contain many of the seeds of what constitutes trade mark law today, ie, the "property" or "asset" 
aspect (including the granting of rights or even "monopoly" by the government),31 the "indication of 
source or origin" aspect,32 the notion of a trade mark being a vessel of "good will"33 and "a mark of 
quality",34 and the first gleanings of the concept of "unfair competition",35 the use of trade marks to 
deter "frauds and deceits" on consumers,36 the punishment of infringement,37 and the status of a 
trade mark as a "legal possession, which may be bought and sold and transmitted." But what is the 
role of a trade mark in contemporary society? How do today's legal scholars view the role of the 
trade mark?  
III ROLE OF TRADE MARKS TODAY – THEIR FUNCTION AND PURPOSE  
There are different schools of thought as to what trade marks are designed to do, what benefit 
they primarily serve and who benefits. Further, differing views as to how much strength to accord a 
trade mark are very relevant to the discussion. These backdrops raise a number of questions: 
  
29  Ibid, 101. 
30  Ibid, 121. 
31  Ibid, 40, 94, 95. 
32  Ibid, 64. 
33  Ibid, 44, 46, 79, 94, 95. 
34  Ibid, 78. 
35  Ibid, 41. 
36  Ibid, 47, 94. 
37  Ibid, 55, 91. 
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Is the role of a trade mark to protect the owner/producer of the goods or to protect 
consumer/society against deceit and fraud? 
Is the trade mark "property", with broad protections against unauthorised use? 
What of the "trade mark common", which would allow unauthorised use of trade marks in 
descriptive fair use, nominative fair use, comparative advertising, etc? 
Further, is the function of a trade mark to assist consumers in selecting products, a means of 
minimising search costs? 
A The "Trademark Use Theory", and the Role of Trade Marks in Minimising Consumer 
Search Costs  
In a paper generally supportive of trade marks as keywords, and more broadly supportive of the 
"trademark use theory", Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley touch upon a number of these themes. 
Dogan and Lemley question the Brookfield and Playboy v Netscape cases,38 and further question 
the US judgments that have held that the use of trade marks as keywords is "trade mark use".39 
Additionally, they view with great concern the rise in prominence of the "initial interest confusion" 
doctrine, and see it as having a "chilling effect" on commerce and trade.40 Their paper expresses the 
fear that:41 
these two axes of trademark expansion pose a grave danger to the law's information-facilitating goals. 
The extension of trademark law to search engines, directories and other parties that use marks as 
classification tools poses a great threat to speech and to the dissemination of truthful information.  
They begin their article with the premise that, "[i]n economic terms, trademarks contribute to 
economic efficiency by reducing consumer search costs." 42  If properly used, trademarks are 
"shorthand indicators" and serve as "a reliable vocabulary for communications between producers 
and consumers."43 From this perspective, they argue that the use of trade marks by third parties as 
keywords, even by competitors, is more likely to benefit consumers rather than cause confusion, 
since it will enhance the amount of information made available to a consumer, and will allow trade 
marks to be used "to promote rigorous, truthful competition in the marketplace by preserving the 
  
38  Dogan and Lemley "Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet", above n 5. 
39  Ibid, 779. 
40  Ibid, 785. 
41  Ibid, 782. 
42  Ibid, 786. 
43  Ibid, 787-788. 
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language of the trade." 44  Further, they caution that "overly restrictive trademark law has the 
potential to stifle competition rather than to facilitate it."45  
Inherent in this approach is the view that trade marks are not "rights in gross, but limited 
entitlements to protect against uses that diminish the informative value of marks."46 In other words, 
the owner of a trade mark does not thereby own the exclusive right to use said mark. Trade mark 
law has carved out exceptions to the limited monopoly that is a trade mark, to allow others, 
including competitors, to engage in fair use, descriptive use, comparative advertising, and other 
varieties of unauthorised use.47 As Dogan and Lemley note:48 
[t]rademark law thus historically limited itself to preventing uses of marks that 'defrauded the public' by 
confusing people into believing that an infringer's goods were produced or sponsored by the trademark 
holder. Likelihood of confusion does not necessarily follow every time a party adopts another's 
trademark ... 
Dogan and Lemley note that to allow a trade mark to "minimize search costs" may "require 
limiting the scope of trademark rights", if "the interests of robust competition and reducing search 
costs outweigh the interest of the trademark claimant in appropriating the full value of its 
goodwill."49 They argue that such unauthorised use is consistent with other fair and/or descriptive 
uses, such as by "resellers of new, used and refurbished products",50 or "competitors" making use of 
"descriptive marks in their nontrademark sense to describe the features or qualities of their own 
products."51 
More importantly, Dogan and Lemley decry the decisions that have penalised use of trade marks 
as keywords since, to use a trade mark in this manner, as merely "an information facilitator",52 is 
simply not a "trademark use". Further:53 
  
44  Ibid, 787. 
45  Ibid, 788. 
46  Ibid, 788. 
47  For example, in US, see the "fair use" exception of the Lanham Act 15 USC §§ 1115(b)(4) and 1125(c)(4). 
In New Zealand, see Trade Marks Act 2002, ss 92-95. 
48  Dogan and Lemley "Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs", above n 5, 788-789, citing Taylor v 
Carpenter (1844) 23 F Cas 742, 744 (CCD Mass), and Boston Athletic Ass'n v Sullivan (1989) 867 F 2d 22, 
35 (1st Cir). 
49  Ibid, 795. 
50  Ibid, 795. 
51  Ibid, 796. 
52  Ibid, 785. 
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[i]f the courts create norms that prohibit search engines from 'using' trademarks in any way that might 
bring financial benefit to the trademark holder's competitor, to a noncompeting business, or to 
themselves, they will have disserved the informational objectives of the Lanham Act by turning 
trademarks into vehicles for suppressing information. 
The "trade mark use" theory is further clarified:54 
The trademark use requirement serves a gatekeeper function, limiting the reach of trademark law 
without regard to a factual inquiry into consumer confusion. The rationale for the doctrine stems from 
the practical reality that it would be both unwise and impossible to permit trademark owners to control 
every use of their marks. ... Rather, the law is designed to prevent consumer confusion by those who 
brand their own goods or services with a mark sufficiently similar to the plaintiff's mark such that 
consumers may be deceived into believing there is some connection between the two. Individuals and 
companies may make reference to, or use of, a trademark without fear of liability unless they are making 
a trademark use. 
Dogan and Lemley's paper, advocating a consumer- and economics-oriented approach to trade 
marks, essentially takes the themes espoused in Landes and Posner's 1987 paper55 and applies them 
to the Internet advertising context. Landes and Posner established the valuable role trade marks play 
in commerce. They allow for ease of remembrance, (Dogan and Lemley's "shorthand indicators").56 
They also serve to assure quality in goods.57 Landes and Posner, however, make it clear that trade 
marks must be protected in order for their beneficial role to be fulfilled. Free from legal regulation, 
the cost of duplicating another's trade mark is low and free-riders would proliferate, destroying the 
"information capital in embodied in a trade mark: and eliminating the incentive to develop a trade 
mark in the first place.58  
It is against the backdrop of trade marks serving to reduce consumer search costs, but 
acknowledging that trade marks must be protected in order to fulfill that role, that Dogan and 
Lemley seek to attain a balance in the online medium.59 With respect of the concept of "trade mark 
  
53  Ibid, 784. 
54  Ibid, 805-806. 
55  William M Landes and Richard A Posner "Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective" (1987) 30 J Law 
Econ 265. 
56  Ibid, 268-269. 
57  Ibid, 269. 
58  Ibid, 270. 
59  Dogan and Lemley "Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs", above n 5, 785. 
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use", their paper, and others similar to it,60 advocate consistency in judicial treatment of what is, 
and what is not, "use of a trade mark", and seeks a return to what the authors view as the original 
interpretation and implementation of the doctrine of "initial interest confusion", as both concepts 
have been the source of inconsistency in US courts.61 
B Opposing Views 
Running counter to the views espoused by Landes and Posner, and Dogan and Lemley,62 which 
center on the reduction-of-search-cost and "economic theory" approaches to trade mark law, is the 
position advanced by scholars such as Mark McKenna, Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis. 63  
While it is safe to say that the Chicago School is more consumer-oriented, the 
McKenna/Dinwoodie/Janis camp, referred to as the "normative school", takes a decidedly pro-
owner perspective toward trade marks.  
Indeed, McKenna stated that from the Middle Ages forward, trade marks were never about the 
consumer, but protection of the producer "from illegitimate diversions of their trade by 
competitors".64  When courts focused on consumer deception, this was to distinguish actionable 
unfair competition from mere competition, which was encouraged. This is supported by the fact 
trade marks are a property-based system, largely derived from the natural rights theory. In other 
words, the Chicago School is engaging in revisionist history, which he describes as a "falsely 
imagined past". 65  From their origins in the guilds, marks were not used for the purpose of 
establishing individual producer goodwill. Intraguild competition was strictly forbidden. Moreover, 
guild regulations were not motivated primarily by a concern for consumers. Even in the cutlers' 
trade, where marks seem to have been viewed most analogously to modern trade marks, regulation 
was intended not for the protection of purchasers, but for "guidance of those exercising control or 
working in rivalry." McKenna observed that if consumers were being protected in the early days, it 
was incidental to the primary goal of protecting the producer and the prevention of "fraud upon the 
goodwill".66 
  
60  See also, Stacy L Dogan and Mark A Lemley "Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use" (2007) 
92 Iowa L Review 1669.  
61  Dogan and Lemley "Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs", above n 5, 781-782. 
62  Collectively referred to as "the Chicago School". See McKenna "The Normative Foundations of Trademark 
Law", above n 9, 1845. 
63  McKenna "The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law", above n 9; and Dinwoodie and Janis 
"Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law", above n 6. 
64  McKenna "The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law", above n 9, 1840-1841. 
65  Ibid, 1848, and paraphrasing Robert H Bork The Antitrust Paradox (2 ed, Free Press, New York, 1993) 15. 
66  McKenna "The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law", above n 9, 1856-1858. 
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Dinwoodie and Janis have also taken aim at the consumer-oriented "trademark use theory",67 
and view the theory as being a dangerous proposition for trade mark law:68 
trademark use theorists are pursuing a false and illusory determinacy [which] will merely prevent 
trademark law from policing new information markets. Limiting liability to trademark use, as that term 
is understood by its proponents, will thus result in insufficient marketplace regulation. 
Further, they caution that:69 
while trademark law cannot, and should not, dispel all possible confusion among consumers, the 
adoption of the trademark use requirement would wholly prevent trademark law from regulating 
important new areas of commercial activity, such as keyword advertising. We have little faith that 
unregulated competition will optimally structure those new markets. And we question the implicit claim 
that more information is always better for consumers. Sometimes more information is just more ... 
Dinwoodie and Janis stress the presence or absence of confusion as being the key issue in 
examining a claim of trade mark infringement.70 
This approach … encourages private ordering to avoid confusion and facilitates the development of 
targeted statutory solutions to particular problems where appropriate. For example, one such solution 
might involve immunizing search engines from trademark liability for their marketing of advertising 
linked to the marks of rival producers under certain conditions, thereby creating a safe harbor 
comparable to that offered to internet service providers under copyright law.  
It would therefore seem that Dinwoodie and Janis are willing to entertain the existence of keyword 
advertising, they are simply reluctant to promote the "trademark use theory". Further, they safeguard 
the notion that words, including those in the trade mark common, are still available for public use in 
online advertising and other commercial settings, provided no confusion results. 
IV WHAT IS KEYWORD ADVERTISING/TRADE MARK KEYING? 
Keyword advertising is any online advertising that is prompted by use of specific words or 
phrases when entered into the search bar of a search engine. As of 2007, there are generally two 
categories of search results. One category, appearing in the centre of the user's screen, would be the 
"organic results", based on the search engine's search algorithms, which are said to be neutral. The 
other category, appearing in a column on the right side of the screen, and often across the top, are 
  
67  Graeme B Dinwoodie and Mark D Janis "Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law" (2007) 
92 Iowa L Rev 1597, 1602; and Graeme B Dinwoodie and Mark D Janis "Lessons From the Trademark Use 
Debate" (2007) 92 Iowa L Rev 1703. 
68  Dinwoodie and Janis "Confusion Over Use", above n 67, 1602-1603. 
69  Ibid, 1606-1607. 
70  Ibid, 1608. 
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links that are placed there as advertisements. These links go by a variety of names, ie, sponsor 
results (Yahoo!), sponsored links (Google), or sponsored sites (Microsoft). For the purposes of this 
paper, such results will be referred to as "sponsor links". Their appearance results from an 
agreement between the owners of those links and the search engine advertising firm. This is 
keyword advertising in its neutral or generic sense. 
Trade mark keying is a subset of keyword advertising, wherein trade marks are sold to those 
parties wanting their links to appear among those sponsor links. These are vendors hoping to offer 
"peripheral" goods/services. On the other hand, the sponsor links might offer "competing" 
goods/services.  
Many trademark owners have objected to this practice, and much litigation has resulted. Not all 
forms of trade mark keying are "competitive". What follows is a brief, non-exhaustive list of the 
types of entities that might purchase a trade marked keyword, competitive or otherwise: 
(a) The trade mark owner itself. Why? To make navigation easier, to help customers find the 
their website, and to prevent competitors from distracting or diverting customers; 
(b) A direct competitor; 
(c) A third-party vendor or retailer,  the seller of peripheral goods, or the reseller of used 
computer equipment; 
(d) An informational site, offering product reviews; 
(e) A purely coincidental purchaser; and 
(f) Bad actors, including purveyors of counterfeit goods, sites that engage in adware, spyware, 
malware, phishing, etc. Such a site might purchase any popular trade mark as a keyword, 
simply in hopes of attracting any user to its site. 
There are differing motivations for the use of keywords and trade marked keywords, and 
different motivations of trade mark owners in addressing such use. 
A What is Trade Mark Use? 
The tricky little three-letter word "use" has many personalities and definitions, even within the 
relatively narrow context of trade mark law. Indeed, in the ownership, registration and 
maintenance/renewal context, its commencement marks the beginning of its true life, and its 
cessation marks (or should mark) its death.71 There are other distinctions of what "use" is. For 
example, in the context of a certification mark, the word use can have two different meanings.72 
  
71  Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK), s 6A(3)(a); Lanham Act 15 USC § 1127; Lanham Act 15 USC § 1052. 
72  In New Zealand, see Trade Marks Act 2002, s 5; in US, see Lanham Act 15 USC § 1127. 
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Further, there are other categories of use, such as "fair use", or "descriptive use", which are not 
considered trade mark use, since they do not serve as an indication of the source or origin of a good 
or service.73  
While dining at a fast-food restaurant, your dinner companion might observe your unfinished 
food, and might inquire, "You using those fries?" You might reply, "Oh, you mean am I going to eat 
them? No, feel free, I'm full." This sort of use is somewhat exclusive. "Can I use your car this 
weekend?" This implies a use that is a licence, an authorised use. "I'm applying for a job. Can I use 
your name as a reference?" Now we're getting closer. What does this form of use mean? 
As will be discussed below, New Zealand's Trade Marks Act specifically requires that the 
plaintiff prove that the complained use by the defendant was "use as a trade mark".74 So, at least we 
know that use is a "gatekeeper issue" in New Zealand. But, as we will see from the US cases, below, 
that's only half the battle. Indeed, is an "invisible use" of a trade mark, such as in a metatag or as a 
keyword, a "use as a trademark"? 
B Invisible Uses of Trade Marks 
This paper will discuss various types of so-called invisible uses of trade marks on the Internet. 
These invisible uses usually occur in the context of metatags, keywords, pop-up and banner ads. In 
short, when a computer user types in a trade mark, either in the browser box or the search box, one 
of a number of things can happen, including: 
(1) User types in www.nike.com or simple "nike", intending to actually visit the Nike website. 
A pop-up, pop-under, or banner ad appears. It might be from a competitor, a 
sporting/athletic event, or it could be from an authorised, licensed retailer of Nike, etc. The 
inclusion of the trade mark in the URL triggered it; someone wanted and paid for the ad to 
appear.  
(2) User conducts a search, using a search engine, and enters the term "Nike". As with No. 1, a 
pop-up, pop-under, or banner ad could result, as a result of the inclusion of the trade mark 
"Nike".  
(3) User conducts a search, using a search engine, for the term "Nike." The search engine 
searches for websites containing that term, perhaps as a result of the invisible use of that 
  
73  See, Lanham Act 15 USC § 1115(b)(4) and § 1125(c)(4). Pursuant to § 1115(b)(4), fair use may be raised as 
a defence to infringement when it is "descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the 
goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin." Pursuant to § 1125(c)(4), "[t]he following shall 
not be actionable under this section: (A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative 
commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the 
famous mark; (B) Noncommercial use of a mark; (C) All forms of reporting and news commentary." 
74  Trade Marks Act 2002, s 89(2). 
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trade mark within the metatags embedded in the HTML code. However, this is a 
phenomenon largely relegated to history; most search engines no longer recognise 
metatags since 1997. 
(4) User conducts a search, using a search engine, for the term "Nike", and the search engine 
lists, as among the Sponsored Links, the website of an entity other than Nike. The owner 
of the site found has purchased the keyword "Nike" from the search engine company. 
C Keyword Advertising, Continued 
Typically, when sponsor links appear across the top or middle of the results page, they are 
within a box or field that is shaded a different colour, as to set them apart from the organic results. 
But, this has not always been the case, as shown in 800-JR Cigar v GoTo.com.75 GoTo.com used 
another business model, and was known as a "pay-for-priority Internet search engine". 76  The 
decision of the US District Court for the District of New Jersey explains it as follows:77 
Pay-for-priority search engines solicit bids from advertisers for key words or phrases to be used as 
search terms, giving priority results on searches for those terms to the highest-paying advertiser. Thus, 
each advertiser's rank in the search results is determined by the amount of its bid on the search term 
entered by the user. The list of paid results on GoTo's web site discloses the amount of each advertiser's 
bid. Advertisers pay GoTo only when a user clicks on their listings in the search results. After all paying 
advertisers' sites are listed as search results, GoTo lists unpaid or "natural" search listings, ie, those 
whose sites are most logically relevant to the search criteria. GoTo receives no revenue when a user 
clicks on unpaid listings. 
As noted above, there are various rationales for the purchase of a trade mark keyword and many 
of these rationales are acceptable to trade mark owners. Some, however, are not. For example, if the 
name Cypress was a trade mark used on personal computers, Cypress Computers Ltd might object 
to a competitor, namely Beech Computers Inc, purchasing the trade mark keyword "Cypress" in 
order to trigger a sponsor link to the Beech Computers web site, in hopes that the search engine user 
might instead purchase a Beech computer. However, the owner of the Cypress trade mark might not 
object if, say, the purchaser were an authorised vendor or retailer of new or used Cypress computers, 
or a company offering repair or technical support for Cypress computers, or offering software and 
accessories for Cypress computers, or product reviews about Cypress computers. Additionally, if the 
purchaser of the term "Cypress" was not even purchasing it as a trade mark keyword, for example, if 
the purchaser was a lumber yard or a nursery, offering cypress panelling or cypress trees, the owner 
of the trade mark Cypress should not object. 
  
75  800-JR Cigar v GoTo.com (2006) 437 F Supp 2d 273, 277 (DC NJ). 
76  Ibid, 277. 
77  Ibid, 277-278. 
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As a result of the concerns of trade mark owners, search engine advertisement firms such as 
Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft have established trade mark use policies, to be used by purchasers of 
keywords, particularly trade marked keywords.  
V SEARCH ENGINE TRADE MARK POLICIES, GENERALLY 
Search engine advertising companies such as Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft are cognisant of the 
concerns of trade mark owners and have established policies to attempt to address these.  
A Yahoo! And Microsoft Policies 
Yahoo!78 and Microsoft79 both acknowledge that advertisers sometimes bid on search terms 
that are the trade marks of others and require that advertisers agree that their search terms do not 
violate the trade mark rights of others. Both allow for use by those related to the trade mark, its 
owner or related products, resellers and those who use it descriptively, such as information sites, 
which are not competitive. 
B Google Policy 
Google's policy80 begins with the statement that it "is not in a position to arbitrate trademark 
disputes between the advertisers and trademark owners"; noting that "the advertisers themselves are 
responsible for the keywords and ad content that they choose to use. Accordingly, we encourage 
trademark owners to resolve their disputes directly with the advertisers". Google's policy further 
offers, "[a]s a courtesy to trademark owners", that it will "perform a limited investigation of 
reasonable complaints", and also that its "procedure differs depending on the country in which 
trademark rights exist." 
Indeed, Google actually has two policies, one for use in the US and Canada, and one for the rest 
of the world. Unlike the policies of Microsoft and Yahoo!, Google's policy actually does allow the 
sale and use of a trade mark keyword by a competitor, provided certain guidelines are followed.  
In the US and Canada, focus is placed on "the use of the trademark in ad text. If the advertiser is 
using the trademark in ad text, (Google) will require the advertiser to remove the trademark and 
prevent them from using it in ad text in the future."81 What this means is that Google will allow a 
  
78  See, Yahoo! Trademarks http://searchmarketing.yahoo.com/legal/trademarks.php (accessed 6 October 
2007). 
79  See, Microsoft Advertising http://advertising.microsoft.com/Home/Article.aspx?pageid=708&Adv_ 
Articleid=3216 (accessed 6 October 2007). 
80  See, Google Trademark Complaint Procedure www.google.com/tm_complaint_adwords.html (accessed 6 
October 2007). 
81  Ibid. 
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trade mark owner to object to a sponsored link containing the trade mark within the text of the ad 
displayed as the sponsored link. 
Google's policy outside of the US and Canada is a bit different, seemingly more pro-trade mark 
owner. In pertinent part, it reads as follows:82 
When we receive a complaint from a trademark owner, our review is limited to ensuring that the 
advertisements at issue are not using a term corresponding to the trademarked term in the ad text or as a 
keyword trigger. If they are, we will require the advertiser to remove the trademarked term from the ad 
text or keyword list and will prevent the advertiser from using the trademarked term in the future.  
In other words, in addition to (seemingly) universally frowning upon use of the trade mark "in 
ad text", it will also, upon receipt of a "complaint from a trade mark owner", ensure that the trade 
mark is not used "as a keyword trigger". But, this does not preclude Google's sale of AdWords 
outside of the US and Canada, it only gives trade mark owners the ability to challenge such use in 
ad text or as a trigger.  
By Comparison Microsoft and Yahoo! attempt to discourage use by competitors, Google's 
policy outside of US/Canada focuses on where the trade mark is used (ie, in the ad text) and if it is 
used as a "trigger". Google's US/Canada policy is somewhat simpler. In some ways, this is more 
permissive (and less protective of trade marks) than Microsoft and Yahoo!'s policy, yet in other 
ways it is more conservative. While Google's US/Canada policy would allow a competitor's 
triggering use, it would not allow the purchase and use by a reseller/authorised retailer, or by an 
"informational site", assuming such a site used the trade mark in the ad text. In the example above, 
Google's US/Canada policy would allow Beech Computers to purchase the trade mark keyword 
"Cypress" and use it to trigger an ad for Cypress Computers, so long as the trade marked keyword 
"Cypress" did not appear in the ad text. 
C Ask.com Policy 
Similar to the other policies we have looked at, Ask.com's policy83 seeks to remove itself from 
any controversy, preferring to characterise it as a dispute between the advertiser and the trade mark 
owner. Ask.com's policy, however, does show a willingness to take action to investigate a claim by 
trademarks owner and request that the advertiser remove the allegedly infringing content, or remove 
it themselves. Ask.com's policy would appear to not allow a descriptive use, a fair use, or otherwise 
a use of a trade mark that might be lawful in a comparative advertising sense. 
  
82  Ibid (emphasis added). 
83  See, Ask Sponsored Links http://sponsoredlistings.ask.com/ (accessed 7 October 2007). 
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VI KEYWORD USE IN NEW ZEALAND TODAY – TRADE MARK 
INFRINGEMENT 
Despite the apparent discouragement from the major search engines' policies, companies in New 
Zealand do in fact purchase trade marks as keywords and use them as triggers, presumably until 
such time as the trade mark owner files a complaint. In this section of the paper, I will focus on New 
Zealand, its trade mark and related jurisprudence, and the jurisprudence of other nations from which 
New Zealand may derive guidance, such as Australia and the United Kingdom (UK).  
A Trade Mark Infringement – New Zealand's Trade Marks Act 2002 
Fortunately, it is well settled in New Zealand that in an infringement matter, trade mark use is in 
fact the "gatekeeper issue". In other words, for a plaintiff to successfully bring a trade mark 
infringement claim, it would have to prove that the defendant, by making use of a sign, used that 
sign "in such a manner as to render the use of the sign as likely to be taken as being use as a trade 
mark."84 As such, if the court determined that the "use of the sign" was not a trade mark use, it 
could not find trade mark infringement. 
The relevant section can be paraphrased as follows:85 
Section 89 Sign - Good Sign - Services Confusion or Deception 
1(a) Identical Identical No need to prove, it is deemed
1(b) Identical Similar Plaintiff must prove 
1(c) Similar Identical or Similar Plaintiff must prove 
1(d) Identical or 
Similar 
Not Similar Not relevant. However, plaintiff 
must prove defendant's use "takes 
unfair advantage of, or is 
detrimental to, the distinctive 
character or the repute of the mark" 
In considering whether or not the use of a trade mark as a keyword could be infringement, it 
makes sense to look at section 89 on a subsection-by-subsection basis, with a discussion of the types 
of scenarios that might be governed by the respective parts thereof, with an eye to the interpretory 
guidance offered by section 5. The following analysis includes the imaginary companies Beech and 
Cypress Computers, an analysis of the various ways in which Beech, and other entities, might use 
"Cypress" as a keyword, and how section 89 might apply.  
  
84  Trade Mark Act 2002, s 89(2). 
85  This is "borrowed" from Susy Frankel and Geoff McLay Intellectual Property in New Zealand (Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths, Wellington, 2002) 467. 
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1 Section 89(1)(a) 
(a)  Competitor scenarios 
Beech purchases the keyword "Cypress" from Search Engine: 
Scenario One: When user searches the term "Cypress" or "Cypress Computers", sponsor links 
include a link to Beech website. The Sponsor Link has as its heading the phrase "Cypress 
Computers", and the body reads "Huge Range of Cypress PCs and Laptops, Free Delivery". 
Scenario Two: When user searches the term "Cypress" or "Cypress Computers ", sponsor links 
include a link to Beech Computers' website. The heading reads "Personal Computers and Laptops", 
and the body reads "Huge Range of PCs and Laptops, Free Delivery". No mention of either the 
Beech or Cypress trade mark is made. 
Scenario Three: When user searches the term "Cypress" or "Cypress Computers", sponsor links 
include a link to Beech website. The heading reads "Beech Computers", and the body of the Sponsor 
Link says "Huge Range of PCs and Laptops, Free Delivery", yet makes no mention of term 
"Cypress". 
Scenario Four: When user searches the term "Cypress" or "Cypress Computers", sponsor links 
include a link to Beech website. The heading reads "Beech Computers", but the body of the Sponsor 
Link says "Huge Range of PCs and Laptops, Free Delivery, our computers compare in quality to 
Cypress". 
If we assume that the mere sale (by Search Engine) and use (by Beech/competitor) of a trade 
mark as a keyword to trigger an ad would be considered "likely to be taken as being use as a trade 
mark", it is my view that the first three of these scenarios could find Beech and Search Engine liable 
for infringing Cypress' trade mark. In each case, Beech and Search Engine a prima facie case is 
made because of the use of the identical sign on identical goods.  But remember, this presumes that 
the mere use as a trigger, with no visible use otherwise, constitutes a "use as a trade mark".  
Additionally, in Scenario One, Cypress' case would be strengthened because that the header and 
body of the Sponsor Link also have a visible use of the Cypress trade mark. 
If we assume for the sake of comparison, that the sale and invisible use of a trademark as a 
keyword to trigger an ad would not be considered "likely to be taken as being use as a trade mark", 
it is my view that only in Scenario One would Beech and Search Engine be found liable for 
infringing Cypress' trade mark. This is a consequence of the visible use of the Cypress trade mark 
within the header and body of the Sponsor Link.  
What about Scenario Four? In my view, Beech would be able to defend its use of the trade mark 
as a keyword under section 94, which is one of the exceptions to section 89.86 This states that a 
  
86  New Zealand Trade Marks Act 2002, s 94. 
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registered trade mark is no infringed by its use for comparative advertising, "in accordance with 
honest practices in industrial or commercial matters"; that is the use does not "without due cause, 
takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade 
mark". Search Engine should also be able to avoid liability, since the underlying action of Beech 
would not be actionable. Generally, Search Engine might rely on the High Court decision in 
Leafscreen NZ Ltd v Leafbusters Group Ltd,87 which concerned two entities using similar names for 
products and services designed to keep leaves out of rain gutters. In Leafscreen, the plaintiff not 
only brought action against the defendant, but also Telecom, since Telecom Directories Ltd had 
agreed "to place advertisements in its publications on behalf of LGL, (which plaintiff alleged) 
amounted to conduct likely to mislead or deceive, carried on in trade for the purposes of section 9 
Fair Trading Act 1986."88 Heath J held that the plaintiff "failed to establish that it had a reputation 
in the marketplace for the terms LEAFSCREEN and LEAFSCREENER that was such as to render 
LGL's use of the signs misleading or deceptive conduct in trade, or conduct in trade likely to 
mislead or deceive members of the public."89 As for the potential liability of Telecom, the printer of 
phone directories, the court offered the following:90 
Obiter, it is arguable that a publisher is an innocent agent acting merely as a conduit passing on 
instructions from a principal, and cannot become responsible for anything misleading in the information 
he, she, or it conveys. 
I would submit that this bit of dicta might be relevant, and a search engine would be likely to 
rely on it, characterising the sale of keywords and the placement of advertising as being similar to 
the "publisher" and "conduit" role discussed by the High Court. In the US, although the case law is 
mixed both as to what "trade mark use" is and as to the liability of search engines in keyword 
advertising, legislation offers protection to an "innocent infringer" and/or "innocent violator", ie, a 
party who is only engaged in printing, advertising, or other communications-related activities.91  
Such an approach would also be consistent with the state of play in the defamation and 
censorship realms. Internet Service Provider (ISP) liability, in cases of defamation, often initially 
focus on so-called "innocent dissemination", ie, where the ISP does not initially know about the 
defamatory or infringing content on its servers, which it is merely hosting for third-parties. ISPs 
generally are not held to the duty of policing the content on their customers' websites.92 
  
87  Leafscreen NZ Ltd v Leafbusters Group Ltd (25 February 2004) HC AK CIV2003-404-7015 Heath J. 
88  Ibid. 
89  Ibid.  
90  Ibid (emphasis added). 
91  Lanham Act 15 USC § 1114(2). 
92  New Zealand Defamation Act 1992, s 21. 
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Consistent with this approach are the recent amendments to the Films, Videos and Publications 
Classification Act of 1993,93 which stated that a "network operator or service provider" was not to 
be included as among the "distributors" of an offending publication, for purposes of the FVPCA.94 
Furthermore, amendments to New Zealand's Copyright Act will shield an ISP from liability for 
copyright infringement if it was unaware of the infringing activity it hosted.95  
(b) Non-competitor scenarios 
Electronics retailer purchases "Cypress" from Search Engine: 
Scenario Five: When user searches the term "Cypress", or "Cypress Computers", among the 
sponsor links is a link to Retailer's website. The Sponsor Link has as its heading the phrase "Cypress 
Computers", and the body read "Huge Range of Cypress PCs and Laptops, Free Delivery". 
However, when user clicks on the link, it is taken to a page on Retailer's site that offers Beech (and 
other non-Cypress) computers, but not Cypress computers. 
Scenario Six: When user searches the term "Cypress", or "Cypress Computers", sponsor links 
include link to Retailer's website. The Sponsor Link's heading reads "Top Quality Computers", and 
the body of the Sponsor Link says "Huge Range of PCs and Laptops, Free Delivery". When user 
clicks on the link, it is taken to a page on Retailer's site that offers Beech (and other non-Cypress) 
computers, but not Cypress computers. 
Scenario Seven: When user searches the term "Cypress", or "Cypress Computers", among the 
sponsor links is a link to Retailer's website. The Sponsor Link has as its heading the phrase "Top 
Quality Computers", and the body reads "Huge Range of PCs and Laptops, Free Delivery". 
However, when user clicks on the link, it is taken to a page on Retailer's site that offers Beech (and 
other non-Cypress) computers, as well as Cypress computers. 
Scenario Eight: When user searches the term "Cypress", or "Cypress Computers", sponsor links 
include link to Retailer's website. The Sponsor Link's heading reads "Beech Computers", and the 
body of the Sponsor Link says "Huge Range of Beech PCs and Laptops, Free Delivery". When user 
clicks on the link, it is taken to a page on Retailer's site that offers Beech (and other non-Cypress) 
computers, but not Cypress computers. 
Scenario Nine: When user searches the term "Cypress", or "Cypress Computers", sponsor links 
include a link to Retailer's website. The Sponsor Link's heading reads "Cypress, Beech and Other 
  
93  Films, Videos and Publications Classification Amendment Act 2005. 
94  Films, Videos, and Publications Classification Act 1993, ss 122-123, as amended by Films, Videos, and 
Publications Classification Amendment Act 2005. 
95  See, New Zealand Copyright (New Technologies and Performers Rights) Amendment Act, adding s 92 B 
and C to the Copyright Act 1994. 
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Top Brand Computers", and the body of the Sponsor Link says "Huge Range of Cypress, Beech, 
and Other Top Brand PCs and Laptops, Free Delivery". When user clicks on the link, it is taken to a 
page on Retailer's site that offers Beech, Cypress, and other brand computers. 
If we assume that the mere sale and use of a trade mark as a keyword to trigger an ad would be 
considered "use as a trade mark", it is possible that all five of these scenarios could find Retailer and 
Search Engine liable for infringing Cypress' trade mark. A prima facie case is made by virtue of the 
use of the identical sign on identical goods. 
Note that in Scenarios Seven and Nine, the user will encounter Cypress Computers at the 
Sponsor Link. However, the fact that the Retailer has used the Cypress trade mark as "bait" to entice 
the user to click on a link that will transport him to a page that contains "identical goods", ie, other 
brands of computers, it might be sufficient to satisfy the strict liability of 89(1)(a). Additionally, in 
Scenario Five, Cypress' case would be strengthened by the fact that the header and body of the 
Sponsor Link also have a visible use of the Cypress trade mark. 
If we assume that the sale/use of a trade mark as a keyword to trigger an ad would not be 
considered use as a trade mark, it is my view that only in Scenario Five and Scenario Nine could 
Retailer and Search Engine possibly be found liable for infringing Cypress' trade mark. This 
presumes that the visible use of the Cypress trade mark within the header and body of the Sponsor 
Link qualifies as "likely to be taken as being use as a trade mark". Indeed, since no likelihood of 
confusion or deception is necessary under 89(1)(a), the mere fact that the resulting page offers non-
Cypress computers might be enough to result in liability. 
2 Section 89(1)(b) 
Section 89(1)(b) pertains to an "identical mark, similar goods" scenario. In the following 
scenarios, it is assumed that Cypress only makes computers, but not software, accessories and 
peripherals. I do not believe it is relevant if Beech or Retailer are in the shoes of the keyword 
purchaser, and if they are a competitor or not, since the fact pattern will require them to be selling 
goods similar, but not identical to, Cypress' goods. Beech (or Retailer) purchases the keyword 
"Cypress" from Search Engine: 
Scenario One: When user searches the term "Cypress", or "Cypress Computers", sponsor links 
include a link to Beech/Retailer website. The Sponsor Link has as its heading the phrase "Cypress 
Peripherals", and the body reads "Huge Range of Software and Accessories for Cypress Computers, 
Free Delivery". 
Scenario Two: When user searches the term "Cypress", or "Cypress Computers", sponsor links 
include a link to Beech/Retailer website. The heading reads "Beech Software and Peripherals", and 
the body of the Sponsor Link says "Huge Range of Beech Software and Peripherals, Free Delivery", 
yet makes no mention of term "Cypress". 
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Scenario Three: When user searches the term "Cypress", or "Cypress Computers", sponsor links 
include a link to Beech/Retailer website. The heading reads "Beech Software and Peripherals", but 
the body of the Sponsor Link says "Huge Range of Accessories and Software for Cypress 
Computers". 
If we, again, assume that the mere sale/use of a trade mark as a keyword to trigger an ad would 
be considered as use as a trade mark, the issue then turns on "if that use would be likely to deceive 
or confuse".96 On the one hand, use of the trade mark "Cypress" in the heading and/or body in 
Scenarios One and Three might be relied on by Cypress to show bad faith, and conduct likely to 
deceive and/or confuse. On the other hand, Beech/Retailer might characterise it as a descriptive fair 
use of the trade mark since, after all, Cypress does not make peripherals, software or accessories, 
and all Beech or Retailer was doing was to advertise the products it made available.  
3 Section 89(1)(c) 
Section 89(1)(c) pertains to a "similar mark, identical or similar goods" scenario. Section 
89(1)(c) might apply to scenarios where the plaintiff's trade mark is easily/often misspelt, or where a 
similar term might be used as a keyword. The following examples, using the Google search engine, 
might include: 
(1) "Travel Centre" is an established travel service, selling air reservations, holiday bookings, 
hotel and resort bookings, etc. "Travel Center" (misspelt) has been used to trigger links to 
competing travel agencies, namely HouseOfTravel.co.nz. 
(2) In the Beech/Cypress example, perhaps Beech might purchase keywords "Cypres" and 
"Cyprus." 
If we assume that the sale/use of a trade mark as a keyword to trigger an ad would be considered 
as use as a trade mark, the issue then turns on "if that use would be likely to deceive or confuse."97 
In its defence, HouseOfTravel.co.nz could assert that it is making use of the generic term "travel 
centre", that Travel Centre's trade mark does not protect the generic term "travel centre", since, after 
all, HouseOfTravel.co.nz is in fact a "travel center." As such, it would argue that this is not an 
infringement of the weak trade mark Travel Centre. 
4 Section 89(1)(d) 
Note that Section 89(1)(d) pertains to an "identical or similar mark, not similar goods" scenario. 
Section 89(1)(d) might apply to scenarios involving "attention seeking behaviour", ie, a website 
using a famous mark just to draw attention to itself. There might be no relation whatsoever to the 
trade mark. Examples might include marks that are simply popular as a search term, famous marks 
  
96  New Zealand Trade Marks Act 2002, s 89(1)(b). 
97  Ibid, s 89(1)(c).  
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such as iPod, Rolex, Calvin Klein, or even a celebrity whose name happens to be a registered trade 
mark. Such searches might yield sponsor links to sites offering pornography, general merchandise, 
other thrown-together Pay-Per-Click advertising pages, all of which might damage the reputation of 
the trade mark owner. Note that there is no burden on plaintiff to show likelihood of deception or 
confusion, so it would come down to a factual analysis as to whether or not "the trade mark is well 
known in New Zealand and the use of the sign takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the 
distinctive character or the repute of the mark."98 
B Section 89(2) – Just What is "Use as a Trade Mark" in New Zealand?  
As noted above, in assessing the applicability of section 89 as to whether or not the use of a 
trade mark as a keyword merely to trigger a third-party sponsor link is an infringement of the trade 
mark, it all comes down to that tricky question, is the use of a trade mark as a keyword a "use as a 
trade mark?"99 By my use of the word "merely", I am referring to the mere use of the mark as a 
trigger, with no visible use in the heading or body of the sponsor link. 
If we look to the statute alone, I suggest that the non-visible use of a trade mark as a trigger is 
not "use as a trade mark", under section 89, nor does it qualify as an "infringing good", "infringing 
material", or "infringing object", pursuant to section 5. Looking at section 5 first, I note that this 
section requires that the infringing good, material or object must "bear" the mark. Further, since this 
section addresses the issue within the context of "the application of the sign to the goods or their 
packaging", ie, that the mark must be applied to the goods or their packaging, it would not appear 
that an invisible use that merely triggers a sponsor link (which has no visible use of the mark) would 
be considered as infringing.  
Of course, I should not end my discussion with a surface-level reading of the statute, I should 
look at how New Zealand Courts, and other jurisdictions on which New Zealand Courts might rely, 
have interpreted section 89 and its predecessor section in the 1953 Act. New Zealand Courts have 
not yet dealt with any "invisible use" cases, such as keywords or metatags. Accordingly, in 
examining section 89, it is necessary to examine other cases where "use as a trade mark" has been 
considered, and such cases will hinge on a factual analysis as to the quality of that use and how the 
mark is used. 
In the 2007 case YPG IP Ltd v Yellow Book.com.au Pty Ltd,100 an infringement case concerning 
a competitor of the Yellow Pages/Yellow Book telephone directory, trading under the name 
"Yellow Duck", the topic of use is examined. Here, the High Court Auckland, Allan J, noted: 
  
98  New Zealand Trade Marks Act 2002, s 89(1)(d).   
99  Ibid. 
100  YPG IP Ltd v Yellow Book.com.au Pty Ltd (2008) 8 NZBLC 102,063. 
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[T]he definition encompasses both use on the goods themselves, and in advertising or promotional 
materials.  … the use of the name YELLOW BOOK by the first and second defendants on the website 
www.yellowbook.co.nz plainly falls within the definition of "use" in relation to services in s 6 of the 
Trade Marks Act. Those services are business directory services which are similar, if not identical, to the 
services covered by the YELLOW PAGES trade marks. The next question is whether the use by the first 
and second defendants of the YELLOW BOOK mark is likely to deceive or confuse, for the purposes of 
s 89(1)(c) of the Trade Marks Act. The leading decision on that point remains that of the Court of 
Appeal in Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Co v Hy-Line Chicks Pty Ltd [1978] 2 NZLR 50, which, although 
decided under the Trade Marks Act 1953, remains applicable to a consideration of the question of 
infringement under the 2002 Act. The Court in Pioneer distinguished between the terms 'deceive' and 
'confuse'.  At p 62 Richardson J explained that "deceived" implies the creation of an incorrect belief or 
mental impression while causing "confusion" may go no further than perplexing or mixing up the minds 
of the purchasing public.  Moreover, where the deception or confusion alleged is as to the source of the 
goods, 'deceived' is equivalent to being misled into thinking that the goods bearing the applicant's mark 
come from some other source, and 'confused' is equivalent to being caused to wonder whether that might 
not be the case.  
In an assessment of whether deception or confusion is likely to arise, the Court must consider 
the use of the first plaintiff's mark in a normal and fair manner in relation to the goods for which it is 
registered, then to assess the likelihood of confusion arising from the way the defendant actually 
uses its mark. The proper approach is illustrated in Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budweiser Budvar.101 The 
President said:102 
The marks are to be compared as they would be encountered in the usual circumstances of trade. That 
contemplates wholesale and retail transactions, knowledgeable and uninformed purchasers, purchases 
for on-premises consumption, and for subsequent consumption bearing in mind the varying conditions 
that may prevail from noisy bars and clubs to self-service stores. Purchases will be made by oral 
requests (including telephone) and on appearance alone. The products will not necessarily be presented 
side by side. There may be prospective purchasers who have previously encountered one product and 
imperfectly recalling its mark, then see or hear of the other. 
Furthermore, the use must be "in the course of trade".103 Paul Sumpter comments that "[t]he 
term 'course of trade' is not defined but has been said to be concerned with the purposes of trade 
(rather than necessarily in trade)".104 As an example he offers the 1956 Australian case WD and HO 
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Wills (Aust) Ltd v Rothmans Ltd,105 in which an Australian trade mark was removed from the trade 
mark register based on non-use.106 The mark was originally used on cigarettes, although the facts 
showed that no bona fide use had taken place in Australia for several years. The court reasoned 
that:107 
The user or use must … be a user or use (1) for the purposes of trade, (2) by the proprietor or a 
registered user, (3) in respect of the goods in respect of which the mark is registered. … That is to say … 
it must be 'used for the purpose of indicating, or so as to indicate, a connection in the course of trade' 
between the goods and the proprietor of the registered mark. 
1 "Use" in the World of Sport 
Three cases from the world of sport are worth discussing from the context of "use of a trade 
mark".108 The UK case Trebor Bassett Ltd v Football Association Ltd109 is instructive as to what 
constitutes use in the infringement context. In this 1996 High Court case, the Football Association 
(FA) was the owner of a logo of a crest showing three lions. The logo was worn on the uniforms of 
English footballers. Bassett was the maker of packaged candy, and with each package of candy sold 
a "football card", a collectible card showing a football player from the English league. Often, the 
logo might be visible on the player's uniform in the photo on the collectible football card.110 FA 
made repeated complaints of trade mark infringement and Bassett ultimately filed suit against FA, 
requesting that FA be enjoined from such conduct. FA countersued for infringement.111 
At issue was the visible presence of the mark on the uniforms of the players depicted on the 
football cards, whether or not it constituted a use of the trade mark, and, as such, whether the 
activities of Bassett infringed FA's registered trade mark.112 In its defence, Bassett submitted that 
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"Bassett is not using the England logo in relation to any goods or services, any more than is the 
publisher of a newspaper bearing a photograph of a footballer in the England strip as part of a news 
report on a football match using the logo in relation to the particular newspaper."113  
Rattee J held that there was no infringement:114 
[I]t cannot seriously be argued … Trebor Bassett is in any sense using the logo in respect of the cards on 
which the photographs appear. … The reproduction of the photograph on the card inevitably reproduces 
the England logo on the garments which the player was wearing when the photograph was taken. By 
such reproduction, in my judgment, Trebor Bassett is not even arguably using the logo, as such, in any 
real sense of the word 'uses', and is certainly not, in my judgment, using it as a sign in respect of its 
cards. It is, I consider, unreal to say ... Bassett is affixing the sign comprising the England logo to its 
cards – and therefore to goods … or that it is putting the cards on the market under the sign comprising 
the England logo. 
In the UK case Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew Reed, the meaning of trade mark use 
received detailed consideration.115 Mr Reed had, for some 30 years, operated a stall outside the 
football stadium where the English football team "Arsenal" played their home games. From this 
stall, Reed sold clothing, souvenirs and other memorabilia with the Arsenal theme and containing 
several Arsenal logos and trade marks.116 While some of the merchandise Reed sold was "official", 
ie, it was manufactured under an official licence from Arsenal, much of the merchandise was 
"unofficial", meaning that Reed obtained it from sources other than "officially licenced" 
manufacturers.117 Reed was careful "to educate his customers" as to the possibility of non-official 
nature of some products.118  Arsenal Football Club (AFC) came to learn of Reed's business in 
unofficial Arsenal merchandise and brought suit for trade mark infringement. 
At trial, Reed argued that his actions could not be considered trade mark infringement,119 since 
the Arsenal trade marks were not used as an indicator of source and they were not being used as a 
trade mark, but "badges of allegiance".120 In other words, Reed was arguing that merely because an 
article of clothing carried the name and/or trade mark of the football club, it did not necessarily 
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mean that the garment came from or was manufactured by that football club. The name and/or trade 
mark was merely there to express the loyalty of the wearer to that club. 
The presiding judge in the High Court, Laddie J, applied the relatively new 1994 Act, which 
implemented the European Community Trade Mark Directive and was different from the original 
UK trade mark law. Some commentators have opined that Laddie was still in the mindset of the 
1938 Act, which had more of a focus on trade marks serving as a source of origin, and that a use 
could not be "trade mark use" unless it served as an indicator of source.121 As such, Laddie J was 
sympathetic of Reed's defence.122 Laddie further thought that an expansive interpretation of the Act, 
to consider as infringement conduct that did not indicate source or origin, was a dangerous 
proposition, since it ran the risk of granting "a new and very wide monopoly" to trade mark 
owners.123 On the trade mark infringement action, Laddie made findings of fact favourable to the 
defendant, and opined that the use of the Arsenal marks was not trade mark infringement, since it 
did not indicate origin.124 Laddie also ruled against AFC on the passing off claim, noting that in 
order for passing off action to succeed, there must be deception.125 
The Arsenal case was far from over, however. As he was dealing with an interpretation of the 
relatively new Act, Laddie J saw fit to refer the infringement element of the action to the European 
Court of Justice.126 The ECJ considered the case, held a hearing,127 and returned its findings to the 
English High Court, where the matter was again heard by Laddie J. The ECJ provided the following 
in response to Laddie's question:  
[W]here a third party uses in the course of trade a sign which is identical to a validly registered trade 
mark on goods which are identical to those for which it is registered, the trade mark proprietor of the 
mark is entitled, in circumstances such as those in the present case, … to prevent that use. It is 
immaterial that, in the context of that use, the sign is perceived as a badge of support for or loyalty or 
affiliation to the trade mark proprietor. 
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Although appearing to support Arsenal's infringement claim, Laddie interpreted the ECJ's 
interpretation as overstepping its bounds by delving into the findings of fact in the case, where it 
should have limited itself to the narrower role of merely interpreting the statute.128  Therefore, 
Laddie J, apparently making trade mark use a requirement for infringing use, concluded that there 
was no infringement on the basis that the defendant's use did not prejudice the essential function of 
the registered mark".129 Laddie ruled in favour of defendant Reed, finding that no infringement took 
place, since Reed's use of Arsenal's trade mark was not a trade mark use.130 
On appeal, Aldous J began his opinion with the observation that "[t]he Trade Marks Act 1994 
swept away the old law and implemented the Trade Mark Directive. It follows that the provisions of 
the 1994 Act must be construed so as to reflect the terms of the Trade Mark Directive."131 He also 
devoted attention to the ECJ's commentary on "the essential function of a trade mark",132 stating 
that this is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the market goods or services.133 He continued 
that this function of the assurance of origin requires protection against competitors taking "unfair 
advantage of the status and reputation of the trad mark by selling products illegally bearing it", and 
that "the ECJ is not concerned with whether the use complained about is trade mark use" or whether 
there was confusion, but whether the "use affects or is likely to affect the functions of the trade 
mark".134  
Aldous J allowed the appeal, concluding that, even though the goods were purchased as badges 
of loyalty, such use could "still jeopardise the functions of the trade marks, namely the ability to 
guarantee origin".135 In fact, "the wider and more extensive the use, the less likely the trade marks 
would be able to perform their function."136  
In New Zealand Rugby Football Union v Saint Publishing,137 the courts once again dealt with 
merchandise. The New Zealand Rugby Football Union (Union) owns a registered trade mark on 
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ALL BLACKS, which is the name of the New Zealand national rugby team, and another trade mark 
on a fern leaf logo. "The defendant had printed calendars displaying All Black test captains, 
including the current captain."138 The Union brought an action in infringement, under the Trade 
Marks Act 1953, 139  as well as under the Fair Trading Act 1986, 140  and sought an injunction 
prohibiting such use of the trade marks. With respect to the trade mark infringement claim, the High 
Court ruled for the plaintiff. Williams J stated that "the calendar infringed registered marks by using 
them as a trade mark in the course of trade" and that "[t]he purpose of utilising photos of the 
captains in uniform must have been to capitalise on their All Black status."141 
The High Court also ruled in favour of the plaintiff under the Fair Trading Act claim, because it 
it was "arguable that a member of the public would conclude the All Black captain or the plaintiff 
had consented to or authorised use of the photograph for merchandising purposes."142 Furthermore, 
"[t]he plaintiff also had the right to protect its own interests as proprietor of its trade marks plus the 
interests of those who had paid to be permitted to produced licensed goods."143 
2 Sport Merchandise Cases Vis-a-Vis Trade Mark Keyword Advertising  
The three cases discussed above are perhaps useful in assessing how a New Zealand court might 
rule on the subject of trade mark keyword advertising, particularly the issue of "trade mark use". 
The High Court, in the "All Blacks" case, interpreted the "use" aspect of the 1953 Act,144 which 
included language similar to that used in the 2002 Act,145 as encompassing the visible use of the All 
Blacks' name and fern logo on a calendar. Similarly, the English Court of Appeal in the Arsenal case 
determined that the unauthorised use of a trade mark on memorabilia and clothing was infringement. 
On the other hand, the High Court in Trebor Bassett held that the incidental appearance of the 
football club's marks on uniforms on football cards was not a trade mark use sufficient to bring 
about infringement. 
In my view, the three cases may be distinguished from the keyword advertising scenario in that 
all three concerned visible uses of the trade marks, ie, the marks were visible in player photographs, 
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shown on football uniforms and the like. What is more telling, and significant in the discussion of 
keyword advertising, is the discussion of "use" in the Arsenal decisions, and the ultimate holding. In 
my view, the Arsenal decision is significant, not only in what it said about the concept of source or 
origin, but also the overall control over the use of a trade mark that is reserved to the owner. In other 
words, we see in Arsenal how England has had to shift its view on trade marks.146 Perhaps the 
Arsenal decision is an indication that the UK is now operating in a trade mark regime that is more 
akin to the "trade marks as property" school that pervades in Europe. Such a sea change did not and 
has not taken place in New Zealand. New Zealand's Trade Marks Act still requires "use as a trade 
mark" in order to support a finding in infringement.147 
I note that the Arsenal decision was not a coup de grace with respect to the ongoing battle 
between the "trade marks are property, and may not be used by third parties without permission" 
camp, and that of the supporters of robust fair use of trade marks and the trade mark common. 
Indeed, on the day after the Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the trade mark owner in Arsenal, the 
House of Lords handed down an arguably inconsistent decision in the case of R v Johnstone.148 In 
Johnstone, the defendant was charged with selling "bootleg recordings made of performances by 
world-renowned performers including Bon Jovi."149 On the copies of the bootleg CDs at issue, the 
names of the artists appeared. But was that a trade mark use? The court concluded that the use of the 
performer's names on the particular CD in question did not indicate any connection between the 
performer and the origin of the CD, and was only descriptive of what was on the CD. 
The cases discussed above are illustrative of the ongoing debate over the role and purpose of a 
trade mark, historically, as an indicator of source or as a property right. The Arsenal decision shows 
a strengthening of the hand of a trade mark owner, with more focus on the owner's rights, and the 
exclusivity that may accompany a mark and, further, that a trade mark is far more than just a source 
indicator but a piece of personal property that cannot be used by others without permission. 
However, it is important to note that this debate is in the UK more so than in New Zealand and 
Australia, given the UK's adoption of the Trade Mark Directive, and its attempt at reconciling the 
differences between the Directive and English common law. While New Zealand and Australia may 
derive much of its trade mark jurisprudence from English common law tradition, the passage of 
1994 Act and implementation of the Trade Mark Directive will likely result, I would suggest, as a 
point of divergence between the two systems. 
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As a final thought, I would add that sport merchandise takes us into an area of trade mark law 
where source is not necessarily the paramount objective. Further, whether or not you agree with the 
whole issue of a trade mark being a "badge of loyalty, support or affiliation", it's an understandable 
concept. After all, if I wear a shirt with an alligator or polo player on it, it is understood that the shirt 
originated from Izod Lacoste or Ralph Lauren Polo, respectively. If not, it's a knockoff or 
counterfeit good. However, if I wear a cap displaying the "curly W" of the Washington Nationals 
baseball club, the "curly W" does not necessarily indicate that the cap was made by that 
organisation; indeed, it could have originated from one of a number of licensed manufacturers or, as 
we have seen, unauthorised sources. Further, that "curly W" trade mark is likely going to "reduce 
consumer search costs" in an entirely different way. In other words, it will not tell me one whit 
about the quality of the goods, as the Izod or Polo logo might. Indeed, quality is not necessarily a 
factor in my choice; I would rather wear an inferior Nationals or All Blacks cap than a Yankee or 
Wallabies cap of the finest materials and craftsmanship, every day of the week. Perhaps in this 
context we can see the adaptability of trade marks, how they can be encountered in different 
contexts by consumers and how they indicate different things. 
3 The Cheetah Case 
Relevant to the issue of what constitutes "use" of a trade mark, it might be instructive to have a 
look at Cheetah Trade Mark. 150  In that case, the plaintiff, referred to simply as "H", was the 
manufacturer of an herbicide known and sold in the UK by the brand name "Cheetah". Cheetah was 
also sold in France and Belgium under the brand name "Puma", however the markings on containers 
of "Puma" did not comply with regulations of the UK's Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. 
Nevertheless, the defendant, known only as "C", shipped packages of Puma into the UK, selling 
them under the name Cheetah. Although the product label still said "Puma", delivery notes and 
invoices" specifically bore the name "Cheetah". H brought an action against C for trade mark 
infringement.151 C argued that there was no infringement as there was no use of the mark printed or 
otherwise visually represented "upon or in physical relation to goods". 152  The invoices with 
CHEETAH on them were rendered after the sale and delivery of the herbicide,153  so that the 
invoices were not in the course of trade.154 
The Chancery Division ruled in favour of the plaintiff and determined that, although the 
packaging still said "Puma", the fact that the trade mark "Cheetah" was displayed on the invoice was 
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sufficient to show use of the mark. "The invoice in the instant case was, by definition, rendered in 
the course of trade. The invoice used the mark and did so in relation to goods and any other 
conclusion would have been absurd."155 
Perhaps the Cheetah case is useful in determining what constitutes "use" of a trade mark "in the 
course of trade", however its limitations are that the mark was indeed visible to the purchaser, and it 
is likely that the purchaser relied on the visual aspect of the mark in the course of making the 
purchase. 
4 Is the Use of a Trade Mark as a Keyword "Importing a Reference?" – What is "Importing a 
Reference?" 
Under the Trade Marks Act 1953, there were basically two ways of infringing another party's 
trade mark.156 One was to actually use the mark as a trade mark,157 and the other was to use it in 
such a way as to be "importing a reference" to the proprietor of goods or services "in an 
advertisement".158 In other words, making use of another party's trade mark in such a way "likely to 
cause confusion or indicate a connection in the course of trade between the defendant's goods and 
the plaintiff's goods as proprietor of the trade mark" was considered as "importing a reference".159 
In short, the prohibitions appeared to prohibit what is known as comparative advertising.160  
However, much has changed since the passage of the Trade Marks Act 2002; comparative 
advertising is now permissible.161 As a result, I would submit that in the post-2002 Act world, 
importing a reference is now just one of the ways in which a use could be "otherwise than in 
accordance with honest practices", and/or a use which "takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental 
to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark". In other words, just as one can push too 
far and exceed "fair use" in the copyright context, one can also go too far in the use of another's 
trade mark, and go beyond comparative advertising, and engage in a use that is deceptive or 
misleading, and which thereby "imports a reference", or suggests a connection, to the mark or its 
owner. 
As a result of the relatively recent passage of the 2002 Act, it is difficult to rely too much on the 
available New Zealand jurisprudence on the issue of importing a reference. As noted above, prior to 
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the 2002 Act, importing a reference was a much broader infringement.162 However, the 2002 Act 
appears to have severely eroded the cause of action of importing a reference,163 and the one post-
2002 Act decision that relates to this balance between importing a reference (plaintiff's case) and 
comparative advertising (defendant's defence) would be the Mitre 10 case.164  
In Mitre 10, both the defendant and the plaintiff were retailers in hardware and home 
improvement merchandise, the plaintiff under the name "Mitre 10", the defendant Benchmark traded 
under the name "Bunnings". 165  The defendant commenced a rather unorthodox advertising 
campaign, making use of Mitre 10 printed advertisements, in which Benchmark/Bunnings 
"displayed outside its stores original copies of Mitre 10 brochures which had been received by its 
employees. These had superimposed on them bright orange stickers placed against the 
advertisements of some of the products stating 'Bunnings' Price' with handwritten dollar amounts 
lower than those offered by Mitre 10."166 Mitre 10 brought an action based on trade mark and 
copyright infringement, and the High Court Auckland issued a preliminary injunction.167 
On appeal, counsel for the defence noted that the passage of the 2002 Act would serve to permit 
comparative advertising, which is all that Bunnings had done. 168  The Court of Appeal 
acknowledged that "[u]nder the new Act there is no longer a provision for infringement by 
importing a reference to the proprietor's own goods."169 
The view that the Court of Appeal had reached was that what Benchmark/Bunnings had done 
was in fact within the scope of comparative advertising.170 The following reasoning of the Court of 
Appeal is, in my view, very instructive both with respect of the scope of comparative advertising, as 
well as the parameters of "honest practices".171 The Court proceeded to assess whether Benchmark's 
use was otherwise in accordance "with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters in that, 
without due cause, it takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the 
  
162  See the discussion of comparative advertising in PC Direct Ltd v Best Buy Ltd, above n 159, 727-728. 
163  See, Andrew Brown "Legislative Developments – Trade Marks 2002: Big Changes to Some Key 
Provisions" www.andrewbrown.co.nz/legislative/tma2002changes.asp (accessed 24 November 2007). 
164  Mitre 10 (New Zealand) Ltd v Benchmark Building Supplies Ltd [2004] 1 NZLR 26 (CA); 58 IPR 407. 
165  Ibid, 407. 
166  Ibid, 407.  
167  Ibid, 407.  
168  Ibid, 411.  
169  Ibid, 411.  
170 Ibid, 415-416.  
171  Ibid, 415-416.  
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repute of the trade marks". The function of the trade marks, as used by Mitre 10 in their brochures, 
was to identify or distinguish the retail source of the products advertised. It was found that when 
Benchmark displayed the brochures, they were using the trade marks to "perform precisely the same 
function as they performed upon Mitre 10's original distribution of the brochures", namely 
indicating Mitre 10's retail goods and services. Thus, the distinctiveness of the marks was not 
damaged and Benchmark did not take unfair advantage of the distinctiveness or repute of the trade 
marks any more than conventional forms of comparative advertising do. It was concluded that there 
was no evidence that Benchmark's practices were inconsistent with honest commercial matters, but 
were open and obvious.   
In my view, with the 2002 Act's legitimisation of comparative advertising, all that is left of 
"importing a reference" is instances where the defendant's conduct goes beyond "honest 
practices".172 Perhaps the question as to the vitality of the concept of "importing a reference" is 
academic, perhaps it comes down to the matter of simply analysing whether or not the use of the 
other party's mark is comparative advertising or not, under an analysis of s 94 of the 2002 Act. 
However, New Zealand's jurisprudence in the area of importing a reference is still worth analysis, 
and is still instructional in terms of assessing that balancing act between comparative advertising 
and actions that could be considered beyond "honest practices". 
One such case was Villa Maria v Montana Wines.173 In Villa Maria, both parties were (and still 
are) New Zealand wineries. The defendant Villa Maria had an advertising campaign in magazines, 
whereby they illustrated bottles of their wine and Montana wine, accompanied by text.174  The 
labels on the Montana bottles, some including wine press markers, were clear. It was Villa Maria's 
intention to promote its wine by equating it to the quality of the then better known and established 
Montana.  
In the Court of Appeal, Somers J held that, because some who saw the advertisements would 
have assumed that Montana must have agreed to the campaign, contributed to its production or that 
there was a corporate link between the two companies,175 Villa Maria used Montana's marks in a 
trade mark sense.176 His Honour stated that "Villa Maria … used the marks in such a manner as to 
  
172  Trade Marks Act 2002, s 94. See also Brown "Legislative Developments – Trade Marks 2002: Big Changes 
to Some Key Provisions", above n 166. 
173  Villa Maria Wines Ltd v Montana Wines Ltd [1997] 2 NZLR 723. 
174  Ibid, 423-424. 
175  Ibid, 424. 
176  Ibid, 430. 
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render their use likely to be taken as importing a reference to wine with which Montana is connected 
in the course of trade ...".177 
The "importing a reference" cases are useful from the perspective of looking at how the marks 
were actually used. In other words, in the context of keyword advertising, in instances where the 
mark actually appears in the triggered ad or sponsor link, the manner in which the advertising party 
is using the keyed trade mark may or may not constitute "importing a reference". There will be a 
balancing act, ie, does the use of the keyed trade mark in the sponsor link import a reference, or is it 
used in a comparative or descriptive manner? Is the use "otherwise in accordance with honest 
practices in industrial or commercial matters"?178 This will be for the Courts to decide, based on the 
facts at hand.179 
5 Domain Name Cases  
Internet domain name cases might be instructive in deliberating the notion of "trade mark use" 
from the perspective of examining whether or not an actual "use" has been made by the mere act of 
registering the domain name. While the topic of domain name disputes encompasses a wide range of 
issues, and is far too vast to cover within this paper, what follows is a very cursory overview of 
some salient aspects of domain name disputes, concerning both the generic Top-Level Domain 
(gTLD) names (such as .COM and .ORG), as well as in the country code Top-Level Domain 
(ccTLD). What I focus on is that question, does the mere registration of the domain name constitute 
a use of the trade mark that is the focal point of the dispute? In other words, if I am Microsoft, and I 
learn that someone has registered Microsoft.com, and has not a) put up a website, or b) offered to 
sell it, or c) done anything at all with it, is that act of registering the domain name actionable as trade 
mark infringement? 
While I am raising the topic of domain name cases within the trade mark infringement section of 
this paper, it is a matter that has also been adjudicated as passing off, and within the context of 
domain name dispute policies. I am addressing it in this section in the hope that such cases can be 
useful in examining whether or not "use as a trade mark" and/or "trade mark use" has occurred. 
Since, as will be seen in the passing off discussion, below, "a misrepresentation made by a trader in 
the course of trade", is a component of one test used in passing off cases.180 Perhaps parallels can 
be gleaned from these cases in the trade mark infringement context. 
  
177  Ibid. 
178  Trade Marks Act 2002, s 94. 
179  For further discussion and analysis of "honest practices", see also, the following UK cases: Cable and 
Wireless v British Telecom [1998] FSR 383; Barclay's Bank v RBS Advanta [1996] RPC 307; Vodafone v 
Orange [1997] FSR 34; McMillan Magazines Ltd v RCM Publishing Co Ltd [1998] FSR 9; and British 
Airways v Ryanair [2001] FSR 541. 
180  See Erven Warnink RV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979] AC 731; 2 All ER 927, 932. 
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(a) Within gTLDs  
As noted above, a trade mark owner has several options available to it when faced with another 
party's registration of a domain name which the trade mark owner believes to infringe its trade mark. 
At the gTLD level, the trade mark owner may file a domain name dispute, under the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy 
(ICANN UDRP). Additionally, the trade mark owner might also bring a conventional litigation, 
under the theory of trade mark infringement, passing off, tortious interference with trade and other 
remedies available to that party in its jurisdiction.181 
Under the UDRP, it is noteworthy that the mere registration of a domain name is not necessarily 
enough to allow a trade mark owner to contest the offending registration. Indeed, under the UDRP, a 
three-prong test is required for the trade mark owner to prevail:182 (i) the domain name must be 
identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; 
(ii) the domain name owner must have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain 
name; and (iii) the domain name was registered and used in bad faith. 
Note that the third prong of the test requires that the domain name be used in bad faith, not just 
registered in bad faith; both elements must be present. Examples abound where complainants in 
gTLD disputed have failed to prove bad faith merely because the respondent never used the domain 
name - all it did was to register it.183 However, some domain name dispute policies at the ccTLD 
level, notably Australia and New Zealand, do not require actual use of the domain name. 
While the UDRP and decisions made under it have made it clear that mere registration is not 
sufficient to prove bad faith, early cybersquatting case law is more problematic in terms of deriving 
guidance. The 1998 cybersquatting case, British Telecommunications Plc v One in a Million Ltd,184 
resulted in a decision from the UK Court of Appeal which centred on the common law tort of 
passing off. In that case, the defendant, a company specialising in domain name registrations, had 
registered Internet domain names that corresponded with trade marks of other parties. These names 
included BRITISHTELECOM.NET, MARKSANDSPENCER.COM, BRITISHTELECOME.COM, 
ORANGE.COM, BRITISHSAINSBURYS.COM and VIRGIN.ORG (think "Virgin Airlines"). The 
defendant then offered the names to the respective parties associated with them, at a high price. If 
those parties did not pay that high price, the defendant threatened that it would then sell the names 
  
181  For example, in the US, a party might file suit under the Lanham Act, which includes the 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. Or, in New Zealand, an action in trade mark infringement 
might be brought under s 89 of the Trade Marks Act 2002, or under the common law tort of passing off. 
182  See ICANN UDRP, s 4(a) www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (accessed 24 November 2007).  
183  See Telstra Corporation Limited v Nuclear Marshmallows WIPO D2000-0003; see also Panavision v 
Toeppen (1998) 141 F 3d 1316, 1324-25 (9th Cir). 
184  British Telecommunications Plc v One in a Million, Ltd (1998) 4 All ER 476 (EWCA). 
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to the highest bidder. The defendant at no time hosted websites at any of the domains.185 The 
plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to compel the defendant to surrender the domain names, and 
brought their action under passing off.186 
The case was an appeal from an order for summary judgment and which ruled a quia timet 
injunction.187 The Deputy Judge justified the injunction on the grounds that it was necessary to 
preclude or avoid a threatened breach, ie, the subsequent transfer of the offending domains to third 
parties, where it was reasonably foreseeable that further damage to each plaintiff's goodwill in the 
respective names might be damaged.188 This decision was based on an analysis that the defendant 
controlling the domain names amounted to "instruments of fraud".189 
In the Court of Appeal, the defendant argued that since at least some of the domain names could 
be used for non-infringing purposes (for example, "Virgin" could mean any number of things, as 
could "Sainsburys"; the plaintiffs did not own a monopoly on those names), there was no instrument 
of fraud, and injunctive relief was only appropriate if defendant had threatened to engage in passing 
off.190 
The Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, upholding the High Court's decision that 
defendant had committed passing off. 191  I will discuss this decision in greater detail in the 
discussion of passing off. However, for purposes of this discussion, it is notable that, outside of the 
UDRP arena, courts have indeed held that passing off may occur even when no actual "use" of a 
trade mark has been made. 
(b) New Zealand's .NZ Domain Name Dispute Resolution Service Policy 
In the ccTLD arena, specifically under the .NZ Domain Name Dispute Resolution Service 
Policy,192 it would appear that the Policy might consider a domain name to be actionable by a 
plaintiff/trade mark owner even if the registrant never actually made any "use" of it, and only 
registered it. In framing out the ways in which a plaintiff might bring an action, the .NZ policy is 
quite succinct, requiring that the complainant has rights in respect of a name or mark which is 
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192  .NZ policy available at http://dnc.org.nz/drs/index.php?clsid=1012 (accessed 29 October 2007). 
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identical or similar to the domain name and the domain name, in the hands of the respondent, is an 
unfair registration.193  
Fortunately, the .NZ Policy offers guidance on what constitutes, and what does not constitute, an 
unfair registration, and in doing so, recites several ways in which a domain name registration could 
theoretically, without any actual "use" of the domain, be considered unfair. These include situations 
where there are "[c]ircumstances indicating that the Respondent has registered or otherwise acquired 
the Domain Name primarily" to sell, rent or otherwise transfer the domain name to the 
complainant,194 "as a blocking registration against a name or mark in which the Complainant has 
rights",195 or "for the purpose of unfairly disrupting the business of the Complainant".196 Or if 
"circumstances demonstrat(e) that the Respondent is using the Domain Name in a way which is 
likely to confuse, mislead or deceive people or businesses into believing that the Domain Name is 
registered to, operated or authorised by, or otherwise connected with the Complainant",197 or if:198 
[t]he Complainant can demonstrate that the Respondent is engaged in a pattern of registrations where the 
Respondent is the registrant of domain names (under .nz or otherwise) which correspond to well known 
names or trade marks in which the Respondent has no apparent rights, and the Domain Name is part of 
that pattern ... 
Whether or not the analogy of the domain name dispute is of use in this discussion is debatable. 
I suggest that it may well be relevant, as we have seen from certain domain name disputes, and the 
.NZ dispute policy, the defendant need not actually make "trade mark use" of the domain name. In 
One in a Million, and under the .NZ policy, no "use" even has to be made for the mere registration a 
domain name to be considered actionable. Another interesting aspect of this analogy is that it is 
quite possible for the registration of the domain name by the registrant to remain invisible to the 
public, if no use is ever made in the form of an active website. This is analogous to the purchase of a 
trade mark as a keyword, which is never seen by the public. Indeed, in the .NZ dispute concerning 
the domain name MOUNTAINBUGGY.CO.NZ, no "use" of the domain was ever made; it was not 
offered back to the trade mark owner for sale, and no website was ever established by the 
registrant.199 Although the registrant prevailed in that case, I question if the trade mark owner might 
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have prevailed in the dispute had it pressed the "blocking registration" claim.200 Indeed, I would 
suggest that under the .NZ policy, an "unfair registration" might encompass a domain name that 
never sees the light of day, and is never "used", in a trade mark sense. 
(c) Other notable New Zealand cases – pre-dispute policy 
Prior to the implementation of the .NZ Domain Name Dispute Resolution Service Policy, 
discussed above, disputes over .NZ domain names were typically handled in conventional litigation, 
using passing off, the Fair Trading Act, trade mark infringement, or a combination of all three.201 In 
these cases, the fact pattern was generally the same; the plaintiff was a well-established company, 
and the defendant had registered a name corresponding with the plaintiff's name, and had either used 
that domain name for a) a pornographic site or other content/links unrelated to the plaintiff's 
business, b) a token web page, or c) has demanded a high sum for the sale of the domain name to the 
plaintiff. 
Three representative New Zealand cases are New Zealand Post Ltd v Leng,202 Oggi Advertising 
Ltd v McKenzie,203 and DB Breweries Ltd v Domain Name Company Ltd and Others.204 These 
cases are of varying utility to this discussion of trade mark use, given the extent to which each case 
saw an actual "use" of the plaintiff's trade mark within the domain name, and the nature of that use. 
DB Breweries is the only one relevant to the issue of whether mere registration of a domain name 
corresponding with a third-party trade mark might constitute use of the trade mark. In DB 
Breweries, it would appear that there was never a website established by the defendant at that 
domain name, and therefore no visible use of the plaintiff's mark was made. The other two cases, 
Oggi and New Zealand Post, will be discussed in the passing off section of this paper. 
In DB Breweries, the:205 
plaintiff was a large New Zealand company which had carried on business for many years under the 
trade mark DB and had acquired a substantial reputation and goodwill as a brewer and marketer of beer. 
It was the registered proprietor of the trade mark DB. ... The defendants had registered the domain name 
DB.CO.NZ.  
  
200  .NZ Policy, supra, 5.1.1(b). 
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The plaintiff brought a suit based on three causes of action: (a) a threat to infringe DB's trade mark 
by registering and offering the domain name for sale; (b) passing off; and (c) a breach of the Fair 
Trading Act 1986.206  
The defendants, inter alia, raised the defence that no use as a trade mark had taken place and that 
the plaintiff did not have a universal right to the letters DB, but only an exclusive right to the letters 
in relation to the marketing and sale of their goods and services for which the mark was 
registered.207 In addressing the defendant's claim that no trade mark use had occurred, the High 
Court appeared to acknowledge that the case for trade mark infringement was rather strained. 
Randerson J, however, followed Aldous J in British Telecommunications v One in a Million.208 He 
concluded that:209 
[w]hile the defendants may properly argue that the domain name has not yet been used to offer goods or 
services for sale using the mark, I am satisfied that the threat of it may be sufficient to justify injunctive 
relief at least pending trial … . 
Predictably, Randerson J was equally reliant on One in a Million and its "instrument of fraud" in 
holding in favour of the plaintiff in the passing off element of the case.210 
As noted above, these domain name cases might be of value in assessing whether the mere 
registration of a domain name, without any visible "use as a trade mark", might be useful in 
determining whether the use of a trade mark as a keyword to merely trigger a sponsor link might be 
actionable as trade mark infringement. My view is that their utility is somewhat limited in this 
regard. I suggest that to the extent to which these domain name decisions were largely adjudicated 
in the "early days" of the Internet, where courts around the world were coming to grips with 
cybersquatting, you had a lot of cases that were, "right for the wrong reasons". In other words, the 
courts were straining to find in favour of the plaintiff out of a basic sense of right versus wrong. 
Given the fact that we now have a considerable amount of experience and jurisprudence from the 
respective domain name dispute policies, it is my view that courts will not be as willing to stretch 
concepts such as trade mark infringement and passing off to fashion relief for a plaintiff, at least in 
the domain name context.211  
(d) Australian domain name dispute policy  
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Under the Dispute Resolution Policy for Australia's .AU domain, use of the domain name is not 
required. A domain name can be taken away from a registrant if it is determined to have "been 
registered or subsequently used in bad faith".212 Accordingly, in both Australia and New Zealand, 
actual use of an offending domain name is not necessary in order for a plaintiff to prevail in a 
domain name suit. Whether or not this is analogous to the keyword advertising context is debatable, 
however, it is useful to examine instances where no actual or "visible" use of a trade mark is 
required in order for a plaintiff to be successful in bringing an action to prevent that use. 
Of particular interest to whether or not a domain name registration, without any actual "use" in 
the form of a website, might constitute "trade mark use", is the 2003 Australian case CSR Ltd v 
Resource Capital Australia Pty Ltd.213 In CSR Ltd, the defendant RCA registered domain names 
corresponding to the business name of the plaintiff, namely, CSRSUGAR.COM and 
CSRSUGAR.COM.AU, then offered the domains to the plaintiff at a high sum. CSR declined to 
purchase the domains, then commenced an action against RCA for trade mark infringement.214  
In the decision of the Federal Court of Australia, Hill J noted the difficulty in successfully 
bringing a trade mark infringement action, since no use of the trade mark had been made:215 
It is a problem that is noted by the Court of Appeal in the One in a Million case but not ultimately 
decided by it. It is one thing to say that a cyber squatter who registers a name intending to sell that name 
to the owner of a trade mark or threaten a sale to a competitor if the owner does not come up with the 
money may have registered the name as an instrument of fraud, and thereby be guilty of the tort of 
passing off as was held by the Court of Appeal in England. … But it is another thing to say that … RCA 
used the domain name as a trade mark in relation to goods or services in respect of which CSR had 
registration or for that matter closely related to either goods or services referred to in the CSR 
registrations. No doubt it can be said that the interest of CSR were likely to be adversely affected by the 
acts of RCA but that is not sufficient to constitute an infringement. There could be a threatened 
infringement if one were to take seriously the suggestion that RCA intended to engage in the sugar 
trade. Clearly, however, that was not the real intention of RCA … who at no time used or intended to 
use the domain names as trade marks in relation to either goods or services. 
The Federal Court ruled in favour of the plaintiff, not under the Trade Marks Act, but under the 
Trade Practices Act, supportive of the view that the mere registration of a domain name that 
corresponds with a trade mark is not an infringement of that mark, since no use as a trade mark had 
been made.  
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VI JURISPRUDENCE FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS AS GUIDANCE 
As noted above, because no keyword or metatag cases have yet been brought in New Zealand, it 
is likely that New Zealand courts would look to UK and Australia decisions.  
A United Kingdom Metatag Cases 
Two cases relating to invisible use of trade marks have been heard in the UK, and both 
concerned metatags, with the latter of the two, Reed, also containing the use of a trademark as a 
keyword.216 Roadtech Computer Systems Ltd v Mandata Ltd was decided in the Chancery Division 
on 25 May 2000. In this action, both parties were competitors in the field of computer software and 
related services in the commercial trucking/road haulage industry. Roadtech had a very popular 
website, which received over 1,000 hits per day. Roadtech owned trade mark registrations on the 
marks "Roadtech" and "Roadrunner". Mandata's website used both trade marks as metatags on its 
site; Roadtech alleged that Mandata did so to attain some degree of "diversion of trade" from the 
Roadtech site to the Mandata site.217 Roadtech further alleged that: (1) the defendant has taken a 
free ride on the back of the claimant's very successful web site; and (2) the defendant clearly 
intended to gain a commercial advantage from its actions.218 
Master Bowman found that both infringement and passing off had taken place by virtue of 
defendant Mandata's use of the plaintiff's trade marks within its metatags.219 However, liability 
appears to have been based more on admissions of the defendant, rather than on substantive 
analysis.220  Indeed, the only specific reference to metatags within the decision itself is a brief 
statement that "it is said that every reasonable effort was made on the part of the defendant to 
remove the offending metatags and that should have been the end of the matter."221 Elsewhere, the 
decision appears to refer to the metatags in the sentence that reads, "the offending material was 
substantially, although not completely, removed by early November."222 
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Similar to my observations about the contemporary US cases, in my view, Master Bowman's 
finding that the existence of metatags was grounds for an action in trade mark infringement is 
consistent with the time of the case. In the first several years of cases dealing with metatags, courts 
did not focus on whether the use of trade marks as metatags was sufficient to prove "use" of the 
trade mark. Rather, it was somewhat presumed that metatag use was trade mark use. 223  The 
Roadtech v Mandata decision was handed down in May of 2000. It was not until a few years later; a 
US District Court's 2003 decision in the 1-800 Contacts case,224 and the 2005 decision of US Court 
of Appeals (which was reversed), that you find an in-depth (and now obligatory) analysis of the "use 
in commerce" requirement of the Lanham Act.225 
The next UK case was Reed Executive v Reed Business Information Ltd.226 There, both parties 
had peacefully coexisted in separate spheres of the business world under some form of the surname 
"Reed". The plaintiff, trading under the name Reed Employment, was an established employment 
firm. The defendant, trading under the name Reed Elsevier, was engaged in the publication of 
magazines and journals. Conflict arose, when the defendant expanded its horizons and commenced 
operation of a jobs posting website, at Totaljobs.com. The website contained visible uses of the 
Reed Elsevier name and logo, as well as the invisible metatag "Reed Business Information". 
Additionally, the defendant purchased the keyword "Reed" from Yahoo!, which resulted in banner 
advertisements for defendant's website to appear when that term was searched for using the Yahoo! 
search engine. 
The plaintiff brought an action alleging trade mark infringement and passing off.227  In the 
decision by Mr Justice Pumfrey, separate attention was paid to the invisible uses of the trade mark 
"Reed". Pumfrey J stated:228 
[Legislation] require[s] use of the sign in the course of trade for there to be infringement. I take this to 
mean that the sign is to be used for business purposes. It appears clear that the use must also be what has 
often been called trade mark use, that is to say, use whose purpose or effect is to indicate the trade origin 
of the goods or services. I think that the use of the word 'Reed' in the phrase 'Reed Business Information' 
satisfies this test. What gives me concern in the context of this action … is the relevance of the use if its 
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only effect is to allow the Defendants' website to appear in the list of search hits but lower than the 
plaintiffs' website, provided that the Defendants' site does not use the word when it is accessed. In other 
words, does the user of a web search engine suppose that when he or she searches against, say 'Reed 
jobs' the sites raised have any connection with the Claimant? Obviously if they are to do so, the search 
must include the word 'Reed'. But if that search is done, the exhibits show many results having no 
connection with the Claimants at all.229 
... This seems to me to be an infringing use: it is akin to having the labels printed and attached to the 
goods, but not yet having moved them outside the factory. But where no such material appears on the 
search engine results, why should it infringe? The argument by analogy suggests that the search engine 
is to be taken to be the eyes of the user, but I suspect that is a poor analogy. Like many computer 
applications, the intervention of a human is essential to sort the rubbish from the potentially interesting 
in any web search. Nonetheless, my view is that the concept of use is wide enough to cover invisible use 
in metatags which is visible in the search results.  
Pumfrey J also concluded there was passing off.  His Honour said "[s]o far as the invisible uses, 
the answer again seems to turn on the question whether the Defendants can be said to be responsible 
in any way for the appearance of the site in response to a search against 'Reed', and, if so, what the 
nature of that responsibility is."230 
The decision of the High Court was appealed and reversed, as the judge's finding was "not 
explicitly tied to any particular form of infringement".231 Jacob LJ on the topic of the invisible uses 
of the trade mark "Reed", beginning with the Yahoo! banner ad, said:232 
I am unable to agree with this. The banner itself referred only to totaljobs – there was no visible 
appearance of the word Reed at all. Whether the use as a reserved word can fairly be regarded as "use in 
the course of trade" or not (as to which I express no opinion), I cannot see that causing the unarguably 
inoffensive-in-itself banner to appear on a search under the name "Reed" or "Reed jobs" can amount to 
an … infringement. The web-using member of the public knows that all sorts of banners appear when he 
or she does a search and they are or may be triggered by something in the search. He or she also knows 
that searches produce fuzzy results – results with much rubbish thrown in. The idea that a search under 
the name Reed would make anyone think there was a trade connection between a total jobs banner 
making no reference to the word "Reed" and Reed Employment is fanciful. No likelihood of confusion 
was established. 
  
229  Ibid, para 35. 
230  Ibid, para 37. 
231  Reed Executive plc and Reed Solutions plc v Reed Business Information Ltd and Reed Elsevier (UK) Ltd 
and Totaljobs.com, above n 216, para 139. 
232  See Reed Executive plc and Reed Solutions plc v Reed Business Information Ltd and Reed Elsevier (UK) Ltd 
and Totaljobs.com [2004] EWCA Civ 159, para 140-142 (emphasis added). 
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That is not to say, of course, that if anyone actually clicked through (and few did) and found an 
infringing use, there could not be infringement. Whether there was or not would depend solely on the 
site content, not the banner. 
... It may be that an invisible use of this sort is not use at all for the purposes of this trade mark 
legislation – the computers who 'read' sets of letters merely 'look for' patterns of 0s and 1s – there is no 
meaning being conveyed to anyone – no 'sign'. 
As to whether the use of the "Reed" keyword to trigger a banner ad constituted passing off, 
Jacob LJ disagreed with the lower Court's finding that there was passing off by substitution.233 
Passing off by substitution is where one good is supplied in place of another, because the consumer 
is unlikely to notice the substitution and is, thus, misled. Jacob LJ found that the concept was "a 
hundred miles from a consumer conducting a search under the name Reed and finding a banner 
which on its face has no connection with his search term." Passing off could only result from the 
content of the webpage. 
With respect of the metatags, Jacob LJ found that, because evidence showed that a search for 
"Reed jobs" listed totaljobs below Reed Employment, there was no misrepresentation.234 Anyone 
looking for Reed Employment would find it, whether the metatag was visible or not. His Honour 
found no infringement, as, "[a]ssuming metatag use counts as use of a trade mark, there is simply no 
confusion."235  He stated that the "purpose [of the metatag] is irrelevant to trade mark infringement 
and causing a site to appear in a search result, without more, does not suggest any connection with 
anyone else."236 
His Honour refrained from deciding whether the metatags constituted use, but pointed out:237 
(a) First, does metatag use count as use of a trade mark at all? In this context it must be remembered 
that use is important not only for infringement but also for saving a mark from non-use. In the latter 
context it would at least be odd that a wholly invisible use could defeat a non-use attack. … Uses read 
only by computers may not count - they never convey a message to anyone. 
(b)  If metatag use does count as use, is there infringement if the marks and goods or services are 
identical? This is important: one way of competing with another is to use his trade mark in your metatag 
– so that a search for him will also produce you in the search results. Some might think this unfair – but 
others that this is good competition provided that no-one is misled. 
  
233  Ibid, para 26. 
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236  Ibid, para 148. 
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  47 
(c)  If metatag use can fall within the infringement provisions …, can the defences … apply, for 
instance the own name defence? The Judge thought they could not because the use was invisible. That 
makes little sense - why should visibility be irrelevant to [infringement] but relevant to [defences]?  
The use of the "Reed" metatag was held not to constitute passing off, as there was no 
misrepresentation causing damage.238 
As I interpret the Court of Appeal decision in Reed v Reed Elsevier, although the Court did not 
definitively rule out the possibility that a party's use of another party's trade mark as a metatag and 
keywords could constitute "trade mark use" for purposes of an infringement action, it certainly cast 
doubt on it. Although Jacob LJ qualifies stating that he expresses no (or is reserving his) opinion,239 
it is rather apparent, that Jacob LJ is only just barely "reserving" his opinion. Indeed, there are some 
statements where it is readily apparent that he does not consider this to be a "use in the course of 
trade".240 It is also striking that Jacob LJ examines the question of "use" from the perspective of 
whether or not such "use" would qualify in terms of "saving a mark from non-use". 241  As to 
"wholly invisible use" of potentially defeating a "non-use attack",242 (in other words, if a third-party 
were to attack a registration on the grounds of abandonment or non-use, and the owner's only proof 
of use was an invisible use, such as use as a metatag) Jacob LJ indicates his view that "it would at 
least be odd" that such evidence could possibly be sufficient. 
Accordingly, the English Court of Appeal has cast doubt on the concept that invisible uses of 
trade marks, such as within metatags or as keywords, could constitute "use in the course of trade" 
for purposes of trade mark infringement. As is noted by Kitchin and Llewelyn, this view is not 
without some caveats:243 
Prior to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Reed Executive it seemed clear that under the 1994 Act 
use of a mark in a metatag does constitute use of the sign for the purposes of infringement. The fact that 
the metatag is normally not seen should not make any difference, due to s.103 (2) which specifically 
includes use 'otherwise than by means of a graphic representation'. Likewise for passing off: the fact that 
the user may not see the metatag might be thought not to remove the misrepresentation. 
  
238  See Reed Executive plc and Reed Solutions plc v Reed Business Information Ltd and Reed Elsevier (UK) Ltd 
and Totaljobs.com, above n 216, para 28. 
239  Ibid, para 140 and 149. 
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242  Ibid, para 149. 
243  David Kitchin and David Llewelyn et al Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (14 ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 2005) 736-737. 
 
48 KEYWORD ADVERTISING, AND OTHER INVISIBLE USES OF THIRD-PARTY TRADE MARKS IN ONLINE ADVERTISING 
With respect of the above reference to section 103(2) of the UK's Trade Marks Act 1994, I 
suggest that section 103(2)'s apparent expansion of the concept of trade mark use still requires some 
sort of use that the senses can detect. In other words, trade marks can be registered to protect smells 
and sounds, the "use" and infringement of which certainly would not be "by means of a graphic 
representation". Accordingly, it could be argued that section 102(3) does not contemplate "invisible 
use", per se, but rather a use that is perceptible by some sense other than sight. Perhaps instead of 
referring to "invisible use", I should refer to it as "humanly imperceptible use". This may well be 
supported by Cornish and Llewelyn's, who stated that:244 
Advertising jingles can be written in musical notation, non-musical sounds can be described ('the roar of 
a lion'), smells can be defined in terms of chemical components, by chromatographical analysis or even 
by reference to elements in the product which cause them. 'Graphic representation' may well be limited 
to clear and easily determined means of describing sensations which can be appreciated by hearing or 
smell. 
Kitchin and Llewelyn go on to analyse the issue of invisible use in the wake of Reed 
Executive:245 
The difficulty identified by Jacob L.J. is whether the use of a mark as a metatag or an advertising 
keyword constitutes use which is capable of affecting the functions of a trade mark, given that in normal 
operation the consumer will not be aware of the use by the defendant itself, merely of the results of the 
use (the display of a competitor's advertisement or a higher position on a search engine result table). In 
many circumstances it is the consumer who has typed in the mark in issue, and the only visible use on 
the consumer's screen, alongside the advertisements and search results complained of. A further 
difficulty identified in Reed is the issue of whether, assuming such use was capable of constituting use 
for the purposes of trade mark infringement, it would also constitute use for the purposes of defeating an 
application to revoke for non-use? In response to the latter point, it is difficult to see how 'invisible' or 
metatag use could be use in order to create or preserve an outlet for goods and services as required by 
Ansul. 
I also suggest that the Court of Appeal decision in Reed tends to show that the US doctrine of 
Initial Interest Confusion246 would not find the UK as hospitable soil in which to take root. Indeed, 
the decision appears to place a higher degree of confidence in the savvy of the average Web user 
than Judge O'Scannlain did in the Brookfield247 decision. 
  
244  William Cornish and David Llewelyn Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied 
Rights (4 ed, Street & Maxwell, London, 1999) s 17-21. 
245   Kitchin and Llewelyn Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, above n 248, 737-738, citing Ansul v 
Ajax [2003] ECR I-2439 (C40/01). 
246  See below. 
247  See below. 
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B Other UK Guidance 
Mindful of the requirement that the infringing use must be a use "in the course of trade", it is 
perhaps of value to look at the 1945 case Aristoc Ltd v Rysta Ltd.248 Although not an infringement 
case, but rather one dealing with an application to register a trade mark, it still offers some guidance 
on what "in the course of trade" might be:249 
The proprietor is required to be a trader who places the goods before the public as being his goods. That 
is the vital connection, not some later partial and ephemeral attribution to some one else. Trade is a very 
wide term: it is one of the oldest and commonest words in the English language. Its great width of 
meaning and application can be seen by referring to the heading in the Oxford English Dictionary. But it 
must always be read in its context. That gives it the special connotation appropriate to the particular 
case. In the 1938 Act the context shows that "trade" refers to selling or otherwise trading in the goods to 
which the mark is applied. Thus in s 26(2)(6), we find the words "goods to be sold or otherwise traded 
in"; the same collocation of words is found in s 31; and again in s 68 in the definition of Limitations. 
These instances show that trade is here used in the particular sense of merchanting, selling or the like, 
which would nowadays include the more modern practices of hire purchase, leasing (eg, of valuable 
machines), letting out for public use, exporting, etc. But equally it is clear that repairing or processing or 
the like is not included because it is not trade in the particular sense intended. This construction is 
consonant with the established user in the past of the word trade mark and the established definition of 
its functions.  
Also in the registration context is the guidance offered by Cornish and Llewelyn which, in 
interpreting the UK's Trade Marks Act 1994, notes that:250 
[w]hereas the previous law required that trade marks had to indicate 'a connection in the course of trade', 
the TMA 1994, following the Directive, refers to the capacity to distinguish goods or services of one 
undertaking from those of other undertakings. In the course of Parliamentary debate on the Bill, the 
Government insisted that this wording (from the Directive) implied that the mark must be used in 
commercial context and therefore refused to accept an amendment which would have said so explicitly. 
All in all, a requirement for a trade connection continues to be necessary. 
  
248  Aristoc Ltd v Rysta Ltd and Another [1945] 1 All ER 34. Decided under the 1938 Act, s 68, and in particular 
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Rights (5 ed, Street & Maxwell, London, 2003) 655, citing Hansard, HL Vol 552, cols 732-733. 
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C Australian Jurisprudence 
In Australia, trade mark use is also a "gatekeeper issue" in an infringement action; an action may 
not proceed under the theory of trade mark infringement if the defendant has not used the mark as a 
trade mark.251 According to "Shanahan's Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off ", the 
"use as a trade mark" prerequisite is found not only in the Australian Trade Marks Act 1995, but has 
its origins prior to the passage of that Act,252 in Yeast-Vite, which held that "the exclusive right to 
the use of such trade mark … carried with it the implication of use of the mark as a trade mark to 
denote origin in the person using it".253 Use of a trade mark for descriptive or functional purposes is 
not trade mark use. 
With respect of the visibility of a mark as being a component of "use of a trade mark", the 2002 
case of Philmac Pty Ltd v Registrar of Trade Marks is useful. It was not an infringement case, but 
one dealing with the minimum requirement of use in an application for registration. In considering 
the use of colour in a trade mark, and whether or not that served as a trade mark, Mansfield J stated 
that "[u]nless it is a visible feature of the goods in respect of which registration is sought, it cannot 
be capable of distinguishing those goods in the course of trade from the goods of other persons."254  
In the infringement context, the Federal Court of Australia held that for in order for an 
infringement to have taken place, the mark must have been used to indicate origin:255 
(i)  'Use' of a trade mark for the purposes of the Act means use as a 'badge of origin' that indicates a 
connection in the course of trade between the goods and the person who applies the mark to those 
goods. 
(ii)  To determine whether there has been 'use as a trade mark' requires an analysis of whether the 
alleged infringer has used a sign so as to indicate origin in itself, not whether the alleged infringer has 
used a sign so as to indicate origin in the registered owner of the mark. 
  
251  Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth), s 120. "Use" is defined in s 7.  
252  Mark Davison, Kate Johnston and Patricia Kennedy Shanahan's Australian Law of Trade Marks and 
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VII  BEYOND TRADE MARK INFRINGEMENT - PASSING OFF AND THE 
FAIR TRADING ACT 1986 
The owner of a New Zealand trade mark, who might find itself a plaintiff in an enforcement 
action for trade mark infringement, will be likely to employ what is often called a "shotgun 
approach", ie, to claim any and all means of relief available. In other words, the complaint will 
likely raise trade mark infringement, passing off and violation of the Fair Trading Act 1986.256 
Further, passing off is something of a safety net for trade mark infringement, and the Fair Trading 
Act is a safety net beneath that; the respective burdens of proof appear to be less for each respective 
cause of action, as the cases I will discuss will show. Indeed, as was noted in Patience & Nicholson 
(NZ) Ltd v Cyclone Hardware Pty Ltd, "the Fair Trading Act has a wider scope than the action for 
passing off; there is no need to show damage to goodwill."257  
A Passing Off 
The common law tort of passing off is similar to trade mark infringement, but rather than protect 
the "property right" in the mark, passing off protects the goodwill therein.258 Further, it will also 
provide protection for a mark that has not been registered as a trade mark, ie, a common law trade 
mark. Indeed, an action based on trade mark infringement cannot be brought without a registered 
trade mark.259  
The term "passing off" first appears in the 1842 case Perry v Truefitt.260  Wilberforce J in 
Norman Kark Publications Ltd v Odhams Press Ltd emphasised the need for a showing of goodwill 
in the name and deceptive use by the defendant.261 The essential elements in proving the tort of 
passing off were set forth in Erven Warnink RV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd,262 the "Advocaat" 
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case. Lord Diplock identified five characteristics which must be present to give rise to a valid cause 
of action as:263 
(1) a misrepresentation, (2) made by a trader in the course of trade, (3) to prospective customers of his or 
ultimate consumers of goods or services supplied by him, (4) which is calculated to injure the business 
or goodwill of another trader (in the sense that this is a reasonably foreseeable consequence) and (5) 
which causes actual damage to a business or goodwill of the trader by whom the action is brought or (in 
a quia timet action) will probably do so. 
However, Lord Diplock offered a cautionary note following that test, noting that everything had 
to be taken in context.264 As summarised by Frankel and McLay: 
[i]n short, not all fact situations that satisfy the test will necessarily give rise to passing off. ...  His 
Lordship was then clear that the law he was formulating to protect competition, should not become a 
tool to prevent that very competition. 
Also within the Erven Warnink decision we find another classic test for passing off, from Lord 
Fraser of Tullybelton, who stated:265 
(1) that his business consists of, or includes, selling in England a class of goods to which the particular 
trade name applies; (2) that the class of goods is clearly defined, and that in the minds of the public, or a 
section of the public, in England, the trade name distinguishes that class from other similar goods; (3) 
that because of the reputation of the goods, there is goodwill attached to the name; (4) that he, the 
plaintiff, as a member of the class of those who sell the goods, is the owner of goodwill in England 
which is of substantial value; (5) that he has suffered, or is really likely to suffer, substantial damage to 
his property in the goodwill by reason of the defendants selling goods which are falsely described by the 
trade name to which the goodwill is attached. 
While it may seem odd to have not one but two tests for passing off within the same case, any 
apparent contradiction is dismissed in decisions such as that of Oliver J, who held in Anheuser-
Busch Inc v Budejovicky Budvar NP:266 
These two statements of principle complement one another, Lord Diplock emphasising what has been 
done by the defendant to give rise to the complaint, and Lord Fraser what the plaintiff has to show as a 
prerequisite of complaining. Since the remaining members of their Lordship's House agreed with both 
speeches, it is not in dispute that the two statements have to be taken as a composite. 
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The twin-perspectives of defendant and plaintiff espoused by Lords Diplock and Fraser has also 
been characterised as a reflection on the dual nature of the tort, in Taylor Bros Ltd v Taylors Group 
Ltd, where the High Court held that "[t]he law about passing off represents a compromise between 
two conflicting objectives, on the one hand the public interest in free competition, on the other the 
protection of a trader against unfair competition by others."267  
In hopes of simplifying the matter, I offer one last test in passing off cases, which has come to 
be known as "the classical trinity".268 It is the three-pronged test espoused by Lord Oliver in Reckitt 
& Colman v Borden, which sets forth the basic elements of passing off, goodwill, misrepresentation 
and damage.269 
1 The misrepresentation element 
Misrepresentation is the cornerstone of an action in passing off:270 
It does not automatically follow that the commencement of business in New Zealand under a name the 
same as, or similar to, that of an existing like business will amount to passing off. It is still necessary to 
consider whether the use by the defendants of the (plaintiff's) trade name ... is a misrepresentation in the 
sense that they have, innocently or deliberately, described their goods in a way calculated to injure the 
business or goodwill of the plaintiff by leading persons doing business with them to suppose that they are 
doing business with the plaintiff.   
Further, the misrepresentation must be "reasonably foreseeable as injurious to the business or 
goodwill of another trader and in fact damaging to the goodwill of the trader who sues."271 As was 
noted by Gault J in the Wineworths case:272  
It is necessary to keep firmly in mind that it is in the market or trade setting that the issues arise for 
determination. It is the point at which goods or services are bought and sold, where business dealings are 
transacted that the elements of the tort are to be investigated. It is concerned with trade or business 
goodwill and with conduct in trade or commerce establishing or injuring that goodwill. The manner in 
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which a name is presented in trade will dictate the goodwill that is generated. It is the understanding of 
those engaged in trade that will dictate whether or not they are, or will be, misled.273 
Misrepresentation need not be intentional and it is not necessary to "show particular instances of 
deception or damage, although if that can be done it would strengthen the plaintiff's case."274 In 
Patience v Nicholson case:275 
It is, of course, the best evidence of likely future deception. It is notoriously difficult to obtain. It has 
been said 'the more complete the deception, the less likely its detection'. I bear in mind also that 
evidence of confusion is not the decisive question. Confusion is not the same as deception and may arise 
without any misrepresentation. 
2 Damage to goodwill required 
As is noted in the above tests, in order for the plaintiff to succeed in a passing off action, it must 
not only prove that it has goodwill in the mark, but that the defendant's actions either caused damage 
to that goodwill, or "probably" or was "really likely" to do so.276 In Taylor Brothers,277 McGechan 
J identified three categories of loss actionable in passing off – diversion of trade, loss to reputation 
and dilution, where:278 
[d]iversion is an appropriation of the plaintiff's goodwill. Damage to reputation amounts to a poisoning 
of the plaintiff's goodwill. Damage by suggestion of association of the plaintiff's business amounts to a 
dilution of the plaintiff's goodwill. 
(a) Source motivation 
The discussion of damage to goodwill brings us to so-called "source motivation". This is 
especially interesting with respect to the discussion of the use of trade marks as keywords, and 
against the American jurisprudential concept of "Initial Interest Confusion", as will be discussed in 
more depth below. As discussed by Frankel and McLay:279 
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In Tot Toys, Fisher J emphasised that 'source motivation' was an essential element of a diversion action. 
It is not enough that the plaintiff had lost customers to a competitor, but rather the plaintiff needs to 
establish that the customers it had lost linked the competitor's products to its own. 
3 Analysis of Passing Off 
I now look at the availability of passing off as a cause of action by a trade mark owner whose 
mark has been used as a keyword, to trigger a sponsor link to a competitor's ad. I will first look at 
the possible defendants. Beginning with the competitor, in an action for passing off, a trade mark 
owner would generally have a difficult burden of proof with respect of passing off claim. All such 
cases, of course, rely on the facts at hand. However, the challenges facing the trade mark owner, in 
my view, and making use of Lord Diplock's five part test, are as follows: 
1. Is the use of the plaintiff's trade mark to trigger a sponsor link owned by the defendant 
competitor a "misrepresentation"? 
2, 3 Is that triggering use made by the defendant competitor "in the course of trade", and to the 
plaintiff's prospective customers? 
4. Is the triggering use "calculated to injure the business or goodwill" of the plaintiff? 
5. Does the triggering use in fact damage the plaintiff's goodwill in the mark, and/or is such 
damage probable? 
So, is the use of a trade mark as a keyword by a competitor of the mark owner a passing off? 
Again, the answer will lie within the facts of the case, but perhaps it is best to look at this issue 
using the scenarios I introduced in the analysis of Section 89(1) of the Trade Mark Act 2002, above, 
vis-à-vis the salient elements in the tests for passing off, discussed above.280 
(a) Misrepresentation? 
In Scenario One, misrepresentation could indeed be found, since Beech is using the keyword 
"Cypress" to bring a would-be Cypress customer to the Beech site, and is using the Cypress trade 
mark deceptively in the heading and body of the link. As was held in Yves St Laurent Parfums, 
"[t]he nature of a relevant misrepresentation can vary. Often it takes the form of a representation that 
the goods being sold by the defendant are a plaintiff's goods."281  
On the topic of possible misrepresentation in the online advertising context, Yves St Laurent 
Parfums stated:282  
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It is not necessary for a misrepresentation to be crass. It may be astute and involve a complex of 
mechanisms of misrepresentation. A representation may operate by invoking a recollection of a 
plaintiff's intellectual property, and in a number of ways, no single one of which may be compelling but 
the combination of which is effective. In the contemporary market, where products are advertised and 
promoted in ways which effectively use the qualities of electronic media, and plainly exploit modern 
knowledge of psychology and sociology, misrepresentations may relate to distinctive mental images and 
connotations in which a plaintiff has acquired a proprietary interest. ... the tort is no longer anchored, as 
in its early nineteenth century formulation, to the name or trade mark of a product or business. It is wide 
enough to encompass other descriptive material, such as slogans or visual images, which radio, 
television, or newspaper advertising campaigns can lead the market to associate with a plaintiff's 
product, provided always that such descriptive material has become part of the goodwill of the product. 
In Scenario Two, it is my view that misrepresentation would be more difficult, if not impossible 
to show, since the heading and body of the link do not mention the name Cypress. Plaintiff would 
have to show that a misrepresentation has taken place, some degree of deception. As noted above, 
this will be a fact-driven analysis. 
Scenario Three would pose an even harder standard for plaintiff to meet, given the openness of 
the use of Beech's own trade mark(s) within the body and heading of the link. Unless the linked ad 
itself, or other elements about the link were found to be misleading, deceptive, or otherwise a 
misrepresentation, it is my view that passing off would be hard to prove.  
Scenario Four would, in my view, be the least likely possibility for a finding of passing off, 
especially given the fact that comparative advertising is lawful in New Zealand; accordingly, as long 
as the use is generally in good faith, "honest practices" are adhered to, and the use of the plaintiff's 
mark does not take "unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute 
of the trade mark", I would submit that the plaintiff would be hard pressed to succeed in a showing 
of misrepresentation.283 
These views find some support in "Shanahan's Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing 
Off",284 in the following passage, which refers to Lord Diplock's five-part test: 
It is possible to find within his Lordship's formulation of passing off, four broad categories of 
misrepresentation: 
(a) misrepresentation by which the defendant's business or product is associated with the plaintiff (or 
with some class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member); 
  
283  Trade Marks Act 2002, s 94. 
284  Davison, Johnston and Kennedy Shanahan's Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off, above n 252, 
496. 
 
  57 
(b) misrepresentation praising the defendant's business or product without reference to that of the 
plaintiff; 
(c) misrepresentation disparaging the plaintiff's business or product without reference to that of the 
defendant; and 
(d) misrepresentation unfavourably comparing the plaintiff's business or product with that of the 
defendant. 
The first is clearly passing off.... 
As for the second, this has provided a competitor with no basis at all for relief at common law285 
(though it, like the three other categories, may sustain an action in deceit by a purchaser).286 While 
authority on the subject is sparse, this second category seems clearly enough to be one of those forms of 
'inaccurate statement' noted by Lord Diplock for which the policy of the common law has denied 
redress. ... 
As for the third and fourth categories, both have been tortious hitherto, as injurious falsehood, but only 
on proof of malice and actual damage.287 
The final comment on misrepresentation, is suggestive of the "gatekeeper issue" that the "trade 
mark use theory" seeks to be. Is misrepresentation to passing off what the trade mark use theory is to 
infringement? In other words, if it does not misrepresent, it cannot be passing off? The logical next 
question: Is the use of a trade mark to trigger a competitor's ad a misrepresentation, per se? If the 
user types in NIKON and a Sponsored Link appears on the right that either says DIGITAL 
CAMERAS or CANON, is that a misrepresentation? If not, then I would suggest that only when the 
link itself, and/or the linked-to ad contains a misrepresentation, can you then go through the rest of 
the test for passing off. If not, then the "gatekeeper issue" of misrepresentation should eject the case 
at that point. 
(b) In the Course of Trade? 
In applying the longer Lord Diplock test, the next question is, would the triggering use of a trade 
mark be "in the course of trade" and to the plaintiff's "prospective customers?" This question, of 
course, will invoke comparisons to the whole "trade mark use theory", "use as a trade mark" and 
"trade mark use" discussions that have been hotly debated in US keyword cases. A use "made in the 
  
285  Ibid, there is a footnote that reads "But will under the Trade Practices Act 1974, which catches all four kinds 
of misrepresentation." 
286  Ibid, it is noted that "Equity will provide rescission. At common law, such a representation, if fraudulent, is 
actionable as deceit, for which both rescission and damages are available." 
287   Davison, Johnston and Kennedy Shanahan's Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off, above n 252, 
496-497. 
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course of trade" it is a lower threshold than "use as a trade mark".288 The plaintiff would argue that, 
by virtue of purchasing its trade mark and then having it trigger sponsored ads to the defendant's 
web site, the mark was being used in the course of trade. 
The plaintiff would likely need to offer analogies to other passing off cases to support this view, 
however. Certainly, it would be tempting to offer the Court of Appeal decision in British 
Telecommunications Plc v One In A Million Ltd,289 where domain name cybersquatting was held to 
be passing off. In that case, the defendants were engaged in the registration of domain names that 
corresponded with popular trade marks.290 The respective owners of the trade marks brought suit 
for trade mark infringement and passing off.291 
In the High Court, this conduct was enjoined.292 The decision of Deputy Judge, Sumption QC, 
was a curious one. He explained that it was not passing off, since the registration of the domain 
names only constituted an "instrument of deception",293 but that an injunction was nevertheless 
proper, because it was reasonably foreseeable that the goodwill of the plaintiffs could be damaged. 
Of particular significance as to whether, or not, a use of a trade mark as a keyword to trigger a 
competitor's ad might be a "use in the course of trade", the High Court in Marks & Spencer contains 
an interesting determination:294 
What then are the issues which the defendants say should go to trial under this head? There appear to be 
two: (i) they deny that their use of it has been 'in the course of trade'; and (ii) they contend that it is an 
implicit requirement … that there should have been a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, 
and there has been none. 
The first of these points can be shortly dealt with. Use 'in the course of trade' means use by way of 
business. It does not mean use as a trade mark ... The use of a trade mark in the course of the business of 
a professional dealer for the purpose of making domain names more valuable and extracting money 
from the trade mark owner is a use in the course of trade. 
In the Court of Appeal in One in a Million, Aldous J determined that the mere registration of a 
domain name could in fact be a passing off, to the extent to which the act could be considered "an 
  
288  As required by Trade Marks Act 2002, s 89(2).  
289  British Telecommunications Plc v One in a Million Ltd, above n 184. 
290  Ibid, 4. 
291  Ibid, 3-4. 
292  British Telecommunications Plc v One in a Million Ltd [1998] FSR 265. 
293  Ibid, 271. 
294  Marks & Spencer Plc v One in a Million Ltd [1998] FSR 265, 315. 
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instrument of fraud".295 I should note that One in a Million has been criticised as being an over-
extension of passing off, 296  but it has been followed in Global Projects Management Ltd v 
Citigroup Inc:297   
A key strand in Aldous's LJ reasoning was that the main names which One in a Million succeeded in 
having registered to it were 'instruments of fraud.' I do not think that he meant fraud in the criminal and 
most pejorative sense of the term. … 
The reason why the domain names were regarded by Aldous LJ as instruments of fraud was not that One 
in a Million itself used the domain names to make fraudulent misrepresentations to the public that goods 
and services supplied by it were the goods and services of, for example, Marks & Spencer or British 
Telecom. One in a Million's main defence to the passing off claim had been that, although companies 
like Marks & Spencer and British Telecom may have disliked what One in a Million was doing, it was 
not trying to supply any goods or services to anybody. Aldous LJ did not accept the defence, and in the 
circumstances I consider that it is not open to me to accept the equivalent defence in this case either. The 
mere registration and maintenance in force of a domain name which leads, or may lead, people to 
believe that the holder of the domain is linked with a person is enough to make the domain a potential 
'instrument of fraud', and it is passing off. 
(c) Damage to goodwill? 
In any of the above scenarios, whether or not the triggering use was "calculated to injure the 
business or goodwill" of the plaintiff, or was the cause of "actual damage" are factual matters, but it 
would appear that such could indeed be proven, given the appropriate fact patterns. For example, if 
the triggered link were to contain disparaging references to the owner of the mark or its 
goods/services, or feature knock-off products that were, in and of themselves, passing off, damage 
could be easily shown. In Scenario One, since the plaintiff's mark is used in the heading and body of 
the ad, in a way that could be considered deceptive in and of itself, the plaintiff would be capable of 
proving damage to goodwill. It would be a matter of proof. 
Until now, my analysis has been somewhat limited to a competitor (mis)using a trade mark as a 
keyword, to trigger an advertisement to his site, ie, the Beech and Cypress scenarios. But earlier in 
this paper, I suggested that a non-competitor might wish to purchase a very popular trade mark, one 
that is expected to be searched for often, simply to have sponsor links appear, offering anything 
from pornography, malware, and other potentially harmful content. To the extent to which the mark 
holder's goodwill might be damaged, or the mark itself "diluted ", or its distinctiveness impaired, 
  
295   British Telecommunications Plc v One in a Million Ltd, above n 184, 10. 
296  Sims "Rethinking One in a Million", above n 268, as well as Jason Goodall "The Unruly Rise of Passing 
Off" (2002) 9 Auck U LR 643, 1004. 
297  Global Projects Management Ltd v Citigroup Inc and others [2005] EWHC 2663, paras 39-40.   
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Taylor Bros Ltd is relevant, as it states that "in some cases it is legitimate to infer damage from a 
tendency to impair distinctiveness. "298 
4 New Zealand domain name cases brought under passing off 
As was discussed above, there have been a number of New Zealand cases about the registration 
and use of domain names, brought as passing off actions.299 These cases might be of some use in 
terms of reviewing the implementation of the test for passing off in the keyword advertising context. 
In Oggi Advertising Ltd, the plaintiff was an advertising firm,300 which came to discover that the 
defendant had registered the domain name OGGI.CO.NZ.301 The defendant soon posted a one-page 
website, containing the following statement:302 
OPEN YOUR EYES 
80 Million people can drive past 
EVERY DAY 
THE CHANGING FACE OF ADVERTISING 
The plaintiff brought an action in passing off.303 In holding for the plaintiff, Baragwanath J 
relied on One in a Million,304 holding that Lord Diplock's five-part test for passing off had been 
met:305 
1. There has been floated into cyberspace a misrepresentation associating Mr McKenzie and his 
alias 'Ron Towitt' with the plaintiff's name 'Oggi' and a homepage referable to its business of outdoor 
advertising. 
2. There was accordingly a clear business implication. 
3. New Zealand users of the web are prospective customers. 
  
298  Taylor Bros Ltd v Taylors Group Ltd, above n 267, 52, citing. 
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section, infra. 
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4. By diverting business intended to go to the plaintiff, the conduct is calculated to injure its 
goodwill. 
5. The conduct will probably cause actual damage, not least in the competition with the plaintiff's 
major competitor. 
In the New Zealand Post case, the defendant registered NZPOST.COM, whereas the plaintiff 
had already registered, and operated its website, at NZPOST.CO.NZ.306 The defendant used the 
domain name NZPOST.COM to present a directory of other sites, such as an Auckland modelling 
agency, adult-oriented material, matchmaking and other such content.307 The plaintiff brought an 
action in passing off, and under the Fair Trading Act and prevailed in having the High Court rule in 
its favour because of NZ Post’s goodwill in its name both in New Zealand and overseas 
Baragwanath J held that:308 
there is enough to suggest that his domain site is under development and … that it receives a large 
number of 'hits'. 
The Court has little difficulty in concluding that the domain site nzpost.com is likely to be confused with 
nzpost.co by all but experienced users of the Internet and that, notwithstanding the need for precise 
identity, information sought by inquirers using search engines and browsers may also lead them to 
nzpost.com and thus result in confusion. … 
As far as the cause of action under the Fair Trading Act 1986 is concerned, again, in the Court's view, 
there is sufficient to show at least a prima facie case for breach even though Mr Leng may only have 
been trading in a modest way to the present time.309 
The DB Breweries case, discussed above, also discusses causes of action in passing off and the 
Fair Trading Act 1986. 
5 Concluding thoughts on passing off  
My analysis has focused on the conduct and potential liability of the competitor as the plaintiff. 
But what of the conduct and potential liability of Search Engine? It is my view that Search Engine 
could indeed be found liable under the analyses shown above, depending on what level of 
involvement a Court would determine Search Engine to have taken, given the decisions in the 
domain name and company name cases referenced above, namely, One in a Million, Fletcher 
  
306  New Zealand Post Ltd, above n 202, 220. 
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Challenge, Citicorp, Direct Line, Glaxo,310 and related cases. In these actions, the defendant was 
not necessarily the end user of the misappropriated name, it was in the position of a broker, or 
someone looking to leverage the name, either back to the "rightful owner ", or to sell it to a third-
party, in whose hands it was viewed as either an "instrument of deception" or an "instrument of 
fraud". From this perspective, I suggest that the defendants' role could be akin to that of Search 
Engine. 
On the other hand, I note that in the above cases, as well as in the New Zealand domain name 
cases New Zealand Post, Oggi Advertising and DB Breweries, there was a party to the transaction 
that was held not liable. Indeed, in all of these and other domain name cases, the domain name 
registrar has consistently been held to have been above the fray.311 Would Search Engine be viewed 
as the broker with unclean hands, as in the One in a Million and Glaxo line of cases, or as the 
neutral, good-faith purveyor of keywords on a first-come, first-served basis, as with domain name 
registrars? This characterisation could be the crux of the case, in my view. 
Further support for immunity of search engines would be the dicta found in the Leafscreen case, 
discussed above. In that case, the High Court was prepared to absolve Telecom Directories Ltd of 
liability since its role was only that of a "publisher" or "conduit".312  
B Fair Trading Act 1986 
Characterised in its introduction as "[a]n Act to prohibit certain conduct and practices in trade, 
to provide for the disclosure of consumer information relating to the supply of goods and services 
and to promote product safety ...",313 the Act regulates misleading and deceptive conduct.314  
It is my view that trade mark infringement is the hardest case for a New Zealand plaintiff to 
prove, with passing off serving as a "safety net" or backstop to trade mark infringement, especially 
for an unregistered mark. For the past 20 years, New Zealand plaintiffs have had the Fair Trading 
Act (FTA) to catch those cases where the other two remedies might not apply. As noted by Frankel 
and McLay:315 
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[r]ather than conferring a property right, the Fair Trading Act protects only consumers' interest in not 
being misled or deceived as to the origin of those goods. Passing off lies somewhere in the middle of a 
continuum between property right conferred by the Trade Marks Act, and a consumer protection status 
of the Fair Trading Act. 
1 Focus on conduct 
One of the reasons for the view that an infringement action is the hardest to win results from the 
simple fact that trade mark infringement requires a showing of "use as a trade mark ",316 which is 
more difficult to prove (at least in the keyword advertising context) than use "in the course of 
trade", 317  one of the requirements in passing off. What does the FTA require in terms of the 
defendant's behaviour? Conduct, nothing more, just conduct, ie, some activity that is misleading 
and/or deceptive. 
On this topic, I offer an interesting anecdote, from "Shanahan's Australian Law of Trade Marks 
and Passing Off":318 
It is said that there were three tailors side by side in the high street, and that the one in the middle, 
confronted by a 'Summer Sale' to the right and a 'Closing Down Sale' on the left, confounded its rivals 
by erecting a large sign saying simply 'Main Entrance.' It is not reported whether that tailor was ever 
enjoined, but as the case may demonstrate, passing off need not involve the use of any mark or name. 
Indeed, whether or not that tailor was engaging in a passing off, I would submit that he was 
engaging in conduct, possibly misleading or deceptive conduct, at that. But it is important to note 
that courts will look at the big picture, examine all of the facts in context. The decision in New 
Zealand Conference of Seventh Day Adventists v Registrar of Companies319 offers a good overview 
of the examination Courts will place on the defendant's conduct, as well as the degree to which a 
Court will exercise discretion:320 
It will be noted that the Fair Trading Act is not concerned with the use of any particular name or 
expression per se. Rather, the focus lies upon conduct in trade. The conduct may or may not involve the 
use of a name as one of its components but the essentials under s 9 are that it must be conduct in trade 
and that it must be misleading or deceptive or be likely to mislead or deceive. ... A meticulous 
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examination of the particular facts will be necessary in each case.321  Use of a name which would be 
misleading in some circumstances could be perfectly acceptable in others due, for example, to 
accompanying disclaimers, a knowledgeable target group or a context otherwise preventing confusion. 
All of this militates against the possibility that anyone could say in advance that the mere adoption of a 
name per se will necessarily result in a breach of the Fair Trading Act. 
2 Confusion still necessary  
And while the plaintiff's burden of proof is lower under the FTA, the plaintiff must still show 
that the complained-of conduct must be more than just confusing. The Australian case of Chase 
Manhattan Overseas Corporation v Chase Corporation reasoned as follows:322 
I am satisfied that if this occurs there is a possibility some degree of confusion may be created in the 
minds of the public or relevant members of the public; but that circumstances does not resolve this 
matter in favour of the appellants (plaintiffs). ... Conduct does not contravene [the Act] merely because 
members of the public would be caused to wonder whether it might not be the case that two products 
come from the same source or two services are provided by the same source or two business names 
suggest that they come from the same stable. The purpose of [the] Act is to protect consumers by 
eliminating unfair trade practices … [and] to prevent misleading or deceptive conduct which will affect 
the identification of goods or services. Conduct which merely causes some uncertainty in the minds of 
the public does not infringe … [One must be careful not to confer] a statutory monopoly in the word ... 
3 Need for showing of misleading/deceptive conduct, misrepresentation 
Bonz Group (Pty) Ltd v Cooke discussed the misrepresentation element:323 
The essence of a cause of action based on s 9 is some misrepresentation by the defendant. Conduct 
cannot be described as misleading or deceptive or likely to be so unless it involves a misrepresentation 
… 
An important question in the present case is the degree of likelihood required before it can be said that 
the conduct in question is likely to mislead or deceive. The words in s 9 'likely to mislead or deceive' 
import a lesser degree of likelihood than something which is more probable than not. The degree of 
likelihood must involve a real risk in the sense that the misleading or deception could well happen. The 
consequence must be more than a mere possibility. 
The fact that there is evidence that someone has been misled or deceived is relevant but not conclusive. 
It is necessary to identify those members of the public who are vulnerable to or at risk of being misled or 
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deceived by the conduct in question. As was said by Lockhart J in Puxu Pty Ltd v Parkdale Custom 
Built Furniture Pty Ltd (1980) 31 ALR 73, 93 one must consider 'the astute and the gullible, the 
intelligent and the not so intelligent, the well educated as well as the poorly educated, men and women 
of various ages pursuing a variety of vocations'.  
Similarly, the Court of Appeal, in Neumegen v Neumegen and Co, stresses that the focus should 
be on the defendant's conduct, and submits that the conduct must rise to the level of 
misrepresentation.324 Further, "[t]he misrepresentation may be express or arise from silence or from 
conduct. It need not be intentional and often will not be."325 
In CSR Ltd v Resource Capital Australia Pty Ltd,326 the Federal Court of Australia held that the 
registration of domain names corresponding to the plaintiff's trade marks constituted a violation of 
the Trade Practices Act. Concerning the "misleading and deceptive" element, Hill J said:327 
The conduct required of a corporation is that it not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is 
misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive. The Court has an undoubted discretion where it 
is satisfied that a person is either in breach of that code of conduct or is proposing to engage in conduct 
that would be in breach of that code of conduct to grant an injunction in such terms as the Court 
determines to be appropriate. … 
While conduct may be misleading or deceptive even where it does not involve a representation which is 
false, a quite large percentage of the cases where contravention has been found under s52 have involved 
representations. ... 
As is noted by Frankel & McLay:328 
"New Zealand Courts, as in passing off cases, have tended to take what might be termed a 'realistic' view 
of consumer behaviour, accepting that some consumers are fallible and may not make the distinctions 
that other well-informed consumers might, or that lawyers arguing later in Court might. While 
defendants may view this approach as being overly indulgent, New Zealand Courts have sought some 
balance by accepting that there are definite limits to the behaviour that they consider to be misleading or 
deceptive. 
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4 FTA should not be viewed as distortion of passing off 
The decision in the 2005 High Court case World TV Ltd v Best TV Ltd329 makes it clear that the 
FTA, just as is the case with Australia's Trade Practices Act, should be viewed in the proper context 
with the common law tort of passing off.330 It states that the legislation is not a statutory enactment 
of passing-off or its principles.331 The FTA and passing off have different backgrounds, different 
purposes, they serve different interests, and "their areas of operation do not coincide".332  
An early, if not the first, New Zealand case to apply section 9 of the FTA, Taylor Bros Ltd v 
Taylors Group Ltd,333 offers some interesting background on the Act:334 
The Fair Trading Act 1986 has its genesis in requirements for harmonisation of trade practices as 
between New Zealand and Australia related at least in part to the CER Treaty. ... Clearly the New 
Zealand provisions presently relevant to a substantial extent have been derived from their Australian 
counterparts. The leading authorities in Australia, as at late 1986 interpreting and applying such 
Australian provisions would have been known to the draftsman of the New Zealand Act. 
5 Not strictly consumer-oriented: competitors may bring action 
Although having a consumer focus, from the beginning New Zealand courts have made it clear 
that a business competitor may use the Act, as was shown in Taylor Bros Ltd:335 
Its provisions are sufficiently broad to allow proceedings between rival traders. 336  Indeed, the 
Australian experience has been that enforcement through proceedings by rival traders predominates. 
Presumably the intention underlying the New Zealand legislation is to permit likewise. In the absence of 
any effective consumer class action in New Zealand, or history of effective State regulation, a legislative 
intent that the Act be self policing is not surprising. On the recognised Australian approach, the 
provisions concerned are to be construed in their natural and ordinary meaning. In particular, they are 
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not to be read down either by reference to other provisions of the legislation or by reference to the 
general law relating to intellectual property … . 
6 No showing of loss or damage by either competitor or consumer required 
In the view of Frankel & McLay, "[a]llowing a rival trader to sue not for loss or goodwill as 
under passing off, but rather for simple consumer confusion, creates a cause of action quite unlike 
any traditional intellectual property action."337  The Court of Appeal decision in the Prudential 
Building Society case338 indicated a further distinction between passing off and an FTA action, as 
Brisson J said:339 
In the tort of passing off, misrepresentation ... which is calculated to injure the goodwill or business of 
the respondents and does so, … is an essential element. This is not the case where an injunction is 
sought under … the Fair Trading Act. ... McGechan J did not make any finding as to economic loss or 
probably economic loss to [Prudential Assurance]. There may well be some. We prefer to consider the 
case as falling more appropriately under the Fair Trading Act than under the tort of passing off. 
This was echoed in the Taylor Brothers case, where Cooke P held that even though the Act is 
primarily consumer-protection legislation, a rival trader may enforce section 9. The FTA operates 
partly for the benefit of the ethical trader. Such a trader need not show damage to goodwill, because 
the Act has a wider scope than the common law of passing off.340 
Taylor Brothers also established that the rival trader in an FTA action need not prove loss or 
damage to the consumer, all that was necessary was to show that the consumer was deceived, and no 
proof of "impact on the economic interests of consumers" was required.341 The Taylor Brothers 
approach was echoed in Levi Strauss.342  
7 "International goodwill" may also be protected 
An interesting aspect of the FTA's coverage has emerged in cases such as Patience & 
Nicholson.343 For example, an internationally-known mark such as "Victoria's Secret®" with no 
brick-and-mortar retail presence in New Zealand, but with strong name recognition nevertheless, 
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might find its trade mark the subject of illicit use as a keyword during periods of time corresponding 
with one of its television specials. Might it seek relief under the FTA, in spite of its non-presence in 
New Zealand?344 
In the end the question of the existence and extent of reputation and of goodwill must be a matter of fact. 
In the case of a business having an international reputation which extends to New Zealand not much in 
the way of activity in New Zealand would I think be required to establish a goodwill. In such cases the 
reputation itself may be almost tantamount to goodwill, activity having importance in localising that 
reputation in New Zealand. 
8 Application of Fair Trading Act in context of keyword advertising? 
The Seventh Day Adventist decision, in my view, gives guidance on the possible application of 
the FTA to a trade mark keyword advertising scenario, especially with respect to the proposition that 
the use of trade marks in keyword advertising should not be prohibited, per se, but rather that such 
use must be viewed in the totality of the circumstances. Further, it reminds us that words simply 
cannot be taken out of the lexicon without an assessment of how they are being used, and the 
context of that use. 
This point is also addressed in Goldsbro v Walker.345 That case offers further guidance relevant 
to the role played by a third party (such as a search engine). While Goldsbro v Walker dealt with an 
agent/solicitor in a real estate transaction, I suggest that the parallels are of guidance in the trade 
mark keyword advertising context:346 
The general principles applying under the section are well settled. First, the test of whether conduct is 
misleading is objective and requires assessment of the circumstances in which the conduct occurred and 
the person or persons likely to be affected by it. In considering whether conduct is to be characterised as 
misleading it is necessary to apply the ordinary words of the section to the particular facts. Problems 
arising tend to be problems of fact and degree. Second, there is no requirement that the person engaging 
in the conduct must do so intending to mislead or with the purpose of persuading the person affected by 
the conduct. It is sufficient that there is a clear nexus between the conduct and the loss or damage 
suffered. In a context such as the present it is sufficient if the vendors relied on that conduct in deciding 
to take the property off the market. Third, the representation need not be the sole factor influencing the 
person affected by the conduct. 
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Another excerpt from Goldsbro v Walker which might be of help in assessing the potential for 
applicability of the FTA to the use of trade marks in keyword advertising is shown below:347 
There is no difficulty in accepting that an innocent agent who acts merely as a conduit and purports to 
do no more than pass on instructions from his principal does not thereby become responsible for 
anything misleading in the information so passed on. ... On the other hand an agent who does not merely 
purport to pass on what he has been told, or who passes it on inaccurately or in some way adopts it as his 
own or adds to it, may himself thereby engage in misleading conduct. ... 
Section 9 requires that the conduct that is misleading be that of the person charged ... It is not sufficient 
to attract liability that the communication simply purports to pass on information ostensibly provided by 
a third party. In such a case any misleading conduct is that of the third party not of the intermediary. …  
The test under s 9 is objective and on which side of the line a particular case falls turns on an assessment 
of what was conveyed. Was it a representation by the person charged or was it the passing on of 
information for what it was worth to the receiver without any inference that the person charged was 
vouching for it? 
Thus, the question would be asked, in an action under the FTA, if the search engine's conduct 
would be assessed in terms of whether or not the sale of the trade mark as a keyword was akin to 
"the passing on of information", with no appearance of "vouching for it". In the Taylor Brothers 
decision, the view of the Court of Appeal regarding the FTA is that "[m]embers of the public have a 
right not to be misled about with whom they are dealing".348 However, within that same decision is 
the following:349 
Certainly the degree of impact or likely impact on consumers is important. It goes both to whether there 
is a real likelihood that persons will be misled or deceived and to whether the Court in its discretion 
should grant an injunction (or other remedy) under the Act. The case has to be sufficiently serious to 
warrant a remedy. 
How protective would New Zealand courts be of consumers using trade marks in the search 
engine context? How likely would the courts be to use the FTA to enjoin a party from using the 
trade mark of a competitor to trigger a link? Would a court be inclined to invoke the FTA if it felt 
that only a handful of consumers might be deceived? In this context, Patterson J's holding in 
Neumegen is intriguing:350 
  
347  Ibid, 398 and 401-402. 
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However, in our view, if the number of affected members of the public is or will be very small and the 
impact upon those persons is or will be minimal a Court may be justified in taking the view that, looked 
at in the round, the conduct of the defendant is not properly to be characterised as deceptive or 
misleading or that, even if it has to be so characterised, what has occurred or is likely to occur is so 
lacking in real importance to any consumers who may be affected that the Court's discretion may fairly 
be exercised against the granting of a remedy. In considering these questions the Court will make a 
judgment about whether the conduct is of a kind which it is the object of the legislation to curb. 
As such, I suggest that New Zealand Courts will consider the impact of the defendant's conduct 
on consumers on a case-by-case basis, with an eye towards balancing the desire to protect 
consumers, against, as Frankel and McLay have noted, "the reality that (the FTA) might also 
overprotect traders. However, as all intellectual property law is about balance, the difficulty is that 
the New Zealand Courts often do not undertake a balancing of interests."351  
Finally, I echo my comments, above, with respect to the possibility that a search engine would 
want to avail itself of the dicta in Leafscreen NZ Ltd.352 A search engine would likely want to 
characterise itself as merely a publisher or conduit, and thereby escape liability.  
9 Fair Trading Act a cradle for initial interest confusion? 
Within this next subsection, I will examine the possibility that the FTA might serve as fertile 
soil for the trade mark doctrine of Initial Interest Confusion to take root. As was cautioned by 
Frankel and McLay:353 
[t]he simplicity of s 9, combined with the ability of competitors to sue, has the potential to sweep away 
all legal doctrine before it. New Zealand judges have, as have their Australian colleagues in relation to 
the Australian Trade Practices Act, struggled with the relationship between this "consumer protection" 
and more traditional intellectual property rights. Section 9 has none of the balancing of interests that is 
an intrinsic part of traditional intellectual property law, and risks preventing activities that might be 
quite legitimate under other intellectual property doctrines in the name of consumer protection. ... From 
a public policy perspective, allowing trade competitors to enforce consumer protection laws is a double-
edged sword. Compared to a trader's competitors, individual consumers are unlikely to have either the 
inclination or the resources to take actions. However, competitors will, at best, be only partially 
motivated by consumer's interests. 
The decision in the ASB Bank354 case offers some language that brings to mind the foundations 
of the Initial Interest Confusion doctrine. The defendant bank used "HIT" to describe its high 
  
351  Frankel and McLay, above n 85, 489. 
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interest accounts in a similar manner to the plaintiff's bank accounts. The Court of Appeal rejected 
that consumer confusion could be fixed at the point of sale.355 
The Court of Appeal's decision in Neumegen, discussed above, refers to ASB Bank, and in doing 
so is reminiscent of that troublesome US case, Playboy v Netscape.356 Neumegen concerned an 
established law firm operating under the name Neumegen & Company, and a newly established 
firm, comprising two cousins of the name Neumegen, wanting to call their new firm Neumegen & 
Neumegen. Much attention was paid, understandably, to the issue of client confusion, and the fact 
that there need not be a showing of bad faith, or an intent to deceive.357 
But what is reminiscent of Playboy v Netscape is the following passage, excerpted from the 
Court of Appeal in ASB Bank,358  which all but appears to contemplate the existence of Initial 
Interest Confusion:359 
There seems to us to be no reason why s 9 should not protect the public from being led into business 
premises by being misled as to the ownership of the business. Once a prospective customer has entered, 
he or she will often be more likely to buy. 
Where such 'buying' occurs, after the consumer has been alerted, it may be thought that no harm has 
been done to the consumer; that there is no adverse consequence. That is a matter which may influence 
the Court's discretion concerning remedy in a particular case.360 
As an aside, I offer the following commentary on the above excerpt, in Frankel and McLay's 
book:361 
However, if consumers suffer no loss, apart from the time delay in entering the wrong bank, is what is 
going on really so much the protection of the consumer, or is it instead the protection of the plaintiff's 
business? 
Perhaps the term "web site" could be inserted where "bank" appears, above? 
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355  Frankel and McLay, above n 85, 486. 
356  Playboy Enterprises, Inc v Netscape Communications Corp, above n 223. See below Part IX D 2 Initial 
interest confusion, continued: evolution, focus shifting from metatags to keywords. 
357  Neumegen v Neumegen and Co, above n 324, 320.  
358  Trust Bank Auckland Ltd v ASB Bank Ltd, above n 354.  
359  Ibid, 389.  
360  Neumegen v Neumegen and Co, above n 324, 320. 
361  Frankel and McLay, above n 85, 486. 
 
72 KEYWORD ADVERTISING, AND OTHER INVISIBLE USES OF THIRD-PARTY TRADE MARKS IN ONLINE ADVERTISING 
The ASB Bank dissent, in my view, is as important as the decision. This is reminiscent of the 
Playboy v Netscape decision, where Ninth Circuit Justice Berzon offered a concurring opinion in 
which she strongly questioned and cautioned against the adoption of the Initial Interest Confusion 
doctrine.362  
In his concurring opinion in Neumegen, Thomas J cautioned against and objected to not only the 
misapplication of section 9 of the Fair Trading Act in this particular case, but its potential for abuse 
in cases where one rival trader seeks to enjoin the conduct of a competitor, since "[t]he Act was 
passed in the public's interest to protect consumers."363 In that case, he questions how it came to 
pass that the defendants can be largely exonerated of wrongdoing, yet can somehow still run afoul 
of section 9. In particular, he noted that the defendant, in attempting to use his last name in 
identifying the law firm belonging to his cousin and himself: (1) avoided an injunction for passing 
off, as there were serious doubts as to sufficient damage to goodwill; (2) were exonerated of any 
deceitful intention; (3) were not liable under section 11 of the FTA for misleading conduct in 
relation to providing services; (4) were not held liable under section 13(b) of the FTA for false 
representation in relation to supply of services; and (5) obtained approval from the Auckland 
District Law Society.364  
Thomas J goes on to criticise the vagueness of section 9 of the Fair Trading Act in terms of its 
scope and application by the courts:365 
But in a literal sense the section is incomplete. It prohibits conduct which is likely to mislead or deceive 
but does not expressly state whom the prohibition is to benefit. The object of the Act provides the 
obvious answer. The Act was passed in the public interest to protect consumers. In the context of name 
protection cases, this object requires, not only that the relevant class or group of consumers 
contemplated be identified, but also that they must warrant protection. Moreover, the conduct to be 
prohibited must be likely to mislead or deceive in a way which is adverse or unfair to the interests of 
those consumers. In most cases the detriment will be self-evident, but where it is not the requirement is 
that it should be expressly addressed. 
He then cautions against the likelihood that "rival traders" will abuse the FTA, which was 
"designed for consumers", and "stifle legitimate competition".366 His Honour continues that "[i]t 
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is the interests of the consumers which are in issue and those interests should clearly be 
adversely or unfairly affected before the section is applied for their protection."367 
Additionally reminiscent of the discussion of Initial Interest Confusion are Thomas J's views on 
"the relevant groups of consumers" 368  who might have been fooled into thinking that one 
Neumegen law firm was actually the other:369 
It is highly probable that the fact the Neumegen & Neumegen they are visiting is not the Neumegen & 
Neumegen of old, or Neumegen and Co, or a branch of Neumegen and Co, would emerge. The potential 
client would at that point have an opportunity to correct his or her mistake and take their leave. Even if 
he or she is not sufficiently assertive to do so, can it be said that they have been misled or deceived? 
Before the point is reached where they feel any need or occasion to proceed with that firm, they are 
aware of the original error.  
In closing, and in noting his extreme reluctance to over-extend the scope of section 9 of the 
FTA, Thomas J stated:370 
I cannot see that, even if there is a residual number of this limited subgroup who would be likely to be 
misled or deceived, his conduct is adverse or unfair to those consumers such as to merit the protection of 
the Act. Protecting consumers who are unlikely to want or ask for that protection is to risk exposing the 
Court to the charge of judicial paternalism. 
10 Australian government's Trade Practices Act litigation against Google 
As was discussed above, section 9 of the FTA is based upon, and virtually identical to, section 
52 of Australia's Trade Practices Act (TPA). Until this point in the paper, I have only been able to 
speculate with respect to New Zealand and its trans-Tasman neighbour Australia. In each instance, 
I've not had any local case law, and could only analogise, or look to the United Kingdom for the few 
metatag cases there. But, in July 2007, that changed, when the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) filed an action against Google (and several other parties) alleging 
violation of the TPA. In short, the ACCC alleged that the use of the names of two car dealerships as 
triggering keywords, and their use as the headings of the Sponsored Links, breached the TPA.371 
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The ACCC is Australia's "consumer watchdog" agency. According to its web site, it is an 
independent statutory authority, formed in 1995 to administer the Trade Practices Act and other 
Acts.372 It promotes competition and fair trade in the market place to benefit consumers, business 
and the community, by enforcing consumer protection laws. 
ACCC alleged that both the party purchasing and using the trade mark keywords (Trading Post) 
and the search engine (Google) violated the TPA.373 Trading Post is an Australian corporation that 
publishes "online classified advertisements accessible to the general public on the internet for the 
sale and provision of a range of goods."374 Google's Australian subsidiary, Google Australia, assists 
and advises "Advertisers in Australia as to the content of advertisements those Advertisers would 
place on Search Engine websites operated by Google Inc or its related companies, and in the 
placement of their advertisements on the Google sites."375 During 2005 and 2006, Trading Post and 
Google (via one or more of the Google defendants) entered into advertising agreements by which 
Trading Post would advertise on Google sites, including the use of keywords. Among those 
keywords were the names of car dealerships in New South Wales, Australia, namely, "Kloster Ford" 
and "Charlestown Toyota."376 No business relationship or connection exists between Trading Post 
and the two car dealerships, Kloster Ford or Charlestown Toyota. Neither dealership ever advertised 
or sold products on the Trading Post website.377  
In August 2005, a Google search for the term "Kloster Ford" would yield a page of search 
results, at the top of which would appear a sponsored link for the Trading Post site. The sponsored 
link sat atop the organic results, rather than off to the right hand side. The sponsored link had the 
term "Kloster Ford" as the heading, and the entirety of the sponsored link appeared as follows: 
"Kloster Ford www.tradingpost.com.au  New/Used Fords – Search 90,000+ auto ads online. Great 
finds daily! "378 This was the same with the search for "Charlestown Toyota", which gave the 
sponsored link: "Charlestown Toyota www.tradingpost.com.au  New/Used Toyota Cars - Search 
90,000+ auto ads online. Great finds daily!"379 
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The ACCC contended that the placement and the nature of these two sponsored link, meant that 
the defendants (Google and Trading Post) were making the following representations: 
1. That by clicking on either the Kloster Ford or Charlestown Toyota links (both of which 
were Trading Post ads), the user would be taken to a website associated with either of the 
two car dealerships;380 
2. That there was therefore an association or affiliation between Trading Post and the 
respective dealership;381 
3. That the dealership sponsored, approved of, and/or paid for the Sponsored Link;382 
4. That information concerning the respective dealership or car sales there from would be 
found at the Trading Post site;383 
5. That the Trading Post ad was not a Sponsored Link (by virtue of its placement atop the 
search results), and indeed was "the most relevant" of the search results;384 
With respect to the Google defendants, ACCC asserted that these representations were:385 
misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive, in that, by reason of the AdWords Programme, 
Search Results are, or may be, accorded priority in the listing on the left hand side of the Results Page 
by reason of payments made by Advertisers, rather than by reason of their relative relevance to the 
Query as determined by the Google Search Tool. 
With respect to Trading Post, the ACCC asserted that the two sponsored links were:386 
misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive, in that the User was directed to the Trading Post 
site by reason of Trading Post having selected the ... (names of the two car dealerships) as a Keyword as 
part of its Adwords Service Agreement rather than by reason of any relevance between the Search Term 
... and Trading Post's business or the Trading Post Site as determined by the Google Search Tool. 
Ultimately, ACCC's claims were upheld.387 
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(a) Discussion 
It might make sense to first have a look at the Google AdWords Trademark Policy388 that was 
in place in 2005,389 and remains in place. The policy states that, outside the US and Canada, their 
"review is limited to ensuring that the advertisements at issue are not using a term corresponding to 
the trademarked term in the ad text or as a keyword trigger."390 Conduct outside of and/or not 
conforming with this policy should not be interpreted as "illegal" or tortious, per se. Google's policy 
is just that, a policy. However, it would appear to be in contravention of the Google policy for 
Trading Post to offer ads that contain the names "Charlestown Toyota" and "Kloster Ford" "in the ad 
text or as a keyword trigger." 
It is clear that the ACCC took a dim view of Google's sponsored links, no matter where they are 
placed (either on the left or right sides of the page), and was not convinced that the "subtle shading" 
does any good in terms of distinguishing or differentiating bona fide search results from 
advertisements. Further, the use of the terms "Kloster Ford" and "Charlestown Toyota" as the 
headings of the two sponsored links, and the act of "highlighting" it, all add up to misleading and/or 
deceptive conduct on the part of Google and Trading Post. 
Is it? Do they "represent that the corporation has a sponsorship, approval or affiliation it does 
not have"?391 This will be a matter for Allsop J to interpret, if the case does not settle before trial. 
As of the time of this writing, a 23 June 2008 trial date has been set.392 
As noted above, Google typically places sponsored links either atop the organic search results, 
or off to the side. Further, they are labelled "sponsored links", and have a shaded background, that is 
presumably intended to differentiate the sponsored links from the organic results. Is this enough of a 
differentiation? Are the shading and the designation an effective means of informing the user that 
the sponsored links are paid-for advertisements, and not present based on relevance among search 
results, or connection, affiliation, or relationship with the owner of the term used as a keyword? 
These, in my view, are matters that, if the case proceeds to trial, will be the subject of extensive 
survey evidence provided by each side. Google will hope to show that most, if not all, computer 
users understand the difference between a sponsored link and an organic search result, and that the 
Trade Practices Act should not be used to protect any consumers who are unaware of the difference. 
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These questions are open to debate, and should be supported by survey evidence from either 
perspective. Frankly, one either understands and accepts the concept of a sponsored link (or other 
designations of its ilk), or one does not. It remains to be seen to what extent Google, either by means 
of judicial compulsion or public policy persuasion, will take steps to even further differentiate and 
distinguish Sponsored Links from regular search results. 
But what of the highlighted/bold font and underlined use of the names "Charlestown Toyota" 
and "Kloster Ford" as the headings for each sponsored link? Are these instances more compelling as 
evidence of misleading and/or deceptive conduct? To me, on the spectrum, they are more likely to 
be misleading and/or deceptive, since I cannot think of a reason for them to be there. If you are 
generally a supporter of keyword advertising, or at least if you understand and accept the concept of 
sponsored links, and you are accepting of the use of sponsored links to help consumers minimise 
search costs, locate other commercial offerings, etc, then you might be willing to accept the adverse 
implications of sponsored links as "the nature of the beast ", and tolerate them. But on what basis 
would one accept the use of the names "Charlestown Toyota" and "Kloster Ford" as the headings for 
each sponsored link? What purpose did their use as the headings of those links serve? What good 
did it do the consumer? Is it in any way justifiable, or supported by some sort of rational or logical 
basis? Whether or not you are a fan of sponsored links, I question whether the use of another entity's 
name in this manner is supportable. 
Suppose, however, that the sponsored link had instead looked something like this: Trading Post 
www.tradingpost.com.au New/Used Toyota Cars – Search 90,000+ auto ads online. Great finds 
daily! We offer better deals than Charlestown Toyota! 
What then? Would these be considered as misleading or deceptive? Although the Google 
AdWord Policy would frown on the use of a competitor's trade mark either "in the ad text or as a 
keyword trigger", at least such use is defensible under the trade mark law concept of comparative 
advertising, and it can be argued that its use is therefore not deceptive or misleading. 
Will the ACCC succeed in forcing some degree of reform or improvement on Google's 
AdWords Policy, or the degree to which it is enforced? It remains to be seen. 
(b) New Zealand and Australia: different approaches to virtually identical statute? 
Section 9 of the FTA and section 52 of the TPA are virtually identical, stating that a party 
("person" in New Zealand, "corporation" in Australia) may not "engage in conduct that is 
misleading or deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive."393 As the TPA predated the FTA by 12 
years, New Zealand courts have looked to Australian decisions under the TPA for guidance when 
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deciding FTA actions.394 But certain decisions have indicated that New Zealand courts are reluctant 
to interpret these statutes identically. 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal has held that the principles set out in the Australian case 
Chase Manhattan395 case are of assistance in construing the FTA.396 However, there are some 
differences in emphasis between the New Zealand and Australian courts with respect to the 
sufficiency of confusion or uncertainty.  Where the Australian courts have tended to say that mere 
evidence of confusion is not enough, Cooke P stated that, some times, it is not difficult to take that 
step between confusion and concluding that something is misleading or deceptive.397 This approach 
was confirmed in Trust Bank Auckland Ltd v ASB Bank Ltd.398 The Courts have emphasised the 
importance of the Act in protecting the consumer.  
In Allied Liquor Merchants Ltd v Independent Liquor, Gault J stated:399 
[I]t is no answer to assert ... that misunderstandings occurring on introduction of a product will 
disappear as the product becomes known. No one is entitled to practice deception until the public get 
used to it. It is perhaps part of the same point that it is not relevant that the public are not particularly 
concerned about the misunderstanding, being more concerned with price. That rather misses the point 
that the public is entitled to be accurately informed. Further, that some people may not be misled is no 
answer if there is a real likelihood that a substantial number of others will be. 
11 Concluding thoughts on the Fair Trading Act 1986 
Just how far should New Zealand courts go to protect consumers, and how many consumers 
merit protection of the FTA? Similarly, how much protection and exclusivity should be afforded to 
trade marks, should their owners enjoy a monopoly over their use as keywords? Should the FTA be 
interpreted to protect all consumers, including "the very unreasonable, reasonable consumer", as is 
characterised by Frankel and McLay?400 Does it extend to "a significant proportion", as was case in 
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Bonz Group? 401  Should it protect "the astute and the gullible, the intelligent and the not so 
intelligent, the well educated as well as the poorly educated, men and women of various ages 
pursuing a variety of vocations"?402   
As discussed above, the extent to which New Zealand courts will interpret and enforce the Fair 
Trading Act to protect consumers will no doubt continue to evolve. Similarly, how New Zealand 
courts would interpret the FTA in a keyword advertising case is also subject to question. In my 
view, a large part of the analysis, as is the case in any FTA action, is the extent to which the Court 
will want to protect consumers. The ACCC interestingly stated:403 
It is not to the point that users may, over time, learn to discern advertisements from search results, to 
disregard the title of an advertisement and to have sole regard to web-site addresses. Indeed the 
difference between those who are misled and those who are not may simply be the number of times such 
users have clicked on an unhelpful result unrelated to their query. 
Will New Zealand Courts "over-protect" consumers, and "over-enforce" the FTA? It is my 
impression, from decisions such as those discussed above, that there is an appreciation for the risk in 
over-application of the FTA, and a reluctance to so do. However, this remains to be seen, should a 
keyword case ever be brought in New Zealand.404 
VIII GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN KEYWORD ADVERTISING – POLICY 
SHAPING ROLE 
A Other Governmental Responses to Concerns Over Possible Search Engine Deception  
While the ACCC's lawsuit against Google is certainly the most aggressive action ever taken by a 
government agency or regulatory body, it is not the first. The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
and the UK's Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) have also taken action to address concerns 
over the possible deceptiveness or misleading nature of pay-for-placement search engine 
advertising. 
1 United States – Federal Trade Commission 
In the US, the Federal Trade Commission is agency primarily responsible for ensuring that trade 
and advertising practises are fair and not deceptive or misleading. Within the FTC, that 
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402  Taco Company of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd, above n 333, 202. 
403  ACCC v Google, above n 7, para 9; Summary Outline of Case Against Second Respondent, filed 24 
September 2007. 
404  DB Breweries, above n 201. See also the DB Breweries case, discussed above in the section dealing with 
Trade Mark Infringement, since the decision of the High Court Auckland also discusses both a cause of 
action in passing off as well as the Fair Trading Act. 
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responsibility falls to the Bureau of Consumer Protection.405 Just as the ACCC is charged with 
responsibility for enforcing the TPA, so to is the FTC given authority over a consumer-protection 
statute, namely, the Federal Trade Commission Act.406 
(a) FTC actions in online advertising 
On 16 July 2001, a consumer organisation Commercial Alert wrote a formal complaint to the 
FTC, against AltaVista Co., AOL Time Warner Inc, Direct Hit Technologies, iWon Inc, LookSmart 
Ltd, Microsoft Corp. and Terra Lycos SA, and requested an investigation into whether the 
companies were violating federal prohibitions against deceptive acts or practices by inserting 
advertisements in search engine results without clear and conspicuous disclosure that the ads were 
ads.407 
In particular, Commercial Alert was complaining about search engines that blended paid ads in 
with the presumably organic results, rather than setting them aside as sponsored links or the like:408 
Commercial Alert alleged that the blending of paid ads within search results violated the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, and was a risk to Internet users of all ages.409 
What is of particular interest, at least with respect to the ACCC litigation, is the following 
statement, which appears to praise Google's "sponsored Links", or, at least considers the Google 
method to be the lesser of two evils: "[n]ot all search engine companies have adopted deceptive 
advertising practices. For example, Google clearly notes that its paid placements are "sponsored 
links", and it will not put paid ads within its search results." 410 Indeed, Commercial Alert did not 
  
405  A Guide to the Federal Trade Commission www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/general/gen03.shtm#intro 
(accessed 20 November 2007). 
406  Federal Trade Commission Act, s 5, cite as 15 USC § 45. Unfair methods of competition unlawful; 
prevention by Commission "(a) Declaration of unlawfulness; power to prohibit unfair practices; 
inapplicability to foreign trade (1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." 
According to its website, www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/commercialalertletter.shtm (accessed 20 November 
2007), "[t]he Commission will find deception if there is a representation, omission, or practice that is likely 
to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment." See FTC 
Policy Statement on Deception, appended to Cliffdale Associates Inc (1984) 103 FTC 110, 174. 
407  See Commercial Alert Latest News www.commercialalert.org/news/news-releases/2001/07/commercial-
alert-files-complaint-against-search-engines-for-deceptive-ads (accessed 20 November 2007). 
408  Ibid. 
409  Ibid. 
410  Ibid. 
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appear to have any concerns that Google's sponsored links were "insufficient" as a means to 
"distinguish search results from advertisements", as the ACCC has maintained.411  
Commercial Alert asked that the FTC "fully investigate this matter and exercise any and all of 
its powers to enjoin the companies listed in this complaint from disseminating deceptive advertising, 
and to require them to disclose, in a clear and conspicuous manner, that ads placed in search engine 
results are, in fact, ads."412  
The FTC replied on 27 June 2002, in a letter back to Commercial Alert.413 Although it noted 
that the FTC would likely not take formal action against the search engine companies, that 
"determination should not, however, be construed as a determination by either the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection or the Commission as to whether or not the practices described in [the] 
complaint violate[d] the FTC Act or any other statute enforced by the Commission." 414  The 
Commission then sent letters to each of the search engine companies, outlining the need for "clear 
and conspicuous disclosures of paid placement", as the existing disclosures may not have been 
sufficiently clear.415 They continued that "depending on the nature of the paid inclusion program, 
there should be clearer disclosure of the use of paid inclusion, including more conspicuous 
descriptions of how any such program operates and its impact on search results."416 
Of particular interest, again, with respect to the ACCC litigation, is this passage concerning the 
desirability of distinguishing and/or setting apart paid ads from organic search results:417 
Paid placement listings may also be denoted by segregating them from non-paid listings. Each separate 
set of paid placement listings should be clearly labeled as such so they can be easily distinguished from 
other types. Of the 12 search sites owned or operated by the 7 named search engine companies, 11 
segregate paid ranking results by placing them above the non-paid results or prominently elsewhere. 
Many of these sites appear to be headed in the right direction, using terms such as "sponsored links" or 
"Sponsored Search Listings" to denote payment for rankings. In some cases, these sites display more 
than one set of paid placement listings, and these additional listings are labeled using terms such as 
"Recommended Sites", "Featured Listings", "Premier Listings", "Search Partners", "Provided by the 
[________] Network", or "Start Here." Other sites use much more ambiguous terms such as "Products 
  
411  ACCC v Google, above n 7, Amended Statement of Claim. 
412  Ibid. 
413  See FTC website www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/commercialalertletter.shtm (accessed 20 November 2007). 
414  Ibid. 
415  Ibid. See FTC website www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/commercialalertattatch.shtm (accessed 20 November 
2007). 
416  Ibid. 
417  Ibid (emphasis added). 
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and Services", "News", "Resources", "Featured Listings", "Partner Search Results", or "Spotlight", or no 
labels at all. To avoid deception, these sites should be labeled to better convey that paid placement is 
being used.  
Additionally, the FTC has undertaken other efforts in this area, including a page on the FTC 
website titled "Being Frank About Search Engine Rank",418 which seeks to inform consumers about 
search engine practises. And, although not relevant to the issues raised in the ACCC case, ie, the use 
of trade marks as keywords, the FTC has paid particular attention to other practises of search 
engines that are of concern to the FTC, namely "behavioural advertising". On 1-2 November 2007, 
the FTC hosted a "town hall meeting" to address consumer protection issues generally.419As such, it 
would seem that the FTC's scrutiny is not as fixed on keyword advertising as is the case with the 
ACCC. 
2 United Kingdom – Advertising Standards Authority 
In the UK, the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) serves as the entity charged with 
oversight over advertising practices. According to its website:420 
The Advertising Standards Authority is the independent body set up by the advertising industry to police 
the rules laid down in the advertising codes. The strength of the self-regulatory system lies in both the 
independence of the ASA and the support and commitment of the advertising industry, through the 
Committee of Advertising Practice (CAP), to the standards of the codes, protecting consumers and 
creating a level playing field for advertisers. 
(a) ASA actions in online advertising 
In 2004, the ASA took action with respect of the issue of paid advertisements within search 
results. The ASA asked an internet service provider (ISP) to make it clearer that some of its web 
search results were paid advertisements, as pay-for-placement listings in search results could 
confuse consumers. ISP provider Wanadoo displayed a light-grey hyperlink (at the foot of each 
sponsored link) against a white background to explain that search results are ranked according to the 
  
418  See FTC website www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/searchalrt.shtm (accessed 20 November 2007). 
419  See FTC ehavioural Advertising www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/ehavioral/index.shtml (accessed 20 
November 2007). "On November 1 and 2, 2007, the Federal Trade Commission will host a Town Hall 
entitled 'Ehavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, and Technology'. The event will bring together 
consumer advocates, industry representatives, technology experts, and academics to address consumer 
protection issues raised by the practice of tracking consumers' activities online to target advertising - or 
'behavioral advertising'. The Town Hall is a follow-on to a dialogue on behavioral advertising that emerged 
at a November 2006 FTC forum, 'Tech-Ade', which examined the key technological and business 
developments that will shape consumers' core experiences in the coming ten years. In addition, several 
consumer privacy advocates, as well as the State of New York, recently sent letters to the FTC asking it to 
examine the effects of behavioral advertising on consumer privacy." 
420  See About the ASA www.asa.org.uk/asa/about/ (accessed 20 November 2007). 
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highest bidder instead of by relevance. They argued that this link was sufficiently clear to remove 
any possible misleading or deception.421 
IX UNITED STATES CASE LAW 
A Overview 
While this section of the paper will discuss a number of US cases, it will not by any means 
provide an exhaustive survey of all US cases dealing with the invisible use of trade marks, such as 
within metatags, keywords, "keying", and other "triggering" uses, as explained below. What I hope 
to accomplish is to set forth a number of salient cases, to showcase the main themes that have been 
the subject of intense scrutiny in these cases, and discuss the extent to which these themes have 
influenced the evolution of US jurisprudence. 
The overall concept of invisible use of trade marks has served as a battlefield where ideologies, 
and doctrines of trade mark law have been debated. One of those doctrines is the concept of Initial 
Interest Confusion. Another area of contention is the concept of "trade mark use", and the extent to 
which "trade mark use" should be the "gatekeeper issue" in cases dealing with invisible use of a 
trade mark. A further issue is far more basic, and concerns the underlying concept of just what is a 
trade mark in the first place? Whom does a trade mark serve? What is its purpose and function? Is it 
a property right, with broad exclusivity as to use, is it designed to protect its owner, and should we 
view it from the owner's perspective? Or is it a means by which consumers are protected, a means 
by which consumers minimise their search time and costs, and should broad latitude be given to the 
unauthorised use by third parties (within the realm of fair use, descriptive use, comparative 
advertising, etc)? My examination of these theme illustrates how the concept of invisible use of 
trade marks, in the US experience, has served as a battleground for these issues. I lastly hope to 
illustrate the extent to which lessons can be learned from these battles. 
B Metatags, Generally 
An examination into US case law on the subject of trade mark keywords should begin with a 
discussion into metatags, since both share the common attribute of being invisible to the computer 
user and since US jurisprudence in the area of invisible use of trade marks began with the metatag 
cases.  
A "metatag" (also "meta tag") is defined as a "tag (that is, a coding statement) in the Hypertext 
Markup Language (HTML) that describes some aspect of the contents of a Web page. The 
  
421  This story is no longer available on News.com, however the author located it at a weblog devoted to search 
engines, Did Google Drop the PageRank Concept? http://bazac.blogspot.com/2004_06_01_archive.html 
(accessed 20 November 2007). 
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information that you provide in a meta tag is used by search engines to index a page so that someone 
searching for the kind of information the page contains will be able to find it."422 
If you think of an interior wall within a house, behind the wall are wires, pipes, and in homes 
outside New Zealand, there is even insulation. But these are "behind the scenes" and invisible to the 
eye. Similarly, metatags and other aspects of the HTML code, exist behind the scenes of a website. 
To view a website's HTML code, including the metatags, you may do so by clicking "View", and 
then "Source", when using the Web browser Windows Explorer. 
To a greater or lesser degree, metatags were originally designed to help search engines find 
websites. Without going into too much detail on how search engines work(ed),423 search engines 
troll through millions of Internet websites and locate "hits" or "results" that correspond to the search 
inquiry. In theory, if I own a website offering shoes for sale, my HTML code would be full of 
metatags such as "shoes", "sneakers", "loafers", "boots", "cleats", "running shoes", etc. Of course, if 
I wanted to attract visitors to my website seeking particular brands of shoes, I could plant Adidas®, 
Nike®, New Balance®, Nine West® and other shoe brands into my metatags. 
In reality, metatags are no longer effective in terms of attracting search engines to websites, so 
say the experts.424 In fact, according to an extensive paper written by expert Danny Sullivan of 
SearchEngineWatch.com, metatags have not been recognised by most search engines since 1997; 
further, Google's search engine technology does not rely on recognition of metatags. 425  
Nevertheless, the notion that metatags are relevant in terms of the likelihood of a search engine 
locating a particular site lives on, at least in the hearts and minds of many plaintiffs in trade mark 
infringement lawsuits. Why? Quite simply, if a trade mark owner discovers its trade mark liberally 
used as metatags within another party's HTML code, it is perceived as a "smoking gun", evidence 
that the website owner intended to rely on that trade mark to lure search engines, and thereby 
visitors, to its website.  
With apologies to the classic film "Casablanca", the trade mark owner will likely exclaim, "I'm 
shocked, shocked to find my trade mark in your metatags!" Indeed, similar to Rick and Louis at the 
end of that film, trade mark owners and metatags have enjoyed a "beautiful friendship" over the 
  
422  See SearchSOA.com Definitions http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid26_gci 
542231,00.html (accessed 10 October 2007). 
423  For excellent discussions of search engines and metatags, please see Greg Lastowka "Search Engines, 
HTML, and Trademarks: What's the Meta for?" (2000) 86(4) Va L Rev 835; Goldman "Deregulating 
Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law", above n 5. 
424  See Technology and Marketing Law Blog http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2007/09/ 
keyword_metatag.htm (accessed 10 October 2007); and Meta Keywords Tag 101: How To "Legally" Hide 
Words On Your Pages For Search Engines  http://searchengineland.com/ 070905-194221.php (accessed 10 
October 2007).  
425  See Meta Keywords Tag 101: How To "Legally" Hide Words On Your Pages For Search Engines, ibid. 
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years, as case after case has found the court focusing on the presence, and significance, of the use of 
trade marks within the defendant's metatags as being among "the usual suspects" under scrutiny.426 
Examination of this issue is seemingly de rigeuer in Internet trade mark litigation. 427  Indeed, 
Professor Eric Goldman notes that "[f]rom a legal standpoint, keyword metatags have earned 
mythical status, which has led some courts to deem their usage as per se infringing, or, at minimum, 
confirmation of a publisher's bad faith."428 
Perhaps the use of a trade mark within a metatag is relevant after all, not necessarily from the 
standpoint of whether or not it technologically is an effective means of attracting search engines to a 
website, but from the standpoint of showing the intentions of the defendant in cases where evidence 
of "stuffing" trade mark metatags into the HTML was shown. In other words, courts will likely 
scrutinise the defendant's use of metatags in assessing whether he acted in good or bad faith.429 Just 
as a drug dealer can be prosecuted for possessing and selling powdered sugar that he thinks is 
cocaine or heroin, if a defendant's web site is loaded with the plaintiff's trade marks as metatags, it 
could be viewed as evidence of a bad faith intention to "free ride" on the plaintiff's trade marks to 
attract users to its site. However, as more and more courts come to understand that metatags are no 
longer relevant to search engines, they are likely to become less relevant in trade mark infringement 
cases. 
C Selected Metatag Cases 
The 1998 case of Playboy Enterprises v Welles430 is useful in discussing the issue of metatags. 
In a nutshell, a model by the name of Terri Welles appeared in Playboy magazine in 1981 and 
attained the title "Playmate of the Year". In 1997, Ms Welles established her own website, at 
TerriWelles.com, and within the HTML code of that site were embedded the metatags "playboy" 
and "playmate", both of which are trade marks of Playboy Enterprises, publisher of the magazine. 
Additionally, those trade marks were visibly used on the website, as well. 
  
426  For example, see Playboy Enterprises Inc v Calvin Designer Label (1997) 985 F Supp 1220 (ND Cal), 
Brookfield, above n 223; Playboy Enterprises v Welles, above n 223. 
427  In addition to the cases cited above, see Nettis Environment Ltd v IWI Inc (1999) 46 F Supp 722 (ND Ohio); 
SNA Inc v Array (1999) US Dist Lexis 8526 (ED Pa); Playboy Enterprises Inc v AsiaFocus International, 
Inc, Civil Action No 97-734-A, (1998) US Dist LEXIS 10359 (ED Va); Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp v 
Faber (1998) 29 F Supp 2d 1161 (CD Cal); Niton Corp v Radiation Monitoring Devices Inc (1998) 27 F 
Supp 2d 102 (D Mass); and Patmont Motor Werks v Gateway Marine (1997) WL 811770 and others. 
428  Goldman "Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law", above n 5, 567, citing Horphag Research 
Ltd v Pelligrini (2003) 337 F 3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir) and Eli Lilly & Co v Natural Answers, Inc (2000) 233 
F 3d 456, 465 (7th Cir) 
429  Ibid. 
430  Playboy Enterprises v Welles, above n 223. 
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As it was 1997, it is likely that search engines seeking the trade marked terms "Playboy" and 
"Playmate" might have found Ms Welles' site, based upon the inclusion of those trade marks within 
the metatags. Playboy Enterprises objected to both the visible and invisible uses of its trade marks 
and, on February 27, 1998, it filed a lawsuit against Welles in the US District Court, complaining of 
trade mark infringement, false designation of origin, unfair competition, trade mark dilution (all 
under Federal statutes), as well as two similar state claims.431  
The District Court ruled in favour of Welles, determining that both the visible and invisible uses 
of the Playboy trade marks were descriptive permissible under the "fair use exception" of the 
Federal Trademark Act.432 Indeed, the Court noted that "Ms Welles has used the trademark term 
Playmate of the Year to identity and describe herself."433 Further, the Court determined that:434  
Ms Welles earned the title of 'Playboy Playmate of the Year' in 1981 and has used that title ever since, 
without objection from PEI. … it is evident that Ms. Welles has minimized her references to Playboy on 
her website and has not attempted to trick consumers into believing that they are viewing a Playboy-
endorsed website. ... In this case, then, defendant's use of the term Playmate of the Year 1981 is 
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe [herself]. 
What is important about the Welles case is that the Court ruled in favour of Welles with respect 
of her use of the trade marks as metatags as well.435 She used the metatags in good faith to index 
the content of her webpage and they are not visible. Furthermore, the term "Playboy" was used only 
in reference to her identity and in a legitimate editorial sense.  
Contrary to the outcome in the Welles case, was Oppedahl & Larson v Advanced Concepts,436 a 
1997 case that showed a deceptive and unsupportable use of metatags. Whereas Terri Welles was 
seen to be acting in good faith in her "fair use" of the Playboy trade marks as metatags, in Oppedahl 
the opposite conclusion was reached. Oppedahl & Larson ("O&L") was a well known intellectual 
property law firm. Advanced Concepts had no connection with O&L, however, according to the 
  
431  Ibid, 1099-1100. 
432  Ibid, 1104-1105. Federal Trademark Act 15 USC §§ 1115(b)(4) and 1125(c)(4). Under s 1115(b)(4), fair use 
may be raised as a defense to infringement when the use of the other party's trade mark is "descriptive of 
and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their geographic 
origin." Pursuant to 1125(c)(4), "[t]he following shall not be actionable under this section: (A) Fair use of a 
famous mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the 
competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark; (B) Noncommercial use of a mark; (C) All 
forms of reporting and news commentary." 
433  Ibid, 1104. 
434  Ibid, 1104. 
435  Ibid, 1104. 
436  Oppedahl & Larson v Advanced Concepts (23 July 1997) Civil Action Number 97-CV-1592 (DC Colo). 
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complaint, hidden from view, but within "the underlying source document for" the Advanced 
Concepts website, could be found the words 'Oppedahl' and 'Larson' eight times each.  
In its Complaint, O&L asserted that it had "determined that the URLs on defendants' web sites 
are using Plaintiff's 'OPPEDAHL' and 'LARSON' marks to erroneously identify to search services 
that these URLs are identifying services provided by Plaintiff."437 O&L further asserted that the use 
was likely to be misleading, cause confusion and mistake, and deceive the public into falsely 
believing there was a connection between the web site and O&L and/or sponsored by O&L. 438 
The defendants in the Oppedahl & Larson case settled, agreeing to a permanent injunction.439 
In Playboy Enterprises Inc v Calvin Designer Label,440 the defendant operated adult-themed 
websites, at the domain names "playboyxxx.com and www.playmatelive.com."441 In addition to the 
"visible" uses of the Playboy trade marks (within the domain names and on the sites themselves), it 
included within each website's metatags a number of Playboy trade marks, including "Playboy" and 
"Playmate."442 However, similar to Oppedahl & Larson, and unlike Welles, the defendant had no 
legitimate reason to use the Playboy trade marks. Indeed, defendant had no connection to Playboy 
and could not rely on any fair use, descriptive use, or nominative use defences, nor could it claim 
use of the trade marks as part of any comparative advertising scheme. 
But, what is significant about Oppedahl and Calvin Designer Label, is the precedent they set. 
These cases established that metatags could be used as evidence in an infringement matter. Indeed, 
in issuing its decision, the United States District Court held that Playboy:443 
... has demonstrated a sufficient (i) likelihood of success on the merits of its trademark infringement, 
unfair competition and dilution claims, (ii) irreparable harm if it is not granted a temporary restraining 
order pending hearing on its motion for a preliminary injunction, (iii) the balance of hardships tipping in 
its favor, (iv) and the absence of any public interest factors militating against the interim relief sought in 
its application, to merit and constitute good cause for the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction Order as 
more particularly described herein. 
And further, that Playboy was:444 
  
437  Ibid, Complaint No 36. 
438  Ibid, paras 37-40. 
439  Order, Judgment and Permanent Injunction with regard to defendants Welch and Advanced 
Concepts www.oppedahl.com/ac/welchord.htm (accessed 10 October 2007). 
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... likely to succeed on the merits in proving inter alia trademark infringement, unfair competition, 
including a false designation of origin and false representation, in Defendants' use of the domain names 
"playboyxxx.com" and "playmatelive.com", the use of the name "Playmate Live Magazine" which 
include Plaintiff's PLAYMATE registered trademark, the use of "Get it all here @ Playboy" which 
includes Plaintiff's PLAYBOY registered trademark, and the repeated use of the PLAYBOY trademark 
in machine readable code in Defendants' Internet Web pages, so that the PLAYBOY trademark is 
accessible to individuals or Internet search engines which attempt to access Plaintiff under Plaintiff's 
PLAYBOY registered trademark.  
With these three cases, there appears to be a logical and reasonable treatment of these invisible 
uses of trade marks by US Courts. Indeed, Welles stands for the notion that trade marks can in fact 
be used "invisibly" within the metatags (and in full, view, as well), as long as the user has a good 
faith, legitimate reason to use them, and uses them within the scope of fair use, descriptive or 
referential use, comparative advertising, etc. Oppedahl and Calvin Designer Label stand for the 
notion that if the defendant lacks this good faith, if it does not make a fair, descriptive, referential or 
other accepted use of the third-party trade mark, it will lose. Unfortunately, this era of logic and 
reasonableness was short-lived. As we will see, the realm of "invisible use" of trade marks would 
come to serve as the venue for fierce debate over trade mark doctrines and ideologies. 
D Concept One: Introduction of "Initial Interest Confusion" Theory into Metatag Cases 
In the 1999 case of Brookfield Communications, Inc v West Coast Entertainment Corp, 445  
dealing with invisible use of a third-party's trade mark within metatags, we begin to see the US 
courts applying initial interest confusion. This has become a very popular theory in US trade mark 
law among plaintiffs.446 In short, initial interest confusion exists where the customer is only initially 
diverted to another party's goods, then realises that the goods are not those of the trade mark owner, 
but decides to purchase them anyway. The Brookfield decision, and the expansion of the doctrine of 
initial interest confusion, have both been criticised.447 
In Brookfield, the plaintiff owned a trade mark on the term "Movie Buff", which it had used 
since 1993 on software relating to the motion picture business, later to include "a searchable 
database containing entertainment-industry related information." 448  The defendant, West Coast 
Video, a video rental store chain, had used the slogan "The Movie Buff's Movie Store" since 1986, 
  
444  Ibid, ss 5 and 6 of the Order of Preliminary Injunction (emphasis added). 
445  Brookfield, above n 223. 
446  Ibid, 1062.  
447 Goldman "Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law", above n 5; Jennifer E Rothman "Initial 
Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law" (2005) 27 Cardozo L Rev 105. 
448  Brookfield, above n 223, 1036. 
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and received a US trade mark registration on that slogan in 1991. Further, it had used the "Movie 
Buff" motif in slogans such as "The Movie Buff's Gift Store", "Calling All Movie Buffs!", "Good 
News, Movie Buffs!", and related slogans since 1986.449 So, as of 1996, there were two entities 
peacefully coexisting, both using the relatively weak trade mark "Movie Buff" in marginally similar 
areas of trade. It would seem from the record that neither party knew of the other's existence. 
Trouble began in 1996 when Brookfield attempted to register the domain name 
MOVIEBUFF.COM. It learned that West Coast had already registered the domain name, on 
February 6, 1996. 450  So, Brookfield registered BROOKFIELDCOMM.COM and 
MOVIEBUFFONLINE.COM, in May and September, 1996, respectively.451 Brookfield then filed 
with the US Patent and Trademark Office to register the mark "MOVIE BUFF" as a US trademark 
and service mark, to cover Brookfield's use of the trade mark on "computer software providing data 
and information in the field of the motion picture and television industries."452 The service mark 
registration was for "providing multiple-user access to an on-line network database offering data and 
information in the field of the motion picture and television industries." 453  According to the 
decision, "[b]oth federal trademark registrations issued on 29 September 1998. Brookfield had 
previously obtained a California state trademark registration for the mark MOVIEBUFF covering 
'computer software' in 1994."454 
According to the decision, "[i]n October 1998, Brookfield learned that West Coast – one of the 
nation's largest video rental store chains with over 500 stores – intended to launch a web site at 
'moviebuff.com' containing, inter alia, a searchable entertainment database similar to 
'MovieBuff.'"455 Brookfield soon sent West Coast a cease and desist letter, requesting that West 
Coast stop its planned use of the domain name MOVIEBUFF.COM, and asserting that doing so 
"would violate Brookfield's trademark rights." "As a 'courtesy,' Brookfield attached a copy of a 
complaint that it threatened to file if West Coast did not desist."456 
West Coast did not heed Brookfield's request or warning, and in November of 1998, Brookfield 
filed a lawsuit with the US District Court for the Central District of California, alleging trade mark 
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infringement and unfair competition in violation of Lanham Act.457 Brookfield later filed a request 
for a Temporary Restraining Order, to enjoin West Coast:458 
[f]rom using ... in any manner ... the mark MOVIEBUFF, or any other term or terms likely to cause 
confusion therewith, including moviebuff.com, as West Coast's domain name, ... as the name of West 
Coast's website service, in buried code or metatags on their home page or web pages, or in connection 
with the retrieval of data or information on other goods or services. 
West Coast prevailed in the lawsuit at the District Court level, where much of the focus was 
directed to priority of rights in the underlying term "MOVIEBUFF" and/or MOVIE BUFF.459 In 
other words, the trial court ruled that based on West Coast's prior use of the longer slogans, such as 
"The Movie Buff's Movie Store", and "Movie Buffs, Show Your Stuff!", and the prior registration 
of the domain name MOVIEBUFF.COM, that it had senior rights in the mark.460 Further, the trial 
court "also determined that Brookfield had not established a likelihood of confusion."461 
At the Court of Appeal, the court looked not only at the issue of which party had superior rights 
in the mark "MOVIE BUFF", but also, assuming that party was Brookfield, whether West Coast's 
use of that mark constituted infringement. Brookfield had to show that the public was likely to be 
"somehow confused about the source or sponsorship of West Coast's 'moviebuff.com' web site - and 
somehow to associate that site with Brookfield."462 In the course of deliberating, Judge O'Scannlain 
invoked the doctrine of initial interest confusion and, in doing so, attempted to explain its rationale 
by employing a lengthy billboard metaphor:463 
Using another's trademark in one's metatags is much like posting a sign with another's trademark in front 
of one's store. Suppose West Coast's competitor (let's call it "Blockbuster") puts up a billboard on a 
highway reading - "West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit 7" - where West Coast is really located at 
Exit 8 but Blockbuster is located at Exit 7. Customers looking for West Coast's store will pull off at Exit 
7 and drive around looking for it. Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster store right by 
  
457  Lanham Act, ss 32 and 43(a). 
458  Brookfield, above n 223, 1043. 
459  Ibid, 1043-1061. 
460  Ibid, 1053. 
461  Ibid, 1043. 
462  Ibid, 1053. 
463  Ibid, 1064. Citing See Blockbuster (1994) 869 F Supp 505, 513 (ED Mich), which found trademark 
infringement where the defendant, a video rental store, attracted customers' initial interest by using a sign 
confusingly to its competitor's even though confusion would end long before the point of sale or rental. Also 
citing Dr. Seuss (1997) 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir), 1405; Mobil Oil Corp v Pegasus Petroleum Corp (1987) 
818 F 2d 254, 260 (2d Cir); Green Prods (1997) 992 F Supp 1070, 1076 (ND Iowa). 
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the highway entrance, they may simply rent there. Even consumers who prefer West Coast may find it 
not worth the trouble to continue searching for West Coast since there is a Blockbuster right there. 
Customers are not confused in the narrow sense: they are fully aware that they are purchasing from 
Blockbuster and they have no reason to believe that Blockbuster is related to, or in any way sponsored 
by, West Coast. Nevertheless, the fact that there is only initial consumer confusion does not alter the fact 
that Blockbuster would be misappropriating West Coast's acquired goodwill.464 
It is my opinion that Judge O'Scannlain not only botched the "billboard metaphor", but he also 
erred in comparing West Coast's use of "movie buff" (as a metatag) to the two Playboy cases he 
cited. As for the billboard metaphor, I respectfully suggest that use of a metatag is not at all like a 
deceptive billboard, especially in the West Coast case. For one, billboards are visible, metatags are 
not. Second, it takes far less effort for a computer user to hit the "back button" and get back on the 
"information super highway", than it would for the real-life driver to get back on an actual highway 
and proceed to the next exit. Third, West Coast had been using the term "movie buff" for over 10 
years; its use (within the longer slogans) pre-existed the use made by Brookfield and, as such, there 
was no bad faith or "bait and switch". Further, I suggest that comparisons to the AsiaFocus and 
Calvin Designer cases were erroneous. Both defendants in those cases had no legitimate claim to use 
the term "Playboy", and had not used it in any fashion prior to the plaintiff, as was the case with 
West Coast. West Coast had used the term "movie buff" to attract users to a term it believed to be its 
own trade mark; the defendants in AsiaFocus and Calvin Designer Label could claim no such "good 
faith" use, their use was purely designed to "free-ride" on the popularity and goodwill associated 
with the Playboy trade marks. 
In closing, Judge O'Scannlain concluded by confirming his belief that West Coast's use of the 
trade "movie buff" constituted "initial interest confusion", and compared it to a domain name 
dispute:465 
As we have seen, registration of a domain name for a Web site does not trump long-established 
principles of trademark law. When a firm uses a competitor's trademark in the domain name of its web 
site, users are likely to be confused as to its source or sponsorship. Similarly, using a competitor's 
trademark in the metatags of such web site is likely to cause what we have described as initial interest 
confusion. These forms of confusion are exactly what the trademark laws are designed to prevent. 
Thus, initial interest confusion, which had been relatively dormant for about 30 years, came to 
be implemented in the context of the Internet, and it has cast a long shadow on not only metatag 
cases, but keyword cases, ever since.466 
  
464  O'Scanlain continued with reference to the Playboy cases. Brookfield, above n 223, 1064-65. Citing Playboy 
Enters v AsiaFocus Int'l Inc (1998) US Dist LEXIS 10459, No 97-734; 1998 WL 724000, 3 and 6-7 (ED 
Va); and Playboy Enters v Calvin Designer Label, above n 425.  
465  Brookfield, above n 223, 1066. 
 
92 KEYWORD ADVERTISING, AND OTHER INVISIBLE USES OF THIRD-PARTY TRADE MARKS IN ONLINE ADVERTISING 
1 Brief background on initial interest confusion: where did it come from? 
In an excellent paper on the concept of initial interest confusion, Rothman examined the roots of 
this theory, tracing it to two earlier trade mark cases, Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz. Th. Steinweg 
Nachf v Steinway & Sons,467 and Mobil Oil Corp v Pegasus Petroleum Corp,468 both of which 
were cited by Judge O'Scannlain in the Brookfield decision.469 Both cases stood for the concept that 
"defendants have committed trademark infringement even when no one is ever likely to be confused 
by the use of the trademark. Instead, courts have allowed findings of trademark infringement solely 
on the bases that a consumer might initially be interested, "attracted", or "distracted" by a 
competitor's, or even a non-competitor's, product or service."470  
The Steinweg case concerned the possible confusion over the names Steinweg and Steinway as 
names for a piano. Steinway is an established brand, and when Steinweg began to sell pianos under 
the name "Steinweg", litigation ensued. The plaintiff, Steinway, prevailed at both the trial court471 
and the appeals court472 level. At the district court level, trade mark infringement was found on the 
basis that consumers were "[m]isled into an initial interest" in the Grotrian-Steinweg pianos because 
of "subliminal confusion" as to the possibility that the two companies might be related to one 
another.473  
The Court of Appeal took a similar view and upheld the lower court's decision:474 
The issue here is not the possibility that a purchaser would buy a Grotrian-Steinweg thinking it was 
actually a Steinway. ... The harm to Steinway, rather, is the likelihood that a consumer, hearing the 
"Grotrian-Steinweg" name and thinking it had some connection with "Steinway", would consider it on 
that basis. The "Grotrian-Steinweg" name therefore would attract potential customers based on the 
reputation built up by Steinway. ... The harm to Steinway in short is the likelihood that potential piano 
purchasers will think that there is some connection between the Grotrian-Steinweg and Steinway pianos. 
Such initial confusion works an injury to Steinway. 
  
466  Rothman "Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law", above n 446. 
467  Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz Th Steinweg Nachf v Steinway & Sons (1975) 523 F 2d 1331 (2d Cir). 
468  Mobil Oil Corp v Pegasus Petroleum Corp, above n 462. 
469  Brookfield, above n 223, 1062-1063. 
470  Rothman "Initial Interest Confusion", above n 446, 108. 
471  Grotrian (1973) 365 F Supp 707 (SD NY). 
472  Grotrian, above n 467. 
473 Grotrian (1973), above n 471 717. 
474  Grotrian, above n 467, 1342. 
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In Mobil Oil,475 the plaintiff, Mobil Oil, had become known by its distinctive "winged horse of 
Pegasus" logo. Mobil alleged that defendant, Pegasus Petroleum, was infringing Mobil's "flying 
horse" trade mark by virtue of its selection of its name, since, after all, a winged horse is known in 
mythological circles as "Pegasus." 476  The District Court, relying on the precedent set by the 
Grotrian-Steinweg decision, found that Pegasus had indeed engaged in initial interest confusion and 
had therefore infringed Mobil's trade mark. 477  The Circuit Court reasoned that in making the 
decision at the District Court:478 
Judge MacMahon found a likelihood of confusion not in the fact that a third party would do business 
with Pegasus Petroleum believing it related to Mobil, but rather in the likelihood that Pegasus Petroleum 
would gain crucial credibility during the initial phases of a deal. For example, an oil trader might listen 
to a cold phone call from Pegasus Petroleum – an admittedly oft used procedure in the oil trading 
business – when otherwise he might not, because of the possibility that Pegasus Petroleum is related to 
Mobil.  
Further, the Court of Appeal expressed its agreement with the reasoning of the district court, 
which had held that "even though defendant's business is transacted in large quantities only with 
sophisticated oil traders, there is still and nevertheless a likelihood of confusion."479 The Circuit 
Court agreed with "the district court's concerns focused upon the probability that potential 
purchasers would be misled into an initial interest in Pegasus Petroleum. Such initial confusion 
works a sufficient trademark injury."480 In affirming the decision of the lower court, the Court of 
Appeal also agreed with the lower court's determination that the defendant had chosen the name 
with the expectation that it would therefore receive a "free ride" on the goodwill associated with the 
plaintiff's trade mark, and thus there was bad faith.481 
In her analysis of both the Grotrian Steinweg and Mobil decisions, and the birth of the doctrine 
of initial interest confusion, Rothman noted that the doctrine was seldom used prior to the mid-to-
late 1990s and always required a likelihood of confusion. 482  Brookfield both resurrected and 
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expanded the doctrine, removing the confusion requirement. In assessing the damage she believes to 
have been done by the Brookfield decision on US trade mark law, Rothman stated:483 
Although there is no source confusion in the sense that consumers know they are patronizing West 
Coast rather than Brookfield, there is nevertheless initial interest confusion in the sense that, by using 
'moviebuff.com' or 'MovieBuff' to divert people looking for 'MovieBuff' to its web site, West Coast 
improperly benefits from the goodwill that Brookfield developed in its mark. The court's conclusion that 
such diversion is improper competition and constitutes trademark infringement is wrong both as a matter 
of statutory construction and as a matter of policy. ... The three cases I have discussed trace the initial 
interest confusion doctrine's evolution from "initial confusion" or confusion that occurs prior to the time 
of sale, to "initial interest" involving "possible" confusion, and then to "initial interest" absent any likely 
confusion. This progression has created the troubling state of the law in which defendants can be held 
liable for trademark infringement absent a showing of a likelihood of confusion. 
2 Initial interest confusion, continued: evolution, focus shifting from metatags to keywords 
In the next major case in the area of invisible use of trade marks, "use" manifested not in 
metatags, but in keywords, and not in computer users being "diverted" to websites, but rather the use 
of trade marks to "key" the appearance of banner ads, pop-up ads, pop-under ads and similar new 
advertising devices.  
In Playboy Enterprises Inc v Netscape Communications Corp and Excite Inc, 484  Netscape 
provided web users its Netscape Navigator web browser, and Excite provided the search engine 
therein. 485  The case was brought in the US District Court. Here, the defendants keyed adult 
entertainment banner ads to over 450 terms, including "playboy" and "playmate".486  The other 
terms were mostly generic terms. Playboy, referred to in the decision as "PEI", objected to its two 
trade marks being included within those 450 terms offered to advertisers, and filed a lawsuit, 
claiming trade mark infringement and trade mark dilution, and sought a preliminary injunction 
against defendants.487 
The trial court ruled in favour of defendants Netscape and Excite, and denied Playboy's request 
for a preliminary injunction, ruling that defendants inclusion of the terms "playboy" and "playmate" 
within the 450 search terms did not constitute trade mark infringement or dilution.488  Playboy 
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attempted to rely on Brookfield and argued that the inclusion of its trade marks within the search 
terms constituted "initial interest infringement."489  The District Court disagreed with Playboy's 
comparison billboard analogy in Brookfield:490 
Here, the analogy is quite unlike that of a devious placement of a road sign bearing false information. 
This case presents a scenario more akin to a driver pulling off the freeway in response to a sign that 
reads "Fast Food Burgers" to find a well-known fast food burger restaurant, next to which stands a 
billboard that reads: "Better Burgers: 1 Block Further." The driver, previously enticed by the prospect of 
a burger from the well-known restaurant, now decides she wants to explore other burger options. 
Assuming that the same entity owns the land on which both the burger restaurant and the competitor's 
billboard stand, should that entity be liable to the burger restaurant for diverting the driver? That is the 
rule PEI contends the Court should adopt. 
The District Court held that the defendants should not be liable, and granted summary judgment 
in favour of defendants.491 Playboy appealed. The District Court was reversed and it was noted 
"that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on both the trademark 
infringement and dilution claims."492 
In its decision, the Court reasoned:493 
PEI's strongest argument for a likelihood of confusion is for a certain kind of confusion: initial interest 
confusion. … Although dispelled before an actual sale occurs, initial interest confusion impermissibly 
capitalizes on the goodwill associated with a mark and is therefore actionable trademark infringement.  
Although the decision couches its findings within the context of Playboy's arguments with 
respect of initial interest confusion, it indirectly agrees with Playboy in a footnote, and viewed the 
defendants' use of Playboy's trade marks constituted initial interest confusion. The footnote states 
"[i]ndeed, we find insufficient evidence to defeat summary judgment on any other theory."494  
Notwithstanding the Court's apparent decision to hinge its holding on the theory of initial 
interest confusion, it proceeded with a more conventional analysis as to the issue of likelihood of 
confusion, looking at strength of the mark, proximity of the goods, similarity of the marks, evidence 
of actual confusion, marketing channels used, type of goods and the degree of care likely to be 
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exercised by the purchaser, defendant's intent in selecting the mark, and likelihood of expansion of 
the product lines.495 
In concurring with the decision, Judge Berzon issued an opinion that called into question the 
theory of initial interest confusion, and expressing his view that it was "an insupportable rule".496 
Judge Berzon disagreed with the implication from Brookfield that one could find initial interest 
confusion when a consumer was never confused as to source affiliation, for example when a banner 
ad is clearly labelled.497 Berzon continued that there is a different between "hijacking" a customer 
by misleading them as to affiliation and merely "distracting a potential customer with another 
choice, when it is clear that it is a choice." 498 Berzon found that "such choices do no constitute 
trademark infringement off the internet", so they should not on it. 499 
After comparing real-world situations, such as a retailer's common practice of placing a generic 
painkiller next to a trade marked one, or Penthouse magazine next to Playboy, Berzon continued: 
"Accordingly, I simply cannot understand the broad principle set forth in Brookfield. Even the main 
analogy given in Brookfield belies its conclusion", at which point she critiqued the flawed billboard 
analogy.500 Berzon concluded that "[s]hould the question arise again, in this case or some other, this 
court needs to consider whether we want to continue to apply an insupportable rule." 
As a final comment on the 9th Circuit's holding in Playboy v Netscape, I will repeat one segment 
of the decision:501  "PEI clearly holds the marks in question and defendants used the marks in 
commerce without PEI's permission. PEI's strongest argument for a likelihood of confusion is for a 
certain kind of confusion: initial interest confusion." I note that within this slender excerpt from the 
decision, the opinion managed to touch upon all three of the major themes I raised above, namely, 
(1) whether an invisible use, such as a trade mark keyword, constitutes a "use in commerce", (2) 
whether or not such a thing could constitute initial interest confusion, or whether that doctrine has 
any viability in the first place; and (3) the extent to which trade marks are rights in gross, to be used 
exclusively and "without permission".502 
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Although the Court of Appeal's decision in Playboy v Netscape, as well as the concept of initial 
interest confusion, have come under attack, both appear to be good law and cast a long shadow on 
trade mark infringement cases, in general, and invisible use cases, in particular Playboy v Netscape 
criticsm, cases following cases rejected.  
E Concept Two: The Debate Over "Use in Commerce" and "Trademark Use" 
As noted above, in the 9th Circuit's decision in Playboy v Netscape, the court rather summarily 
concluded that the defendants had "used the marks in commerce".503 Indeed, in the metatag cases, 
discussed above (Welles, Oppedahl, and Calvin Designer Label), the defendant's "use" of the 
plaintiff's trade marks within each respective website's metatags, was not scrutinised as to whether it 
was considered a "use in commerce" or a "trade mark use". Perhaps because it was in the early days 
of Internet trade mark jurisprudence, the issue appears to have been taken for granted, and 
defendants had not yet awakened to that argument as being part of their arsenal.  
F The US Trademark Statute - The Lanham Act 
The US trade mark statute is known as the Lanham Act. The Lanham Act generally prohibits the 
unauthorised use of a registered trade mark by a third party.504  Additionally, a section of the 
Lanham Act designed to protect unregistered trade marks, and prohibits false designation of origin 
and dilution of a mark.505 
1 Selected US keyword cases examining use 
What follows is a non-exhaustive summary of US cases dealing with metatags and/or keywords 
which focused on whether or not the "use" of the plaintiff's trade mark by the defendant was in fact 
a "trade mark use" or "use in commerce" for purposes of the Lanham Act. The purpose of this 
overview is not to chronicle each and every US case, but to examine some of the factors courts have 
used in ruling for or against a finding of "use", the ways in which courts (or the parties) 
distinguished prior precedents, and other factors. 
(a) Conduct of defendant(s) held to be a use in commerce and/or a trade mark use 
(i) GEICO v Google 
Government Employees Insurance Company ('GEICO') brought an eight-count complaint 
against defendants Google and Overture based on the defendants' use of GEICO trade marks in 
selling advertising on defendants' Internet search engines.506 The plaintiff's claims were upheld, as 
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the Court found that they proved sufficient facts to show trade mark use. The complaint was over 
more than the invisible use of the marks in the internal computer coding, as the defendants had 
argued, but also the use of the marks to sell advertising and sponsored links, ie an unlawful use of 
the marks by allowing advertisers to bid on them and pay to be linked to them.507  
(ii) American Blind and Wallpaper v Google  
This case spanned over three years, resulted in several rulings, two of which are germane to this 
paper, 508  and ultimately settled. "In summary, the action pertains to the sale by Google ... of 
trademarked terms belonging to ABWF as keywords that trigger 'Sponsored Links' on Google's 
search results pages. ABWF alleges that Google sells these terms to ABWF's competitors."509 The 
defendants argued that American Blind's claims that were premised on trade mark 'use' had to be 
dismissed, because American Blind did not – and would not – allege that the defendants use was to 
identify the source of their own search engines or advertising products.510 
After a thorough discussion of conflicting decisions from other circuits,511 the US District Court 
stated that it had was guided by Playboy v Netscape,512 before commenting that "[n]othing in the 
majority's discussion of the relevant facts suggests that it questioned whether the plaintiff had shown 
that there was a use of its trademark in commerce."513 The Court then considered Brookfield, and 
observed that:514  
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[a]s it did later in Playboy, the Ninth Circuit focused its analysis on initial interest confusion and did not 
question whether the metatags were used in commerce in the sense at issue here. Brookfield, like 
Playboy, suggests that the Ninth Circuit would assume use in commerce here. This Court thus 
concludes, as did the courts in GEICO, 800-JR Cigar, Humble Abode, Edina Realty, and Wentworth, 
that the sale of trademarked terms in the AdWords program is a use in commerce for the purposes of the 
Lanham Act. … the lengthy discussions of likelihood of confusion in Brookfield and Playboy would 
have been unnecessary in the absence of actionable trademark use. Accordingly, while Google's 
analogies to trademark infringements outside the digital realm are attractive, the Court will deny 
Google's motion for summary judgment to the extent that it is brought on the basis of an asserted 
absence of trademark use. 
(iii) Edina Realty Inc v TheMLSOnline.com 
The plaintiff, Edina Realty, a real estate brokerage firm, owns a US trade mark on mark "Edina 
Realty". The defendant was also a real estate brokerage firm, and a competitor of the plaintiff.515 
The plaintiff argued that the defendant was riding the coattails of the plaintiff's advertising and 
marketing efforts. Specifically, the defendant used the mark by purchasing it as a keyword Internet 
search term from Google and Yahoo, using it in the text of the advertisements that appear on Google 
and Yahoo, and using it in hidden links and hidden text on its website.516  
The defendant argued that the purchase of the term was not a use in commerce, as there was no 
public promotion of the mark during the search transaction.517 The plaintiff argued that there was a 
visual element, as the user types in the mark as a search term, which is on a tool bar above the 
results. It was held that "[w]hile not a conventional 'use in commerce,' defendant nevertheless uses 
the Edina Realty mark commercially" when they purchased the search term.  
(iv) 800-JR Cigar v GoTo.com  
GoTo.com was a "pay-for-priority search engine", meaning that it did not differentiate sponsor 
results from organic results. All results were ranked according to the amount paid by the advertiser 
purchasing the linked ad. Plaintiff JR Cigar owned a trade mark on that term, and objected to the use 
of that trade mark as a keyword, prompting search results that offered advertisements from 
competitors of JR Cigar. The plaintiff filed suit against GoTo.com, and those competitors 
purchasing ads, alleging that the sale of "JR Cigar" as a keyword constituted trademark 
infringement, unfair competition, and false designation of origin in, involving the unauthorised use 
of JR marks in interstate commerce in a manner that is likely to create confusion. JR Cigar further 
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argued that GoTo had diluted JR Cigar's famous mark, entitling JR Cigar to permanent injunctive 
relief under the anti-dilution statute.518 
The Court ruled in favour of JR, holding that:519   
GoTo makes trademark use of the JR marks in three ways. First, by accepting bids from those 
competitors of JR desiring to pay for prominence in search results, GoTo trades on the value of the 
marks. Second, by ranking its paid advertisers before any "natural" listings in a search results list, GoTo 
has injected itself into the marketplace, acting as a conduit to steer potential customers away from JR to 
JR's competitors. Finally, through the Search Term Suggestion Tool, GoTo identifies those of JR's 
marks which are effective search terms and markets them to JR's competitors. 
(v) Buying for The Home LLC v Humble Abode 
The plaintiff asserted that (1) by causing a sponsored ad to appear next to the results on the 
Google search engine when a computer user enters the search phrase "total bedroom", the defendant 
Humble misappropriated the plaintiff's mark, TOTAL BEDROOM, in connection with the sale of 
goods and in that such use was likely to communicate a false designation of origin of those 
goods.520 The Court followed Edina Reality, and held that there was use in commerce, as:521 
First, the alleged purchase of the keyword was a commercial transaction that occurred 'in commerce,' 
trading on the value of Plaintiff's mark. Second, Defendants' alleged use was both 'in commerce' and 'in 
connection with any goods or services' in that Plaintiff's mark was allegedly used to trigger commercial 
advertising which included a link to Defendants' furniture retailing website. Therefore, not only was the 
alleged use of Plaintiff's mark tied to the promotion of Defendants' goods and retail services, but the 
mark was used to provide a computer user with direct access (ie, a link) to Defendants' website through 
which the user could make furniture purchases.  
(vi) JG Wentworth, SSC Limited Partnership v Settlement Funding LLC d/b/a/ Peachtree 
Settlement Funding 
The plaintiff's claims arose from the defendant's alleged use of plaintiff's trade marks in two 
ways: (1) through Google's AdWords program; and (2) in the 'meta tags' for defendant's website. 
The plaintiff alleged that these uses of plaintiff's name ensured that a link to defendant's website 
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would appear when individuals conducted internet searches for 'J.G. Wentworth' or 'JG 
Wentworth.'522 
Trade mark use was found.523 
[L]ike the Court in Buying for the Home, [the] defendant's use of plaintiff's marks to trigger internet 
advertisements for itself is the type of use consistent with the language in the Lanham Act which makes 
it a violation to use 'in commerce' protected marks 'in connection with the sale, offering for sale, 
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services,' or 'in connection with any goods or services'. 
(vii) Australian Gold et al v Hatfield et al 
Australian Gold (AG) makes tanning products, which it sells to public via authorised dealers. 
The defendants, who were not authorised dealers, acquired AG products and resold them, at deep 
discount, a practise to which AG objects. Additionally, the defendants used AG trade marks as 
metatags on its website to attract customers and as keywords in search engine advertising.  
This case looked at initial interest confusion. It evaluated the plaintiffs' claim for initial interest 
confusion according to the six-prong test se out in Sally Beauty Co v Beautyco Inc:524 (1) the degree 
of similarity between the marks; (2) the intent of the alleged infringer in adopting the mark; (3) 
evidence of actual confusion; (4) similarity of products and manner of marketing; (5) the degree of 
care likely to be exercised by purchasers; and (6) the strength or weakness of the marks. No one 
factor is dispositive, and likelihood of confusion is a question of fact. The Court held that the 
evidence at trial pointed towards a likelihood of confusion, in this the lower court did no err.525 
It is interesting to note that the Court summarily concluded that use of the trade mark was 
established.  
(b) Conduct of defendant(s) that is not a use in commerce and/or a trade mark use 
(i) Merck & Co v Mediplan Health Consulting Inc 
The plaintiff alleged trade mark infringement based on the defendant's use of the trade mark 
ZOCOR as a keyword for sponsored links on Google and Yahoo.526 
  
522  JG Wentworth SSC Limited Partnership v Settlement Funding LLC d/b/a/ Peachtree Settlement Funding, 
above n 511, 4. 
523  Ibid, 16-17. 
524  Sally Beauty Co v Beautyco Inc (2002) 304 F 3d 964 (10th Cir). 
525  Australian Gold et al v Hatfield et al (2006) 436 F 3d 1228, 1238-1239 (10th Cir).  
526  Merck & Co v Mediplan Health Consulting Inc, above n 511, 426. 
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The Court decided not to follow Edina Reality.527 "Trademark use 'ordinarily' involves placing 
a trademark on goods or services to indicate that the goods or services emanate from or are 
authorized by the owner of the mark." Mere commercial use is insufficient. It was held that the 
search engine did not place the mark on goods, etc, nor did they use the marks to indicate 
sponsorship. The internal use of the word was not use of the mark in the trademarks sense (though it 
may have been commercial use), but was more analogous to market strategy.528 "Moreover, here 
defendants actually sell Zocor, albeit Zocor manufactured by Merck's Canadian affiliates. Hence, 
there was nothing improper – in a trademark sense – with their purchase of sponsored links tied to 
searches of the keyword 'Zocor'."529 
(ii) S&L Vitamins, Inc v Australian Gold, Inc  
The defendant, S&L Vitamins (S&L), was not an authorised dealer of the plaintiff's products. It 
acquired AG products from other dealers and resold them, at deep discount. Additionally, S&L used 
AG trade marks as metatags on its website to attract customers, and as keywords in search engine 
advertising. AG filed suit for trade mark infringement, inter alia. 
In its decision, the Court stated that:530 
This Court takes note of AG's argument [as to use], but finds it is premature. While the Second Circuit 
has not ruled on trademark use in metatags and the search engine context, it has expressly rejected the 
initial interest confusion theory prior to a determination of trademark 'use.' … ''use' must be decided as a 
threshold matter, because while any number of activities may be 'in commerce' or create a likelihood of 
confusion, no such activity is actionable under the Lanham Act absent the 'use' of a trademark.' 
Finding the case analogous to Merck v Mediplan Health Consulting, it was held that:531 
by purchasing keywords and sponsored links and using the Marks in its metadata, S&L has not 'used' the 
Marks in the trademark sense and, therefore, does not provide an independent basis for a trademark 
infringement claim. 
(iii) U-Haul Int'l, Inc v WhenU.com, Inc 
WhenU.com distributed a software called "SaveNow", which when installed, would monitor 
user activity and would trigger pop-up ads to appear when certain terms were searched for or 
  
527  Ibid, 426. 
528  Ibid, 427-428. 
529  Ibid, 427. 
530  Referencing 1-800 Contacts, above n 525, 412, which dismissed an argument of initial interest confusion 
because the plaintiff had not yet established 'use' in the trademark sense. 
531  Ibid. 
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entered into the browser address line. For example, if a user entered into a browser the URL of the 
U-Haul web site, a pop-up ad would be triggered, that pop-up being keyed to the U-Haul trade mark, 
(which was found on the "SaveNow" directory). The pop-up was typically an ad for a competitor of 
Plaintiff.532 
The plaintiffs were unable to show that the pop-up advertisements were used as trademarks.533 
Use in commerce was also rejected:534 
(1) "When a WhenU ad appears on a user's computer screen, it opens in a WhenU-branded 
window that is separate and distinct from the window in which the U-Haul website appears"; (2) 
"'use' is not established merely because trademarks are simultaneously visible to a consumer. Such 
comparative advertising does not violate trademark law, even when the advertising makes use of a 
competitor's trademark"; (3) "WhenU's inclusion of the U-Haul uniform resource locator ('URL') 
and 'U-Haul' in its directory incorporated into the SaveNow program does not constitute 'use'", as 
they don't sell the URL to their customers they don't display the URL or the words 'U-Haul' to the 
computer user when the ad pops-up, there was no evidence that WhenU used U-Haul's trademarks 
to identify the source of its goods or services, and When U did no place the marks in commerce. 
"WhenU merely uses the marks for the 'pure machine-linking function' and in no way advertises or 
promotes U-Haul's web address or any other U-Haul trademark."; (4) WhenU's scheme does not 
interfere with the use of U-Haul's web site by its customers and dealers and the SaveNow program is 
a user-installed program where the user has made a conscious decision to install the program. 
(iv) Wells Fargo & Co v WhenU.com Inc 
This had similar facts as the previously discussed case.535 In this case, no trade mark use was 
found, because WhenU only used the plaintiffs' marks in its directory in order to determine what 
advertisements to direct to consumers.536 It was even stated that the "juxtaposition of WhenU's 
advertisements with plaintiffs' websites in separate windows on a participating consumer's computer 
screen is a form of comparative advertising". 537  Use in commerce was rejected, as the 
advertisements did not display the plaintiff's mark, but WhenU's marks. Thus, the URLs were only 
  
532  U-Haul Int'l Inc v WhenU.com Inc (2003) 279 F Supp 2d 723, 724-725 (ED Va). 
533  Ibid, 726. 
534  Ibid, 727-729. 
535  Wells Fargo & Co v WhenU.com Inc (2003) 293 F Supp 2d 734, 738-739 (ED Mich). 
536  Ibid, 759. 
537  Ibid, 761. 
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used to identify the website itself,538 which does not constitute use as is does not "indicate anything 
about the source of the products and services it advertises."539 
(v) 1-800 Contacts Inc v WhenU.com Inc 
This was another WhenU case,540 which also found no trade mark use.541 The court held that 
WhenU did not  trade mark in the manner ordinarily at issue in an infringement claim because it did 
not use the plaintiff's trade marks on any goods or services in order to pass them off as the 
plaintiff's. The District Court had found that the differences between the web address and the trade 
mark were insignificant, however the Court of Appeal disagreed, and held the defendant had 
transformed the trade mark into "a word combination that functions more or less like a public key to 
1-800's website."542 
The Court also stated that it was obvious, as the address was inaccessible to the Computer-user 
and general public, that WhenU only used the address because it was an address, not because it bore 
any resemblance to the trade mark. The Court also found important that the WhenU pop up could 
not be triggered by the input of the trade mark. WhenU does not allow customers to request or 
purchase specific keywords to add to the directory, distinguishing it from "keyword" advertising.   
(vi) Rescuecom Corporation v Google Inc 
Rescuecom, is a computer services franchising business, and owns the trade mark Rescuecom. 
Google operates, a keyword advertising programme. "Rescuecom" was one such AdWord, so when 
"Rescuecom" was entered as Google search term, websites owned by the plaintiff's competitors 
came up within Sponsored Results.543 It was held that:544 
Even if plaintiff proved, as it alleges, that defendant is capitalizing on the good will of plaintiff's 
trademark by marketing it to plaintiff's competitors as a keyword in order to generate defendant's own 
advertising revenues, that plaintiff's competitors believed defendant is authorized to sell its trademark, or 
that Internet users viewing the competitors' sponsored links are confused as to whether the sponsored 
links belong to or emanate from plaintiff, none of these facts, alone or together, establish trademark use. 
… 
  
538  Ibid, 762. 
539  Ibid, 762. 
540  1-800 Contacts Inc v WhenU.com Inc, above n 510, 402-403. 
541  Ibid, 403. 
542  Ibid. 
543  Rescuecom Corp v Google Inc, above n 510, 396-397. 
544  Ibid, 400-401 and 403. 
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Defendant's internal use of plaintiff's trademark to trigger sponsored links is not a use of a trademark 
within the meaning of the Lanham Act, either, because there is no allegation that defendant places 
plaintiff's trademark on any goods, containers, displays, or advertisements, or that its internal use is 
visible to the public. 
G Closing Discussion on US Cases 
Much can be and has been written on the diverging views espoused by these and other US cases 
on the subject of invisible use of trade marks, primarily metatags and keyword advertising. I 
suggest, that US courts are split on two main issues. One issue is the role, if any, to be played by 
initial interest confusion. Is it a prong within the Sleekcraft test, or within the MultiFactor 
Likelihood of Confusion Test, as has been discussed, above? Or have well-intentioned though  
misguided precedents such as Brookfield given initial interest confusion too much weight? I note 
that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have embraced it more than the others, however the Second 
Circuit has outright rejected it. 
The second issue is the whole concept of trade mark use being a gatekeeper issue, and whether 
or not that issue should serve as a litmus test for deciding whether or not an infringement case 
should move forward, or be dismissed.  Again, courts and scholars alike are split. As this paper is 
primarily concerned with New Zealand jurisprudence, and the jurisprudence of other legal systems 
within the Anglo-American tradition, I do not attempt to work out these conflicts, but offer them for 
what they are worth as the subject of possible consideration should a keyword advertising case be 
brought here. 
X CONCLUSION 
In his concurring opinion in Neumegen, discussed above, Thomas J cautioned against the 
careless and overextended use of the Fair Trading Act in protecting consumers when he wrote that 
"[p]rotecting consumers who are unlikely to want or ask for that protection is to risk exposing the 
Court to the charge of judicial paternalism." 
In closing, we are asked a number of questions. Just how far should New Zealand courts go to 
protect consumers, and how many consumers merit protection of the Fair Trading Act? Similar, how 
much protection and exclusivity should be afforded to trade marks; should their owners enjoy a 
monopoly over their use as keywords? Should the FTA be interpreted to protect all consumers? 
Does it extend to "a significant proportion", as was case in the Bonz Group case?545 Should it 
protect "the astute and the gullible, the intelligent and the not so intelligent, the well educated as 
well as the poorly educated, men and women of various ages pursuing a variety of vocations"?546 
  
545  Bonz Group (Pty) Ltd v Cooke, above n 323, 230 (HC). 
546  Taco Company of Australia Inc v Taco Bell Pty Ltd, above n 334, 202. 
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Not because I am writing this paper in New Zealand, I am reminded of the Parable of the Lost 
Sheep, from the New Testament:547 
What do you think? If a man has a hundred sheep, and one of them goes astray, does he not leave the 
ninety-nine and go to the mountains to seek the one that is straying? And if he should find it, assuredly, I 
say to you, he rejoices more over that sheep than over the ninety-nine that did not go astray. Even so it is 
not the will of your Father who is in heaven that one of these little ones should perish. 
 
 
 
547  The Gospel According to Matthew 18:12-14, The New Testament, New King James Version. 
